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Abstract 
 
The notion that there is a relationship between frontal lobe damage and 
aggressive behaviour has been recognised in the clinical literature for over 50 years. 
However, although there is evidence for an association between general brain 
dysfunction and aggression, there is little evidence pertaining to subclinical 
impairment and the propensity for aggressive behaviour. Further to this, given the 
functionally heterogeneity of the prefrontal cortex, it is vital to delineate the specific 
roles of the dorsolateral, orbitofrontal and medial aspects of the prefrontal cortex in 
the expression of aggression.  
Two forms of aggression are distinguished: reactive, impulsive-aggression 
and goal-directed premeditated aggression. While impulsive-aggression is typically 
described as an emotionally-charged aggressive response characterised by a lack of 
control, premeditated aggression is considered to be a planned and controlled 
aggressive display that is instrumental in nature. The qualitative differences between 
these subtypes of aggression suggest distinct neuropsychological differences 
mediating the likelihood of their display.  
The aim of this thesis was to clarify the role of the prefrontal cortex in 
subclinical impulsive-aggression and premeditated aggression. More specifically, 
possible executive functioning deficits mediated by the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, 
and emotion recognition, impulsivity, and response reversal capabilities mediated by 
the orbitofrontal cortex were explored. Participants included university 
undergraduate students identified as having high levels of trait aggression, classified 
as either predominantly impulsive, or predominantly premeditated in nature. 
Experiment 1 (n=85) explored possible executive deficits using a battery of 
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neuropsychological measures pertaining to dorsolateral functioning. It was found that 
impulsive-aggressive individuals performed significantly poorer on measures of 
cognitive flexibility, planning, problem-solving, and flexibility of verbal thought 
processes. 
Experiment 2 (n=87) sought to identify possible deficits in interpretations of 
facial expressions of emotion and hostile attribution biases. Contrary to expectations, 
the results indicated that while impulsive- and premeditated-aggressive individuals 
do not incorrectly interpret emotional expressions, premeditated-aggressive 
individuals attributed greater levels of aggression to neutral faces.  
Experiment 3 (n=87) investigated functions of the orbitofrontal cortex, 
namely impulsivity, response reversal, and decision-making capabilities. No 
differences between impulsive-aggressive and premeditated-aggressive individuals 
were found on any of these measures suggesting negligible involvement of the 
orbitofrontal cortex in subclinical aggression. 
Overall, the results from this thesis suggest distinct neuropsychological 
processes in individuals who display predominantly impulsive-aggressive behaviour 
compared to those who display predominantly premeditated-aggression. While 
impulsive-aggression may result from executive dysfunction pertaining to the 
dorsolateral region of the prefrontal cortex, the display of premeditated aggression is 
related to functioning of the orbitofrontal cortex mediating the interpretation of 
aggression in others. Such findings have important implications not only in the 
understanding of the causal features of such behaviour, but also in the development 
and implementation of successful treatment strategies. 
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 1 
 Chapter 1 
Overview of the Thesis 
While the underpinnings of human aggression are clearly multifactorial, including 
political, socioeconomic, cultural, and psychological factors, it is also clear that some 
forms of aggression, either impulsive or premeditated in nature, have an underlying 
neurobiology that is only just beginning to be understood. In this research the 
neurobiology of aggression is addressed, specifically the role of the prefrontal cortex 
in the expression of both impulsive- and premeditated-aggression. 
 A significant body of evidence indicates that the likelihood of acting 
aggressively is related to the functional capacity of the frontal lobe. Using 
neuroimaging techniques, studies of violent offenders have consistently shown 
abnormalities in frontal lobe structures in individuals who have histories of violence 
(e.g., Raine, Lencz, Bihrle, LaCasse & Colletti, 2000; Raine et al., 1998). 
Additionally, lesion studies (e.g., Damasio, Grabowski, Frank, Galaburda & Damasio, 
1994) and neuropsychological studies (e.g., Stanford, Greve & Gerstle, 1997) have 
provided evidence of the relationship between prefrontal impairment and the 
propensity for aggressive behaviour. Unfortunately, however, the above studies have 
placed little emphasis on the separable regions of the prefrontal cortex. This is despite 
the fact that neuropsychological data strongly suggesting that only medial and 
orbitofrontal regions of the prefrontal cortex are involved in mediating aggression, 
while dorsolateral prefrontal cortex has little role (Grafman et al., 1996). The 
prefrontal cortex is functionally and anatomically heterogeneous and thus the 
separable regions may be differentially involved in the expression of aggression. The 
present thesis thus attempts to delineate the specific roles of these subregions in 
impulsive- and premeditated-aggression. 
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Many researchers have suggested that the relationship between prefrontal 
abnormalities and likelihood of aggression is mediated by the failure to adaptively use 
executive functions (Giancola, 2000). As outlined in Chapter 5, executive functions is 
a broad term used to describe those abilities which allow an individual to respond to 
situations in a flexible manner, creating and adapting plans, and not being governed 
exclusively by external stimuli (Hoaken, Allaby, & Earle, 2007). Such abilities are 
presumed to be mediated predominantly by the dorsolateral region of the prefrontal 
cortex. 
A further ability linked to the prefrontal cortex is the ability to correctly 
interpret emotional facial expressions. More specifically, patients with orbitofrontal 
cortex lesions are impaired in their ability to recognise facial expressions, particularly 
anger (Blair & Cipolotti, 2000; Hornak, Rolls & Wade, 1996). Neuroimaging studies 
support these findings, demonstrating activation in the orbitofrontal cortex by 
negative emotional expressions; in particular, anger, but also fear and disgust (Blair, 
Morris, Frith, Perrett & Dolan, 1999; Kesler-West et al., 2001). As described in 
Chapter 6, aberrations in the ability to identify facial expressions may result in the 
generation of inappropriate social responses, such as reacting aggressively to 
ambiguous social situations (Dodge, Laird, Lochman & Zelli, 2002). This hypothesis 
is based on Dodge (1986) who proposed that the accurate interpretation of social 
stimuli must be completed for prosocial behaviour to be manifested.  
Individuals with lesions to the prefrontal cortex have also been shown to have 
deficits in inhibition, decision-making, and response reversal (Bechara, Damasio, 
Damasio & Anderson, 1994; Rolls, Hornak, Wade & McGrath, 1994). Such patients 
also display impairment in social functioning. The suggestion then follows that 
reappraisal will play an important role in social contexts in which one is required to 
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adapt to rapidly changing contexts (Happaney, Zelazo & Stuss, 2004). Furthermore, 
an inability to suppress previously rewarded responses due to inhibitory deficits, will 
in turn lead to inappropriate social responses. 
In research on aggression, it is vital to distinguish between impulsive- and 
premeditated-aggression. Impulsive-aggression is more reactive in nature and 
displayed without a self-generated goal. Premeditated-aggression, in contrast, appears 
to occur without provocation, is proactive, and is seen as a means to gain a valued 
outcome. This heterogeneity between impulsive- and premeditated-aggression 
suggests distinct cognitive mechanisms responsible for their display.  
Both the animal and human neuropsychological literature suggests that the 
prefrontal cortex is involved in the modulation of impulsive-aggression (Anderson, 
Bechara, Damasio, Tranel & Damasio, 1999; Gregg & Siegel, 2001). Certainly, 
damage to the medial frontal and orbitofrontal cortex is associated with increased risk 
for the display of impulsive-aggression in humans whether the lesion occurs in 
childhood (Anderson et al., 1999) or adulthood (Grafman et al., 1996). More 
specifically, individuals with orbitofrontal cortex lesions are typically described as 
disinhibited, socially inappropriate, impulsive, irresponsible, and as often 
misinterpreting others‟ moods (Rolls et al., 1994). In addition, there are considerable 
neuroimaging data assessing the neural functioning of patients with impulsive-
aggression. These data have revealed reduced prefrontal functioning in patients 
presenting with impulsive-aggression (Søderstrom, Tullberg, Wikkelso, Ekholm & 
Forsman, 2000). Interestingly, this reduced prefrontal functioning is not observed in 
those with predominantly premeditated-aggression (Raine et al., 1998).  
Accounts of premeditated-aggression often lie in the related construct of 
psychopathy. Psychopathic individuals, individuals who present with marked 
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premeditated-aggression, do not present with deficits on neuropsychological measures 
which pertain predominantly to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Mitchell, Colledge, 
Leonard & Blair, 2002). Psychopathic individuals‟ high level of premeditated-
aggression is thus completely unlike that of patients with orbitofrontal cortex lesions 
(Cornell et al., 1996). It is likely then that such individuals show elevated levels of 
premeditated-aggression because they have been reinforced, and not punished, for 
committing such behaviour in the past (Blair, 2004). Such aversive conditioning has 
been shown to be mediated by the amygdala. In support of this, an MRI study by 
Tiihonen et al. (2000) found a strong negative correlation between level of 
psychopathy and amygdala volume.  
However, while there is clear evidence of amygdala involvement in 
premeditated-aggression through its role in aversive conditioning and instrumental 
learning, the orbitofrontal cortex may also be involved through its role in response 
reversal and extinction. That is, changing a response to a stimulus when the 
reinforcement contingencies change (Dias, Robbins & Roberts, 1996a). Moreover, the 
orbitofrontal cortex has been linked to decision-making when knowledge about 
potential positive and negative results is necessary to guide behavioural responding 
(Rogers et al., 1999b). On tasks such as the Intradimensional/Extradimensional 
(ID/ED) Set Shift Task which involves response reversal, adult psychopathic 
individuals show impairment (Mitchell et al., 2002). This suggests possible 
orbitofrontal dysfunction in individuals presenting with marked premeditated 
aggression. 
Investigating prefrontal impairment in antisocial behaviour more broadly is 
problematic due to its heterogeneity and comorbidity with several disorders, including 
drug and alcohol abuse, Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD), pathological 
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gambling, schizophrenia, and bipolar disorders, all of which may or may not involve 
an aggressive component. Frontal lobe functions have been implicated in all of these 
comorbid conditions, however frontal lobe deficits have also been found in disorders 
not readily associated with antisocial behaviour, such as obsessive-compulsive 
disorder. The question thus lies in whether there is a single common component of 
these disorders given that studies on such populations have been inconsistent with 
regard to demonstrated neuropsychological deficits. 
Through an investigation of prefrontal functioning in impulsive- and 
premeditated-aggressive individuals, the current study aimed to answer the following 
research questions: 
1. Do impulsive-aggressive and premeditated-aggressive individuals perform 
differently on measures of executive functioning known to relate to dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex functioning? 
2. Do impulsive-aggressive and premeditated-aggressive individuals differ in their 
recognition of emotions in faces? 
3. Do impulsive-aggressive and premeditated-aggressive individuals demonstrate a 
hostile attributional bias in their interpretation of neutral facial expressions or 
overestimate the level of aggression in aggressive faces? 
4. Do impulsive-aggressive and premeditated-aggressive individuals present with 
deficits on measures of orbitofrontal cortex functioning, namely inhibition, 
decision-making, and response reversal?  
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Chapter 2 
Impulsive- and Premeditated-Aggression – A Review of the Literature 
 
2.1  Aggression 
Aggression can be defined as “any behaviour directed toward another 
individual that is carried out with the proximate (immediate) intent to cause harm” 
(Bushman & Anderson, 2001, p. 274). The aforementioned definition of aggression 
encompasses a variety of behaviours, which can range from verbal to relational to 
physical (Crick & Grotpeter, 1995). For example, a widely used definition of 
aggression is behaviour deliberately aimed at harming people and/or objects (Dodge, 
1991). In this definition, harm has implicitly been defined as hurting someone 
physically. However, other forms of harm, such as psychological harm (e.g., 
humiliating), and relational harm (e.g., malevolent gossip), are just as important when 
discussing the notion of aggression.  
The aforementioned definition of aggression does not assume that all harmful 
behaviours are aggressive, rather, there are many instances in which harmful 
behaviours are prosocial. For example, the possible pain caused by a dentist to their 
patient is not aggressive because the proximate intent of the dentist is to help rather 
than hurt the individual. Similarly, both physical aggression in the context of self-
defence and the selective use of verbal aggression by politicians, for example, are 
adaptive. Aggression, on the contrary, is problematic when it is a habitual behavioural 
pattern (Bushman & Anderson, 2001). 
The notion of aggression has been used to refer to a wide variety of concepts 
and phenomena which has led to much confusion within the aggression literature due, 
in part, to interchangeable use with other terms (Caprara et al., 1985). The related 
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theoretical constructs of anger and hostility continue to be used in lieu of aggression 
and it is therefore necessary to elucidate the conceptual distinctions between these 
constructs by reviewing their operational definitions. As noted above, aggression 
refers to a behavioural process that includes the goal of inflicting harm to another 
individual or object. In contrast, anger is conceptualised as an emotional state that can 
vary in intensity, from mild annoyances to rage (Spielberger, Jacobs, Russell & 
Crane, 1983). Moreover, the experience of anger lacks a specific goal (Berkowitz, 
1993) and is not necessary for aggression to occur. Unlike aggression or anger, 
hostility is an attitudinal or cognitive construct comprised of enduring cognitions that 
involve negative interpretations of the environment. As such, once hostile attitudes 
are verbally or physically expressed, they may be more appropriately labelled as 
aggression. Aggressive behaviour also needs to be distinguished from antisocial 
behaviour. Antisocial behaviour is defined as behaviour by which people are 
disadvantaged and basic forms and norms are violated (Merk, de Castro, Koops, & 
Matthys, 2005). Examples of such behaviour are lying, stealing and truancy. 
Aggressive behaviour, then, is a specific form of antisocial behaviour (Kempes, 
Matthys, de Vries & van Engeland, 2005).  
Caprara and colleagues (Caprara et al., 1985) suggest that the use of such 
concepts should be restricted to the use of two primary concepts: aggressiveness and 
aggression. According to their view, aggressiveness refers to a personality 
characteristic, while aggression refers to the aggressive behaviours manifested.   
 
2.2  Distinguishing between impulsive- and premeditated-aggression 
 Traditionally, the study of violence and aggression has recognised the 
importance of distinguishing between different types of such behaviour. Aggression 
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can be classified in a number of ways, for example, by the target of aggression (e.g., 
self-directed or directed towards another individual or object), mode of aggression 
(e.g., physical or verbal, direct or indirect), or cause of aggression (e.g., medical) 
(Siever, 2008). Although many individuals display more than one subtype of 
aggression (Barker, Tremblay, Nagin, Vitaro, & Lacourse, 2006), and correlations 
often exist among subtypes of aggression (Kempes et al., 2005), two distinct subtypes 
of aggressive behaviour consistently emerge; an affective or impulsive type, and a 
predatory or premeditated type. Characteristically, these two subtypes of aggression 
are distinguished by several features, but primarily by the amount of behavioural 
control exhibited during the incident. 
Impulsive-aggression is described as a reactive or emotionally charged 
aggressive response characterised by a loss of behavioural control (Barratt, 1991; 
Raine et al., 1998). These aggressive acts are unplanned and spontaneous in nature 
and are either unprovoked or out of proportion to the provocation. Impulsive-
aggression is usually accompanied by an agitated or irritated mood, poor modulation 
of physiological arousal and loss of behavioural control (Houston, Stanford, 
Villemarette-Pittman, Conklin & Helfritz, 2003). Interpersonal communication is 
often non-adaptive during the agitated state and information processing appears to be 
inefficient (Elliot, 1992). This subtype of aggression can result in sudden, heightened, 
or inappropriate aggressive responses, and probably accounts for most societal 
problems that are associated with aggression. Coccaro (1998) emphasises that while 
the impulsive-aggressive individual does not necessarily have the intention to cause 
harm either to themselves or to others, their behaviour nevertheless has the potential 
to do so. Perpetrators of impulsive-aggression often report regret after the act, 
however often lack the self control to refrain from committing such acts again 
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(Barratt, 1994). Barratt proposes that the personality traits of impulsiveness and 
anger/hostility are related to most impulsive-aggressive acts.  
The theoretical roots of impulsive-aggression lie in the frustration-aggression 
model (Berkowitz, 1993). According to this theory, aggression is displayed as a 
consequence of frustration, actual or perceived threat, and heightened arousal in the 
form of anger. Aggression is displayed in reaction to aversive events with the 
subjective experiences of the individual central to the situation. The subjective 
experience of, for example, feeling threatened and not necessarily being threatened is 
a principal concept in this theory. Frustration may not immediately lead to aggression, 
but generate such emotions as anger, which can then augment the readiness to display 
aggression (Merk et al., 2005). 
Premeditated-aggression, on the other hand, is considered a purposeful, 
controlled aggressive display that is usually instrumental in nature. These acts require 
forethought and planning and are generally executed with low autonomic arousal 
(Stanford, Houston, Villemarette-Pittman, & Greve, 2003b). Premeditated-aggressive 
acts are carried out with a high degree of behavioural control and are directed toward 
a goal, such as external reinforcers (e.g., money oriented) or intimidation (Dodge & 
Coie, 1987; Hubbard, Dodge, Cillessen, Coie, & Schwartz, 2001; Vitiello, Behar, 
Hunt, Stoff, & Ricciuti, 1990).  
Premeditated-aggression can be understood by the principles of operant 
conditioning, where the probability of aggression is increased by prior history of 
subsequent reward or reinforcement (Dodge, 1991). An act of aggression occurs 
because of the expectancy of the reinforcement or reward that is to follow. From this 
model, one can see that the likelihood of committing an aggressive act may increase 
as a function of social reinforcement emanating from an environment where gangs are 
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present or where aggression is viewed in a more positive light (Kingsbury, Lambert, 
& Hendrickse, 1997). A deficit in the ability to experience or anticipate remorse or the 
aversive outcomes increases the risk of premeditated-aggression, which appears to be 
the case in aggressive individuals with psychopathy who have difficulty anticipating 
and experiencing negative feelings of remorse or guilt (Hare, 1999).  
The utility of this impulsive-premeditated classification has been indicated in 
predictive validity studies (Barratt, Stanford, Felthous, & Kent, 1997a; Barratt, 
Stanford, Kent & Felthous, 1997b; Heilbrun, Heilbrun, & Heilbrun, 1978; Linnoila et 
al., 1983; Mungas, 1988). In a study involving male and female college students, 
Barratt and colleagues (Barratt, Stanford, Dowdy, Liebman, & Kent, 1999) found 
impulsive and premeditated acts of aggression are independent constructs, however, 
emphasised that these two subtypes of aggressive behaviour may also coexist to 
varying degrees in „normal‟ persons. It is rare in practice that the aggressive acts 
exhibited by an individual can be classified as entirely premeditated or entirely 
impulsive (Stanford et al., 2003b; Weinshenker & Siegel, 2002). For example, an 
individual who habitually loses his temper, exhibits an irritable mood and often 
responds out of proportion to the provoking stimulus might be characterised as 
displaying impulsive-aggression. However, it is possible that this individual may also 
demonstrate some incidences of premeditated-aggression. Conversely, an individual 
whose aggressive displays are usually planned and consciously executed may 
experience some instances in which he loses control of his behaviour. Thus the 
proposed dimensional as apposed to categorical classification scheme permits the 
behaviour to be characterised as predominantly premeditated or predominantly 
impulsive, allowing for the heterogeneity that naturally occurs within an individual. 
 11 
Although there has been some criticism of the dichotomous method of 
characterising aggressive behaviour (see Bushman & Anderson, 2001; Parrott & 
Giancola, 2007), a dichotomous approach is supported by a number of important 
distinctions between individuals who express predominantly impulsive- or 
predominantly premeditated-aggression. More specifically, researchers have found 
that impulsive-aggressive individuals experience disruptions across a variety of 
domains including verbal ability and intelligence, physiological reactivity, biological 
function and treatment response (Barratt et al., 1997b; Coccaro, 1992). In contrast, 
individuals demonstrating premeditated-aggression tend to have more circumscribed 
disturbances on measures of personality (Barratt et al., 1997a; Stanford et al., 2003b). 
 
2.2.1  Psychobiological evidence 
The neurotransmitter that has received the most attention in regards to 
aggressive behaviour is serotonin. Serotonin facilitates prefrontal cortical regions, 
such as the orbitofrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex that are involved in 
modulating and often suppressing the emergence of aggressive behaviours (Siever, 
2008). In both humans and animals, it appears that serotonin is primarily associated 
with impulsive-aggression in comparison to premeditated-aggression, and it appears 
that its effects may be receptor specific (Miczek, 1987; Shaikh, De Lanerolle, & 
Siegel, 1997). In humans, a relationship between decreased serotonergic function and 
impulsive-aggressive behaviour has consistently been demonstrated using a number 
of strategies, including central neurochemical measures (CSF 5-HIAA; Linnoila et al., 
1983; Roy, Adinoff and Linnoila, 1988; Virkkunen, De Jong, Bartko, Goodwin, & 
Linnoila, 1989a), platelet binding (Kent et al., 1988), prolactin response 
(Fenfluramine; Coccaro et al., 1989), pharmacological treatment (sertraline; Kavoussi, 
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Liu & Coccaro, 1994; fluoxetine; Coccaro, Kavoussi & Hauger, 1997) and regional 
metabolic activity in response to serotonergic agonist (m-CPP; New et al., 2002). 
Barratt, Kent, Bryant and Felthous (1991) found that phenytoin reduces the frequency 
of aggressive acts. Replication studies have shown that phenytoin may reduce 
incidences of impulsive-aggression, but not premeditated-aggression (Barratt et al., 
1997b; Barratt, Felthous, Kent, Liebman & Coates 2000). Such findings support the 
hypothesis that impulsive- and premeditated-aggression have different underlying 
biological substrates that respond differently to pharmacologic agents with specific 
modes of action. 
 
2.2.2  Psychophysiological evidence 
 Psychophysiological techniques also provide a practical measure of 
neuropsychological functioning, however while a substantial literature exists on 
autonomic correlates of antisocial behaviour (Raine, 2002a, 2000b), there are a 
limited number of studies which have compared these measures in groups whose 
aggression was explicitly classified according to an impulsive-premeditated scheme. 
Pitts (1997) measured heart rate in aggressive children whose behaviour was 
classified as reactive (impulsive) or proactive (premeditated) in nature. Those 
characterised by reactive aggressive behaviour responded to a challenging task with 
increasing heart rate while those characterised by proactive aggression did not. 
Similarly, in a study of domestic batterers, heart rate activity was compared during 
marital interaction (Jacobson & Gottman, 1998). The batterers were divided into those 
whose heart rates lowered during the interaction and those whose heart rate increased. 
The men exhibiting decreasing heart rates were characterised as calm, calculated, 
antisocial and sadistic (premeditated). Those exhibiting increasing heart rates were 
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described as being more emotional, angry and unstable (impulsive). Finally, a more 
recent study of aggressive children indicated a significant increase in skin 
conductance reactivity in those rated high in reactive aggression during a laboratory-
based measure of induced anger (Hubbard et al., 2002). Again, those individuals 
exhibiting primarily reactive or impulsive aggression responded differently 
autonomically than those deemed more proactive or premeditated. 
 Electroencephalography (EEG) abnormalities are also present among those 
who engage in impulsive-aggression. For example, Drake, Hietter and Pakalnis 
(1992) found a greater incidence of EEG slowing in a group of patients described as 
having episodic dyscontrol syndrome as compared to depressed patients and controls. 
Abnormalities in P1 amplitude have been reported in impulsive-aggressive college 
students (Houston & Stanford, 2001) and youths characterised by explosive 
aggressive behaviours (Bars, Heyrend, Simpson & Munger, 2001). In addition, adults 
classified as impulsive-aggressive exhibit decreased P1-N1-P2 latency (Houston & 
Stanford, 2001), reduced P3 amplitude (Barratt et al., 1997b; Gerstle, Mathias & 
Stanford 1998; Mathias & Stanford, 1999), increased P3 latency (Mathias & Stanford, 
1999), and reduced amplitude and increased latency on the late positive potential, a 
purported measure of emotional processing (Conklin & Stanford, 2002). These 
differences reflect a number of sensory and information processing deficits specific to 
impulsive-aggression, as well as preliminary evidence for emotional processing 
impairment. 
 Volkow et al. (1995), using positron emission tomography (PET), found that 
psychiatric patients with a history of repetitive, purposeless violent behaviour showed 
significantly lower relative metabolic values in medial temporal and prefrontal 
cortices compared to normal controls. Similarly, Raine et al. (1998) reported that 
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affective (impulsive) murderers have significantly reduced prefrontal activation when 
compared to predatory (premeditated) murderers and controls.  
 The literature regarding premeditated-aggression though sparse is consistent. 
Individuals who engage in acts of premeditated-aggression show few differences from 
non-aggressive controls on psychophysiological measures, including P3 (Barratt et al., 
1997b; Stanford et al., 2003b). Stanford et al. found that the P3 latency difference did 
approach significance (p = .06), suggesting a trend toward a longer P3 latency in the 
premeditated-aggressive group. Such prolonged P3 latency has been linked to 
increased attitudinal hostility (Bond & Surguy, 2000). Thus, the high levels of 
anger/hostility evidenced in the premeditated-aggressive group may have played a 
role in the latency trend observed in the sample.  
 
2.2.3  Neuropsychological evidence 
While small in number, neuropsychological studies comparing modes of 
aggression have established a correlation between increased impulsive-aggression and 
decreased executive functioning, while few deficits have been found in those who are 
premeditated in their aggressive behaviour (Houston et al., 2003). Dolan and 
Anderson (Dolan, Deakin, Roberts & Anderson, 2002) grouped male personality 
disordered offenders into high and low impulsive aggressors using the Belligerence 
Scale of the Special Hospital Assessment of Personality and Socialization (SHAPS: 
Blackburn, 1982). They found that both impulsivity and aggression were negatively 
related to executive function, and aggression was negatively related to memory 
function. Similarly, Giancola, Moss, Martin, Kirisci and Tarter (1996) found that 
problems in executive functioning were a predictor of reactive aggression in 
adolescent boys at risk for substance abuse. Most recently, Villemarette-Pittman, 
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Stanford and Greve (2002) found that verbal deficiencies varied according to 
executive demands of the task in a sample of impulsive-aggressive college students. 
In the first study to compare premeditated-aggressive subjects with controls on 
a variety of neuropsychological tests, Stanford et al. (2003b) found no significant 
differences except for a single subscale of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST), 
where the premeditated group exhibited greater failure to maintain set than controls. 
In contrast, there were pronounced differences on a range of personality measures, 
including impulsivity, verbal and physical aggression, anger, hostility, psychoticism 
and neuroticism. The authors concluded that the difference between the premeditated-
aggressive group and controls was a result of an impulsive personality style rather 
than a significant cognitive deficit. 
In summary, neuropsychological assessment has shown a clear link between 
impulsive-aggressive behaviour and problems in executive functioning, while few if 
any deficits have been demonstrated in premeditated-aggressive individuals. 
 
2.2.4  Psychopathy 
 The concept of psychopathy has provided some utility in further distinguishing 
between impulsive- and premeditated-aggression. Psychopathy refers to a 
constellation of personality and behavioural characteristics marked by low baseline 
arousal, dishonesty, absence of remorse, empathy, and conscience, antisocial 
behaviour, and impersonal relationships (Hare, 2003). Interpersonally, they are often 
described as grandiose, arrogant, callous, superficial and manipulative (Hare, 1999).  
 The concept of psychopathy has been operationalised by the work of Hare 
(1991, 1999), and its assessment is now highly reliable and valid. There is a growing 
body of research to show that psychopathic criminals engage in more premeditated 
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and predatory violence than non-psychopathic criminals (Cornell et al., 1996; Serin, 
1991). Williamson, Hare and Wong (1987) found that incarcerated psychopaths had 
higher rates (45.2%) than incarcerated non-psychopaths (14.6%) of committing their 
crime for material gain (i.e., proactive in nature), and that non-psychopaths had higher 
rates (31.7 vs. 2.4%) of emotional arousal leading to their offences (i.e., impulsive in 
nature). Likewise, Cornell et al. (1996) found premeditated-aggressive offenders 
could be distinguished from non-premeditated offenders by higher total psychopathy 
specifically concerning: pathological lying; manipulative actions; lack of empathy; 
parasitic lifestyle; irresponsibility; criminal versatility; and superficiality. The authors 
concluded that “the link between psychopathy and instrumental violence supports the 
distinction between instrumental and reactive violence, and raised the possibility that 
the presence of instrumental violence could be an associated characteristic of 
psychopathic offenders” (p. 790). Similarly, Woodworth and Porter (2002), in a study 
of 125 homicide offenders, found that the great majority of homicides committed by 
psychopaths were instrumental (i.e., premeditated), whereas only 48.4% of homicides 
committed by non-psychopaths were instrumental. Meloy (1988) theorised that a 
predisposition to engage in premeditated violence in psychopaths would be due to 
their low levels of autonomic arousal and reactivity, their disidentification with the 
victim, their emotional detachment and their lack of empathy.  
 Similar differences have been found in children. A growing body of evidence 
indicates that children with conduct problems represent a group that can be further 
divided into discrete subtypes based on the presence of callous and unemotional traits 
(Frick, O‟Brien, Wootton & McBurnett, 1994; Frick & Ellis, 1999). Callous and 
unemotional traits are similar to psychopathic traits such as lack of guilt and empathy, 
superficial charm, and constricted emotion. In a sample of children with conduct 
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problems, Christian, Frick, Hill and Tyler (1997) found that a subgroup of children 
exhibiting symptoms of Oppositional Defiant Disorder (ODD) and Conduct Disorder 
(CD) and callous and unemotional traits differed from those without such traits in the 
number and variety of conduct problems. Pardini, Lochman and Frick (2003) found 
that the presence of callous and unemotional traits in adjudicated juveniles was 
associated with the use of aggression to obtain rewards and dominate (i.e., 
premeditated). Frick et al. (2003), in a sample of non-referred children, found that 
children demonstrating conduct problems and callous and unemotional traits were 
more likely to demonstrate high levels of proactive aggression than those without 
these traits, whose aggression was predominantly impulsive. It thus appears that it is 
the presence of callous and unemotional traits that distinguish this subgroup and its 
associated problems. 
 
2.3  Importance of distinguishing between impulsive- and premeditated 
aggression 
There is evidence in both children and adults that impulsive- and 
premeditated- aggression are distinguishable forms of aggressive behaviour with 
important clinical implications. For example, longitudinal studies in children and 
adolescents rated on reactive and proactive aggressive behaviour have shown that 
proactive, but not reactive, aggression predicts later delinquent behaviour (Vitaro, 
Gendreau, Tremblay & Oligny, 1998). Nouvion and colleagues found that proactive 
aggressive subjects had a greater incidence of personality disorders, including CD and 
APD, compared to reactive aggressive and non-aggressive control subjects (Nouvion, 
Cherek, Lane, Tcheremissine & Lieving, 2007).  
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These findings are in line with previous studies that have found proactive, but 
not reactive, aggression to be predictive of ODD, CD and externalising problems 
(e.g., Conner, Steingard, Anderson & Melloni, 2003; Pulkkinen, 1996; Vitaro et al., 
1998). Given that individuals diagnosed with APD must have evidence of CD before 
the age of 15, early onset behavioural problems leading to adult antisocial behaviour 
was prevalent in the premeditated group. This provides evidence that premeditated-
aggressive individuals may have increased personality psychopathology and be at 
increased risk for early aggressive and antisocial behaviours relative to impulsive-
aggressive or non-aggressive individuals. The fact that CD was a distinguishable 
factor between groups is of significance due to the fact that CD is stable over time 
(Bassarath, 2001a; Kazdin, 2000), and is associated with criminal behaviour and 
substance abuse (Hser, Grella, Collins & Teruya, 2003; Mueser et al., 2006; 
Tcheremissine & Lieving, 2006).  
Heilbrun et al. (1978) found that murderers whose violence was classified as 
impulsive were more likely to fail on parole that those whose murders were 
premeditated in nature. In a pharmacological treatment study comparing aggressive 
subtypes, inmates whose aggressive behaviour was classified as impulsive showed 
significant reductions in the frequency and intensity of aggressive acts, normalisation 
of event-related potentials (P3) and improvement in mood state measures during a six 
week trial of anticonvulsant phenytoin (Dilantin) when compared to placebo (Barratt 
et al., 1997a). Inmates whose aggressive behaviour was classified as premeditated in 
nature showed no improvement during the same trial. Similarly, Malone et al. (1998) 
examined the effect of lithium carbonate in CD children whose repeated aggressive 
behaviour was categorised as either predatory or affective in nature. Treatment 
response was associated with affective rather than predatory aggressive behaviour. 
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 While distinguishing between these forms of aggression can not only lead to a 
better theoretical understanding of aggression (Coie & Dodge, 1998; Poulin & Boivin, 
2000; Vitiello & Stoff, 1997), it can also to better prognostication. Such a distinction 
is also assumed to lead to the development of more specific interventions and 
treatment, which may then prove more effective than interventions aimed at 
aggression in general (McAdams, 2002; Vitello & Stoff, 1997).  
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Chapter 3 
Prefrontal Cortex & Aggression 
 
Research into the antecedents of violence and aggression indicates that there 
are many factors which contribute to the development of these behaviours. It is 
important to note that while there are general predictors of violent and aggressive 
behaviour, no single theory can account for causation in all situations. It is accepted 
that the causes of aggression are multi-faceted and that neurological deficit may be a 
factor in only a small percentage of those who demonstrate such behaviour. However, 
given that aggression – like any behaviour – ultimately derives from the normal and 
abnormal operations of the brain, closer examination of the aspects of brain structure 
and function relevant to aggressive behaviour are required. 
Numerous studies, in both animals and humans, have supported an association 
between abnormalities in brain function and aggressive and violent behaviour (Filley 
et al., 2001; Golden, Jackson, Peterson-Rohne & Gontkovsky, 1996; Krakowski, 
2003). Case studies of patients with neurological disorders or those who have suffered 
traumatic brain injury provide provocative insights into which brain regions, when 
damaged, might predispose to irresponsible, aggressive behaviour. 
Psychophysiological and neuropsychological assessments have also demonstrated that 
violent and/or aggressive individuals have lower brain functioning than controls, 
including lower verbal ability and diminished executive functioning (Barratt et al., 
1997b; Dolan & Park, 2002; Hoaken et al., 2007).  
 The availability of new functional and structural neuroimaging techniques, 
such as PET, magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and functional MRI (fMRI), has 
broadened our understanding of the neural circuitry that underlies aggressive and 
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antisocial behaviours. More specifically, as reviewed by Davidson and colleagues, a 
circuit that includes several regions of the prefrontal cortex, the amygdala, 
hippocampus, hypothalamus, anterior cingulate cortex, ventral striatum, and other 
interconnected structures has been implicated in various aspects of emotion regulation 
and affective style (Davidson & Irwin, 1999; Davidson, Jackson & Kalin, 2000a). 
Emotion regulation includes those processes which amplify, attenuate, or maintain an 
emotion, and thus incorporates the expression of aggressive behaviours. Related to 
this is evidence which suggests that individuals who are vulnerable to faulty 
regulation of negative emotion may be at increased risk for aggression and/or violent 
behaviour (Davidson, Putnam & Larson, 2000b). 
 Prefrontal cortical dysfunction has been implicated as a possible anatomical 
correlate of aggressive behaviour (Convitt et al., 1996; Critchley et al., 2000; Pietrini, 
Guazzelli, Basso, Jaffe & Grafman, 2000; Raine et al., 1994). Both cognitive and 
behavioural similarities have been noted between individuals who have frontal lobe 
damage and those who show characteristics of antisocial behaviour (Price, Daffner, 
Stowe & Mesulam, 1990). For example, Eslinger and Damasio (1985) noted that 
damage to the prefrontal area is associated with heightened aggression, emotional 
outbursts, disorganisation, and risk-taking behaviour. This observation has been a 
major impetus for the research on neuropsychological abnormalities in antisocial 
individuals. In particular, damage to the prefrontal regions of the brain and the 
resulting impairment in executive functions is considered to be associated with 
increased aggressive and antisocial behaviour (Brower & Price, 2001; Tateno, Jorge 
& Robinson, 2003).  
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3.1.1 The prefrontal cortex 
The frontal cortex encompasses the brain areas anterior to the central sulcus 
and comprises approximately one third of the cerebral cortex. The frontal cortex can 
be divided into three principle regions: the primary motor cortex, the prefrontal 
cortex, and the limbic cortex (Duke & Kaszniak, 2000). The prefrontal cortex refers to 
the most anterior regions of the frontal lobes and it is functionally and anatomically 
heterogeneous (Fuster, 2001). The prefrontal cortex has a rich supply of connections 
with other neural regions. Cortically, it is connected with association cortex in the 
temporal, parietal and occipital lobes, and subcortically with the hippocampus, 
amygdala, thalamus, hypothalamus, subthalamus, septum, striatum, pons, and 
mesencephalon (Fuster, 2001; Pandya & Barnes, 1987). Given that the prefrontal 
cortex is connected to more brain regions that any other cortical region, its position 
allows the integration of information processed at lower levels, including input from 
the limbic circuits, as well as being the major target of the basal ganglia-
thalamocortical circuits (Royall et al., 2002).  
The prefrontal cortex, along with its underlying subcortical regions, is 
extensively interconnected with the major sensory and motor systems of the brain. 
Connections from the posterior cortical areas, particularly areas of multimodal 
convergence, bring information regarding the external environment. Subcortical 
pathways, including the amygdala, hippocampus, midbrain area, and thalamus, bring 
details about internal states (Duke & Kaszniak, 2000).  
The prefrontal cortex has direct neural projections from a variety of limbic 
structures that are directly linked to the amygdala. There are input projections from 
the thalamus to the prefrontal cortex, and these connections contain information 
arising from the temporal cortex and the amygdala. Direct reciprocal connections 
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from the prefrontal cortex to the amygdala have also been identified (Afifi & 
Bergman, 1998). Output projections to the amygdala are both excitory and inhibitory 
in nature. However, damage to the prefrontal cortex results in an overactivation of the 
amygdala, suggesting that the effect of the prefrontal cortex on the amygdala is 
predominantly inhibitory (Gerwitz, Falls & Davis, 1997; Morgan, Romanski & 
LeDoux, 1993). With regard to the functionality of this connection, lesions to the 
prefrontal cortex in rats reduce the prefrontal inhibitory action on the amygdala, 
resulting in an increased difficulty in the extinction of aversive responses (Morgan et 
al., 1993), as well as impairing the ability to anticipate future negative consequences 
(Bechara, Tranel, Damasio & Damasio, 1996). Therefore, it appears that the 
prefrontal cortex plays an important role in regulating the acquisition of new 
responses, and the extinction of aversive responses (Lopez, Vazquez & Olson, 2004). 
The prefrontal cortex also plays a central role in many aspects of social 
cognition (Rilling et al., 2002), including perspective taking (Frith & Frith, 1999), and 
also in the regulation of emotions such as aggression (see Blair, 2004 for review). 
Early descriptions of frontal lobe syndromes arose from several 19th century 
investigators, described in a number of reviews (Damasio et al., 1994; Macmillan, 
2002; Tranel, Anderson & Benton, 1994), highlighting the changes displayed in social 
behaviour, personality, and emotional regulation that occurred after frontal lobe 
pathology. Subsequent investigators continued to elaborate on the nature and extent of 
these deficits, their causes and management (Miller & Cummings, 1999; Stuss & 
Knight, 2002), firmly establishing a vital role for the frontal lobes, particularly the 
prefrontal cortex, in such processes. 
In an overview of neuroanatomy and neuropathology, Stuss and Benson 
(1984) described six specific manifestations of prefrontal damage: (1) inability to use 
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knowledge to regulate behaviour; (2) impaired ability to handle sequential behaviour; 
(3) impaired ability to establish or change a mental set; (4) impaired ability to 
maintain a mental set; (5) impaired ability to monitor personal behaviour; and (6) 
attitudes of apathy. 
 
3.2  Prefrontal divisions 
For clinical purposes, the prefrontal cortex can be divided into three distinct 
neuroanatomical regions: 1) dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Brodmann‟s areas 9, 10, 
46); 2) medial prefrontal cortex (including the functionally related anterior cingulate 
cortex and Brodmann‟s area 24); and 3) orbital prefrontal cortex (Brodmann‟s areas 
11 and 12), corresponding to the most inferior and ventral parts of the prefrontal 
cortex (behind the eyes, or orbits). Both medial prefrontal and orbitofrontal are part of 
a frontostriatal circuit that has strong connections to the amygdala and other parts of 
the limbic system. Consequently, these regions are anatomically well suited for the 
integration of affective and non-affective information, and for the regulation of 
appetitive/motivated responses. Functionally, these regions are often considered 
together, as when researchers focus on effects of damage to ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex (Happaney et al., 2004). 
The prefrontal cortex is a heterogeneous region of the brain and the three 
principal frontal-subcortical circuits are involved in cognitive, emotional, and 
motivational processes. The primary focus of the current research will be on the roles 
of the dorsolateral and orbital divisions of the prefrontal cortex, which manifest quite 
distinct anatomical and functional properties (Fuster, 1989; Stuss & Benson, 1986). 
The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex projects primarily to the dorsolateral head 
of the caudate nucleus, which receives input from the posterior parietal cortex and 
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premotor areas. The dorsolateral circuit then connects to the dorsolateral part of the 
globus pallidus and rostral substantia nigra reticulate, and continues to the 
parvocellular area of the medial dorsal and ventral anterior portions of the thalamus. 
Projections from the thalamus back to the dorsolateral prefrontal circuit close the 
circuit (Cummings, 1993).  
Functionally, the high-level cognitive abilities mediated by the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex and its connections are those referred to as „executive functions‟, 
including cognitive flexibility, temporal ordering of events, planning, monitoring and 
inhibiting pre-programmed behaviour, set-shifting, working memory and concept 
formation (Smith & Jonides, 1999). According to Cummings (1995), dysfunction in 
the dorsolateral prefrontal circuit is associated with circuit-specific problems 
including decreased verbal fluency, perseveration, difficulty shifting set, poor 
recall/retrieval of information, reduced mental control, limited abstraction ability, and 
poor response inhibition. However, while patients with lesions restricted to this region 
are concrete and perseverative and show impairments in reasoning and mental 
flexibility (Benton, 1986), they typically demonstrate intact perception, calculation, 
language abilities and storage of memories (Duke & Kaszniak, 2000). 
The orbitofrontal cortex occupies the ventral region of the prefrontal cortex 
(Kringelbach & Rolls, 2004), which is reciprocally connected with the amygdala 
(Ghashghaei & Barbas, 2002). The orbitofrontal cortex projects to the ventromedial 
caudate nucleus, which receives input from other cortical association areas and 
brainstem regions, and has open interconnections with the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex, the temporal pole, and the amygdala (Davis & Whalen, 2001). The 
orbitofrontal cortex contains the secondary taste cortex, in which the reward value of 
taste is represented. It also contains the secondary and tertiary olfactory cortical areas, 
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in which the identity and also the reward value of odours are represented. The 
orbitofrontal cortex also receives information about the sight of objects from the 
temporal lobe cortical visual areas (Rolls, 1999).  
The orbitofrontal-subcortical circuit is said to underlie social behaviour and 
appears to play a critical role in the representation of the reward value of a stimulus 
and the way in which this representation guides goal-directed behaviour (Rolls, 1999). 
Lesions specific to the circuit have been found to result in marked changes in 
personality, including disinhibition, impulsivity, and antisocial behaviour, and 
irritability and lability are often prominent (Cummings, 1995). Some of the changes 
may be related to difficulty in the learning and reversal of stimulus-reinforcement 
associations, and thus the correction of behavioural responses when they are no longer 
appropriate due to changes in reinforcement contingencies (Rolls, 2004; Hornak et al., 
2004). Indeed, investigations in macaques have shown that lesions to the orbitofrontal 
cortex impair reversal learning (Dias et al., 1996a). Consistent with this, the 
orbitofrontal cortex is activated by monetary rewards and punishments, and the 
magnitude of the reinforcers (O‟Doherty, Kringelbach, Rolls, Hornak & Andrews, 
2001). The visual input to neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex is in many cases the 
reinforcement association of visual stimuli, one of which is information about faces. 
Such facial stimuli convey information that is important in social reinforcement 
(Rolls, 2004).  
The medial circuit, begins in the anterior cingulate and projects to the nucleus 
accumbens. The anterior cingulate has interconnections with dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex and the amygdala, and it also receives input from the ventral tegmental area 
(Duke & Kaszniak, 2000). The medial frontal-subcortical circuit is involved in 
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motivation. Lesions to this region often produce apathy, lack of motivation, decreased 
social interaction, and psychomotor retardation (Sbordone, 2000).  
The ventromedial prefrontal region includes the medial and varying sectors of 
the lateral orbitofrontal cortex, encompassing Brodmann‟s areas 25, lower 24, 32, and 
medial aspect of 11, 12, and 10, and the white matter subjacent to all of these areas 
(Bechara, 2004). Patients with bilateral lesions of the ventromedial cortex develop 
severe impairments in personal and social decision-making, in spite of otherwise 
largely preserved intellectual abilities. Following damage to this region of the 
prefrontal cortex, patients develop difficulties in daily and future planning, and 
difficulties in choosing friends and activities (Bechara, Damasio & Damasio, 2000a; 
Bechara, Tranel & Damasio, 2002). 
 The identification of these adjacent circuits provides insight as to the 
similarities of behavioural changes caused by lesions to different brain regions. Whilst 
focal lesions to the areas of the prefrontal cortex have led to what have been labelled 
“frontal lobe syndrome”, the involvement of multiple circuits in subcortical lesions 
has resulted in variable behavioural manifestations (Cummings, 1995). For example, 
studies of lesions to the globus pallidus have described patients with marked changes 
in personality and reduced activity levels with memory and executive function 
deficits, but with normal intelligence and language abilities (e.g., Strub, 1989). 
In summary, the frontal–subcortical circuits are extensively connected to each 
other at the level of the frontal lobes. The circuits are discrete in subcortical regions. 
The dorsolateral circuit, because of its neuroanatomy, is uniquely able to integrate 
information from all three frontal–subcortical circuits. Here, the integrated 
information from the external world and the cognitive and emotional states of the 
individual can be used in the production of social behaviour. 
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3.3  Prefrontal dysfunction and aggression 
Frontal lobe dysfunction in particular, has been invoked to explain the actions 
of individuals convicted of violent crimes, who appear to fail to inhibit impulsive, 
trivially motivated, or habitual aggression. Case studies as far back as 1935 have 
reported the onset of antisocial personality traits after frontal lobe injury (Blumer & 
Benson, 1975). Such cases typically involve damage to the orbitofrontal cortex, which 
clinical observations have associated with poor impulse control, explosive aggressive 
outbursts, inappropriate verbal lewdness, jocularity, and lack of interpersonal 
sensitivity (Duffy & Campbell, 1994). This dysregulation of affect and behaviour may 
occur while cognitive, motor, and sensory functioning remains relatively intact 
(Mesulam, 1986).  
 
3.3.1  Lesion studies 
Research on individuals who have suffered traumatic brain injury is of key 
importance in investigating the neural substrates of aggressive behaviour. The critical 
role of the prefrontal cortex in aggressive behaviour was initially recognised by case 
reports that prefrontal brain lesions could result in the emergence of antisocial 
behaviours or psychopathic traits in previously normal subjects (Damasio, Tranel & 
Damasio, 1990). A prime example of this disinhibition is found in the often cited case 
of Phineas Gage, a dependable and responsible stable railroad worker who was 
injured by a tamping rod that penetrated his skull through his orbital frontal cortex. 
After the accident he became irresponsible and impulsive, despite preserved general 
cognitive and motor skills (Damasio et al., 1994).  
McAllister and Price (1987) evaluated 20 psychiatric patients with diverse 
types of frontal cortical pathology as identified by computed tomography scans and 
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EEG. Results indicated that 60% of the patients displayed disinhibited behaviour with 
affective lability and 10% displayed violent outbursts. However, the results of this 
study are difficult to interpret given that, in addition to having a frontal lobe 
pathology, all of the patients had at least one psychiatric diagnosis, and the exact 
neuroanatomical location of the pathology for each patient was not reported. In 
another study, Heinrichs (1989) found that a frontal cortical lesion was the best 
predictor of violent behaviour in a sample of 45 neuropsychiatric patients. Again, 
many of the patients in this study had other psychiatric diagnoses and the exact 
anatomical locations of the frontal neuropathologies were not specified. 
 Further data from neurological case reports have provided much useful 
information regarding the relationship between prefrontal cortical functioning and 
aggression. Thompson (1970) reported a case of a 33-year-old male with a history of 
violent behaviour subsequent to a head injury at the age of 12. A 
pneumencephalography revealed bilateral cortical atrophy in the prefrontal regions. 
Price et al. (1990) studied the adult behaviour patterns of two patients who acquired 
brain damage during childhood. While both patients developed relatively normally 
until the damage was sustained, following the damage these patients displayed an 
inability to respond to punishment or delay gratification, irresponsibility, sexual 
promiscuity, grand larceny, drug involvement, angry outbursts, arson, suspected rape, 
and physical violence. Although the exact location of the lesions in both cases is 
equivocal, neurological and neuropsychological examination indicated bilateral 
lesions in the prefrontal cortex.  
Boone et al. (1988) described a 13-year-old female suffering from partial 
complex seizures localised primarily in the prefrontal cortex. Six weeks before being 
admitted to hospital she began exhibiting prominent behavioural changes consisting 
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of bizarre speech, sexual disinhibition, disobeying parental orders, and verbal and 
physical aggression. An EEG revealed activity in the frontal lobes and 
neuropsychological tests demonstrated deficits on prefrontal tests involving attention, 
alternation between tasks, performance on mazes, response inhibition, and 
distractibility. In a similar case, Eslinger and Damasio (1985) noted personality 
changes in patient EVR subsequent to surgical ablation of the orbital and mesial areas 
of the prefrontal cortex. Following the surgery, while his level of intelligence was 
above average, EVR began to engage in what the authors termed „sociopathic 
behaviour‟, including difficulties in decision-making, adjustment problems, poor 
judgement, and employment problems. The patient performed well on prefrontal 
cortical tests such as the WCST which the authors attributed to the fact that the 
dorsolateral prefrontal regions and superior mesial regions were left undamaged.  
Meyers, Berman, Scheibe and Hayman (1992) noted similar behavioural 
sequelae involving disinhibition, poor judgement, and irresponsibility subsequent to 
surgical damage to the left orbital prefrontal cortex in a 33-year-old male. 
Interestingly, this patient performed in the above average range on prefrontal cortical 
tests such as the WCST; however this is again likely due to the preservation of the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. These findings reflect those of Phineas Gage described 
earlier, who subsequent to his injury, was described as being untrustworthy, 
irresponsibly, and disrespectful. Again, the majority of the neural damage was located 
in the orbital and mesial prefrontal regions, whereas the dorsolateral area was found to 
be spared (Damasio et al., 1994). 
 Of the eight studies reviewed in the preceding section, six document a 
relationship between prefrontal cortical pathology and aggressive behaviour. 
However, none of these reports specified the exact location of the neuropathology 
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within the frontal lobes. As a result, these data do not provide evidence to implicate 
more specifically the dorsolateral or orbital prefrontal regions in the expression of 
aggressive behaviour. The remaining two reports indicate that their patients had 
lesions in the orbital prefrontal cortex and not the dorsolateral area.  
Other case studies of patients who have sustained damage to the orbitofrontal 
region, such as EVR, resemble Gage in manifesting a behavioural profile that has 
been referred to as „acquired sociopathy‟ (Saver & Damasio, 1991; Tranel, 1994; 
Meyers et al., 1992; Blair & Cipolotti, 2000). Damasio et al. (1994) describe acquired 
sociopathy as a reactive, emotionally driven violence toward a person that is related to 
emotional inhibitory dyscontrol. Although showing minimal impairments on standard 
neuropsychological tests of intelligence and executive functions, these patients 
display marked deficits in real life tasks involving judgement, awareness of socially 
appropriate conduct, and the capacity to assess future consequences (Bechara et al., 
2000b).  
Blair and Cipolotti (2000) reported on JS who sustained damage to the 
orbitofrontal cortex and some damage to the left amygdala. Premorbidly, JS was 
described as being a quiet, withdrawn person who was never aggressive. Following 
the damage, JS showed unpredictable, impulsive-aggression and violence, and 
demonstrated deficits in the recognition of facial expression, particularly in the 
recognition of anger and disgust. He also produced significantly lower skin 
conductance responses (SCR) to the anger and disgust expressions compared with 
comparison groups.  
Further clinical data demonstrate that lesions in the orbitofrontal cortex and 
adjacent prefrontal regions produce syndromes characterised by impulsivity and 
aggression. Anderson et al. (1999) reported on two individuals, tested in their 
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twenties, who suffered early damage to orbital and lateral sectors of the prefrontal 
cortex. Both exhibited a significant deficit in moral reasoning, a history of verbal and 
physical aggression, and intermittent, explosive bursts of anger. A further study of 
two adults who sustained frontal lobe injury in childhood suggests that early damage 
to orbitofrontal regions may lead to a “comportmental learning disability” that closely 
resembles sociopathy and includes a diminished capacity to inhibit violence (Price et 
al., 1990).  
Further evidence implicating the orbitofrontal regions comes from a large 
retrospective study of Vietnam veterans with penetrating head injuries, which found 
that ventromedial frontal and orbitofrontal lesions, as assessed by computed 
tomography scans, specifically increased the risk of aggressive and violent behaviour. 
(Grafman et al.,1996). Data have also been reported showing higher rates of antisocial 
behaviour (including stealing, physical assault and sexual comments or advances) in 
patients with frontotemporal dementia, even when compared with equally cognitively 
impaired patients with Alzheimer‟s disease (Miller, Darby, Benson, Cummings, & 
Miller, 1997; Stip, 1995). 
 
3.3.2  Neuroimaging and clinical neurological findings 
Brain imaging studies are now beginning to confirm the role of the prefrontal 
cortex in modulating and controlling violence in humans. Reviews of brain imaging 
studies of violent and psychopathic populations completed by Raine (1993), Mills and 
Raine (1994), Raine and Buchsbaum (1996), Henry and Moffitt (1997), and Bufkin 
and Luttrell (2005), while showing some variability across studies, concur in 
indicating that violent offenders have functional deficits in the anterior regions of the 
brain, particularly the frontal region.  
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Most recently, in their review of 17 neuroimaging studies, Bufkin and Luttrell 
(2005) found that the areas associated with aggressive and/or violent behaviour, 
particularly impulsive acts, are located in the prefrontal cortex and the medial 
temporal regions. Of the 17 studies reviewed, 14 specifically examined possible links 
between frontal lobe pathology and aggressive and/or violent behaviour. In the 10 
single photon emission computed tomography (SPECT) and PET studies, 100% 
reported deficits in either prefrontal (8 of 10 studies) or frontal (2 of 10 studies) 
functioning in aggressive, violent and/or antisocial groups compared to non-
aggressive patients or healthy controls. Analyses of specific regions in the prefrontal 
cortex revealed that individuals who were aggressive and/or violent had significantly 
lower prefrontal activity in the orbitofrontal cortex (4 of 10 studies), anterior medial 
cortex (2 of 10 studies) and/or superior frontal cortex (1 of 10 studies). In the four 
MRI studies, half reported decreased grey matter volume in prefrontal or frontal 
regions, and 25% reported non-specific white matter abnormalities, not localised to 
the frontal cortex. 
Initial studies demonstrate anterior brain dysfunction in individuals with a 
history of violence. Goyer et al. (1994), using PET in an auditory activation condition, 
showed that an increased number of aggressive impulsive acts were associated with 
reduced glucose in the anterior medial and left anterior orbitofrontal frontal cortex of 
17 personality disordered patients. Volkow and colleagues in two PET studies which 
compared forensic psychiatric patients with normal controls, documented decreased 
frontal cortical blood flow or metabolism associated with „repetitive‟ and 
„purposeless‟ violent behaviour (Volkow & Tancredi, 1987; Volkow et al., 1995). 
Søderstrom et al. (2000) using SPECT, found reduced blood flow in both frontal and 
temporal lobes of 21 individuals convicted of impulsive violent crimes.  
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In a PET study evaluating responses to the probe metachlorophenylpiperazine, 
decrements in the lateral, medial and orbital frontal cortices were found at baseline in 
men with a history of physical aggression and in the orbital frontal cortex for both 
men and women with a history of physical aggression (New et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, a series of studies demonstrated that while normal subjects show 
increased relative glucose metabolism in orbitofrontal cortex and anterior cingulate 
gyrus following acute serotonergic stimulation, impulsive-aggressive personality 
disordered patients show decreased relative metabolism in this area (New et al., 2002; 
Siever et al., 1999; Soloff et al., 2003). These studies suggest that orbitofrontal and 
adjacent regions may exert an inhibitory influence on aggression, perhaps through a 
serotonergic mechanism. 
Interictal episodes of impulsive aggression have also been observed in patients 
with temporal lobe epilepsy. Such patients who display episodes of impulsive 
aggression have a highly significant reduction (approximately 17%) in left prefrontal 
gray matter compared with temporal lobe epilepsy patients with no history of 
aggression or controls (Woermann et al., 2000). 
One particular set of studies was undertaken by Raine and colleagues on a 
heterogeneous group of suspected murderers pleading not guilty by reason of insanity. 
In a first study Raine et al. (1994) conducted a PET study on 22 subjects accused of 
murder and 22 matched controls. The offender group had significantly lower glucose 
metabolism in both medial and lateral prefrontal cortex relative to the controls. Raine, 
Buchsbaum and LaCasse, (1997) in a study of 41 murderers found hypoactivation in 
prefrontal territories including lateral and medial regions of the prefrontal cortex, as 
well as activation in the right amygdala, compared with age- and sex-matched 
controls. In a subsequent reanalysis of these data, murderers were classified as those 
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who commit planned, predatory murder or those who committed affective, impulsive 
murder. The impulsive murderers showed reductions in lateral prefrontal metabolism 
compared with controls, whereas the predatory group did not (Raine et al., 1998). 
Findings from a more recent structural MRI study indicated that individuals with a 
diagnosis of APD recruited from the community showed an 11% reduction in the 
volume of gray matter in the prefrontal cortex, compared to both normal controls and 
a substance dependence control group (Raine et al., 2000).  
A number of studies have also found abnormal frontal EEG activity, as well as 
diminished frontal event related potentials (ERP), correlating with antisocial 
personality disorder or histories of aggression (Bauer, O‟Connor & Hesselbrock, 
1994; Bernat, Hall, Steffen, & Patrick, 2007; Finn, Ramsey & Earleywine, 2000; 
O‟Connor, Bauer, Tasman & Hesselbrock, 1994).  
 
 3.4 The specific roles of the orbitofrontal and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in 
aggression 
The cumulative evidence from the studies reviewed above indicates that 
clinically significant frontal lobe dysfunction is associated with aggressive behaviour. 
Subjects with both traumatic brain injury and neurodegenerative disorders primarily 
involving the prefrontal cortex display increased rates of aggressive and antisocial 
behaviour compared to subjects who have no, or non-frontal brain injury. Studies 
employing neuropsychological testing, neurological examination, EEG, and 
neuroimaging have also found evidence for increased rates of prefrontal network 
dysfunction among aggressive and antisocial subjects (see Brower & Price, 2001; 
Bufkin & Luttrell, 2005 for reviews).  
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Unfortunately, however, the above studies have placed little emphasis on 
considering the separable regions of frontal cortex. Data based on acquired damage to 
the prefrontal cortex implicate the ventromedial and orbitofrontal regions of the 
prefrontal cortex (Damasio et al., 1994; Grafman et al., 1996). Alternatively, 
impairments in the dorsolateral region, which is critically involved in cognitive 
flexibility and response perseveration, cannot be ruled out because repetitive 
aggressive behaviour can be conceptualised as perseverative, unmodifiable behaviour 
in response to repeatable punishment. One of few studies to dissociate functional 
regions of the prefrontal cortex with regard to aggression was conducted by Goyer et 
al. (1994) who found lower normalised cerebral blood flow (CBF) in lateral 
orbitofrontal cortex that correlated with a history of reactive aggression.  
The parallels between the effects of orbitofrontal lesions on social behaviour 
and the symptoms of antisocial disorders are prominent. In addition to the classic case 
of Phineas Gage, further studies of individuals with orbitofrontal cortex lesions have 
described these patients as disinhibited, socially inappropriate, misinterpreting others‟ 
moods, impulsive, unconcerned with the consequences of their actions, irresponsible 
in everyday life, lack insight, and show a poor sense of initiative (Rolls et al., 1994). 
Based on these findings, a logical prediction is that the orbitofrontal cortex activity in 
response to provocation may be attenuated in certain individuals, predisposing to 
aggression and violence (Davidson et al., 2000b).   
Several hypotheses about the role of the orbitofrontal cortex in behaviour 
regulation have been developed. One of these, the „somatic markers hypothesis‟ 
suggests that ventromedial frontal lobe lesions impair the capacity to consider 
emotions when making a decision (Damasio, 1996). Alternate and often 
complementary hypotheses suggest that the primary deficit following such frontal 
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lobe lesions lies in self-reflective awareness (Stuss, Gow & Hetherington, 1992), 
perspective taking (Stuss, Gallup & Alexander, 2001b), social schema knowledge 
(Grafman et al., 1996), the ability to respond appropriately to social reinforcers (Rolls 
et al., 1994), and the ability to make inferences about the mental state of others 
(„Theory of Mind‟; Stone, Baron-Cohen & Knight, 1998). 
 
3.5  The role of the prefrontal cortex in impulsive- and premeditated-aggression 
Despite increasing support for the impulsive-premeditated aggression 
distinction as outlined in the previous chapter, surprisingly little is known about the 
neurophysiological and neuroanatomical factors that characterise these subtypes of 
aggression in humans. Indications can nevertheless be gained from the literature on 
the cortical and subcortical mechanisms thought to be involved in aggression and 
violence per se.  
At a cortical level, it has been proposed that abnormalities of the anterior 
cingulate cortex and orbitofrontal cortex, regions of the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex, alone or in combination with abnormalities of the amygdala, underlie the 
hyperarousal and dyscontrol states seen in impulsive aggressors (Best, Williams & 
Coccaro, 2002; Blair, 2004; Davidson et al., 2000b; New et al., 2002, 2004). Blair and 
Davidson et al. proposed that the anterior cingulate cortex and orbitofrontal cortex are 
normally activated during anger arousal via serotonergic mechanisms and exert 
inhibitory influence over aggressive emotional responding via mechanisms including 
inhibition of the amygdala, hypothalamus, and brainstem periaqueductal gray.  
Certainly, damage to medial frontal and orbitofrontal cortex is associated with 
increased risk for the display of impulsive-aggression in humans whether the lesion 
occurs in childhood (Anderson et al., 1999; Pennington & Bennetto, 1993), or 
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adulthood (Grafman et al., 1996). In addition, neuroimaging data have revealed 
reduced frontal functioning in patients presenting with reactive aggression 
(Søderstrom et al., 2000; Volkow & Tancredi, 1987; Volkow et al., 1995). Further 
studies of impulsive-aggression have found hypoactivation of the anterior cingulate 
cortex and orbitofrontal regions of the prefrontal cortex (Best et al., 2002; New et al., 
2002). Interestingly, this reduced frontal functioning is not observed in patients 
presenting with predominantly premeditated-aggression (Raine et al., 1998). This is 
consistent with neuropsychological data that indicate that psychopathic individuals, 
individuals who present with marked instrumental aggression, do not present with 
poor performance on general measures of frontal lobe functioning (LaPierre, Braun, 
& Hodgins, 1995; Mitchell et al., 2002). 
 It has been suggested that regions of the orbitofrontal cortex are involved in a 
system that is crucial for social cognition and the modulation of impulsive-aggression 
(Blair, 2004; Blair & Cipolotti, 2000). The orbitofrontal cortex receives highly 
processed sensory information concerning an individual‟s environmental experience 
(Mesulam, 1986) and is hypothesised to play a role in the perception of social signals, 
in particular, facial expressions of anger (Blair et al., 1999). Rolls (2000) suggested 
that the orbitofrontal cortex modulates the subcortical systems mediating impulsive-
aggression through the expectations of reward and identifying if these expectations 
have been violated. He argued that frustration, which has been linked to the display of 
impulsive-aggression, occurs following the initiation of a specific behaviour to 
achieve an expected reward and the subsequent absence of this reward. It can 
therefore be suggested that orbitofrontal cortex may increase neuronal activity in the 
subcortical systems mediating impulsive-aggression when an expected reward has not 
been achieved and suppress neuronal activity when the expected reward is achieved. 
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 Blair and Cipolotti (2000) proposed a further process termed Social Response 
Reversal (SRR). The position stresses the role of social cues in modulating social 
behaviour (Blair, 2001; Blair & Cipolotti, 2000). The SRR is thought to be activated 
by another individual‟s angry expression, other negative valenced expressions and 
situations associated with social disapproval. In line with this, the orbitofrontal cortex 
is activated by negative emotional expressions including anger, fear and disgust (Blair 
et al., 1999; Kesler-West et al., 2001; Sprengelmeyer, Rausch, Eysel & Przuntek, 
1998). Moreover, patients with orbitofrontal lesions are impaired in their ability to 
recognise facial expressions, particularly anger (Blair & Cipolotti, 2000; Hornak et 
al., 1996). 
 In a discussion of the literature, Davidson et al. (2000b) suggested that 
individuals can typically regulate their negative affect and can also profit from 
restraint-producing cues in their environment, such as others‟ facial expression of fear 
or anger. Information about behaviours that indiciate threat (e.g., hostile stares, 
threatening words) is conveyed to the amygdala, which then projects to other limbic 
structures, and it is there that information about social context derived from the 
orbitofrontal projections is integrated with one‟s current perceptions. The 
orbitofrontal cortex, through its connections with other prefrontal sectors and with the 
amygdala, thus plays an important role in inhibiting impulsive-aggressive outbursts 
because prefrontal activations that occur during anger arousal constrain the impulsive 
expression of emotional behaviour. 
 Davidson et al. (2000b) further proposed that dysfunctions in one or more of 
these regions and/or in the interconnections among them may be associated with 
faulty regulation of negative emotion and an increased propensity for impulsive-
aggression. Firstly, people with prefrontal and/or amygdala dysfunction might 
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misinterpret environmental cues, such as facial expressions of others, and react 
impulsively to a misperceived threat. According to Albert, Walsh and Jonik (1993), 
most acts of human aggression are a reaction toward a threat, be it real or imagined. 
Therefore, the perception of whether a stimulus is threatening is vital in the cognitive 
processing leading to aggressive behaviour. Secondly, evidence suggests that 
individuals vary considerably in their ability to suppress negative emotion. Therefore, 
individuals with decreased prefrontal activity may have greater difficulty suppressing 
negative emotions than those individuals who have greater prefrontal activation.  
 
 3.6 Subcortical Structures 
Subcortically, four structures are viewed as important in mediating aggressive 
behaviour: the amygdala, hippocampus, midbrain area, and thalamus. The amygdala, 
hippocampus and prefrontal cortex make up part of the limbic system governing the 
expression of emotion, while the thalamus relays inputs from subcortical limbic 
structures to the prefrontal cortex (Mirsky & Siegel, 1994). Traditionally, subcortical 
and limbic regions of the brain have been viewed as involved in the generation of 
aggressive feelings and behaviours, while the prefrontal cortex is viewed as inhibiting 
and modulating these basic emotions (Weiger & Bear, 1988). Consequently, it could 
be argued that it is the relative balance of activity between the prefrontal and 
subcortical brain regions which may be critically important in predisposing one to 
aggressive behaviour. If prefrontal functioning is reduced relative to subcortical 
structures, the individual may be more prone to aggression in general and perhaps 
impulsive-aggression in particular. Raine et al.‟s (1998) results support this argument, 
finding lower prefrontal activity in affective (impulsive) murderers and higher 
subcortical activity in both affective and predatory murderers relative to controls.  
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 3.7 Conclusion 
The consistency across studies suggests that prefrontal dysfunction may 
underlie a predisposition to aggressive behaviour. Evidence is strongest for an 
association between prefrontal dysfunction and an impulsive subtype of aggressive 
behaviour (e.g., Bassarath, 2001b; Brower & Price, 2001; Raine et al., 1998). 
However, given the lack of specificity in research in aggression regarding the 
subtypes of impulsive- and premeditated-aggression, the mediating role of the 
prefrontal cortex in premeditated-aggression cannot be ruled out. 
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Chapter 4 
Rationale 
 
 The aim of the present study is to test hypotheses related to information 
processing differences pertaining to prefrontal functioning between impulsive-
aggressive and premeditated-aggressive individuals. According to the clinical 
literature, damage to the prefrontal cortex results in poor impulse control and 
explosive, aggressive outbursts (Duffy & Campbell, 1994). However, although 
problems of disinhibition are implicated, there are many ways in which prefrontal 
dysfunction may heighten the risk for aggressive behaviour.  
Perhaps most salient are defects in executive functions. Such functions involve 
the ability to plan and problem-solve, deficits in which may lead to careless or 
inappropriate behaviours, interpersonal inappropriateness, as well as rigidity or 
difficulty modifying behaviour. A lessened capacity to self-correct, learn, and think 
flexibly, will have a particularly salient effect in situations which lack clear rules and 
structure as an inability to generate a suitable response may exacerbate frustration and 
thus the tendency to reflexive emotional responding. 
A reliance on reflexive responding suggests a certain degree of behavioural 
rigidity. The behavioural rigidity which is often associated with frontal lobe damage 
manifests in overly persistent or perseverative responding (Lezak, Howieson & 
Loring, 2004). Such perseveration can be understood as the continuation of a response 
after it is no longer appropriate. An inability to adjust inappropriate behaviours in 
social situations may lead to heightened interpersonal conflict. Related to this notion 
is the ability to correctly interpret the emotion of others, that is, deficits in such 
abilities will also result in inappropriate responding in social interactions. The 
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inability to inhibit inappropriate behavioural responses may also have a particularly 
salient influence in propelling one toward aggressive responding. Prefrontal deficits 
may result in an inability to control the behavioural expression of mood changes, and 
thus the usual capacity to inhibit inappropriate emotional responses may break down.  
Studies of patients with neurological disorders have provided provocative 
insights into which structural brain mechanisms, when damaged, may predispose 
some persons to antisocial and aggressive behaviour. However, while such individuals 
indicate a link between brain damage and the onset of antisocial behaviour, it could be 
argued that these findings have little relevance to those individuals in the community 
who have consistent aggressive behaviour throughout their lives, yet have not suffered 
gross brain damage. It has been speculated that such individuals possess more subtle 
prefrontal dysfunction than the blunt damage in acquired sociopaths, but there have 
been few tests of this hypothesis. Specifically, it is not known whether aggressive 
individuals in the community have subtle structural deficits in the prefrontal cortex in 
the absence of discernable lesions. 
With the exception of Stanford et al. (1997), most neuropsychological research 
on aggression have investigated possible deficits in either incarcerated prison inmates 
or psychiatric patients, ignoring the large number of individuals in the general 
population who commit aggressive acts yet have not come into contact with the 
criminal justice or mental health systems. Such sampling biases inhibit the usefulness 
of such results in the development of interventions and treatments for reducing 
specific forms of aggression. 
The current review has also emphasised the importance of distinguishing 
between predominantly impulsive-aggressive behaviour and predominantly 
premeditated-aggressive behaviour. While distinguishing between aggressive 
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subtypes is clearly important for understanding the causal features of such behaviour, 
it has also been shown to be crucial in relation to proper intervention and treatment 
(Pulkkinen, 1996; Vitaro et al., 1998). Furthermore, the results of Barratt et al. 
(1997a) and Malone et al. (1998) clearly suggest that the extent to which biological 
variables influence impulsive- and premeditated-aggressive behaviour differs. The 
problem is, however, as Scarpa and Raine (2000) highlighted, “few studies of the 
biological bases of antisocial behaviour in humans have categorised aggression or 
violence according to these subtypes” (p. 321). Rather, most have used heterogeneous 
groups of aggressive individuals comparing them to non-aggressive controls. This has 
led to equivocal and sometimes misleading results throughout the literature. In 
attempting to overcome these problems, the current study attempts to delineate the 
neurobiology of aggression through an investigation of the neuropsychological 
differences between predominantly impulsive- and predominantly premeditated-
aggressive individuals.  
Studies of subjects with acquired frontal lobe injury support the association 
between increased aggression and focal orbitofrontal, or ventromedial frontal injury, 
or both. The neuropsychological literature, however, tends to find increased 
aggressive behaviour associated with deficits in executive function, which correlate 
with dorsolateral prefrontal dysfunction (Dolan & Anderson, 2002; Stanford et al., 
1997). The dorsolateral and orbitofrontal prefrontal cortex are parts of an integrative 
functional system and they typically work together, even in a single situation. Thus, 
one hypothesis to account for discrepant data is that orbitofrontal and dorsolateral 
prefrontal dysfunction contribute to aggressive dyscontrol in different ways.  
Dorsolateral dysfunction may become evident through its impact on executive 
functions. Such executive deficits, as investigated in Study 1, may increase the risk of 
 45 
aggression through its direct effects on impulse control, planning, self-monitoring, 
and cognitive flexibility. Individuals who have dysfunction involving the orbitofrontal 
cortex comprise a different group. Retrospective data strongly support a link between 
the disinhibited type of frontal network syndrome and aggressive dyscontrol. Thus, 
dysfunction in the orbitofrontal cortex may lead to aggression through impaired 
emotion recognition, as examined in Study 2, as well as through inhibitory, response 
reversal, and decision-making deficits investigated in Study 3 (Brower & Price, 
2001).  
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Chapter 5 
Study 1: Executive Functioning 
 
Executive functioning has been conceptualised as the capacity to use certain „higher-
order‟ cognitive abilities to adaptively regulate one‟s goal-directed behaviour 
(Giancola, Roth & Parrott, 2006). While previous notions of executive functioning 
have described a homogenous set of processes, not differentiating among individual 
skills, it is now understood that executive functions are best understood as an 
umbrella term, encompassing a number of interrelated subskills, necessary for 
purposive action (Stuss & Benson, 1986). One can thus conceive of executive 
functions as a set of processes that are distinct from one another but that nonetheless 
work together in order to meet a particular common goal (Sylvester et al., 2003). 
In a review of neuropsychological assessment procedures, Lezak (1995) stated 
that executive functions are those capacities which enable a person to successfully 
engage in independent, purposeful, and self-serving behaviours. Stuss (1992) has 
proposed an integrated model of executive function, including a set of associated 
skills that allow the individual to develop goals, actively hold them in memory, 
monitor performance, and control for interference to achieve these goals. Shallice 
(1990) and Walsh (1978) fine-tuned the concept further, suggesting that executive 
functions may not be employed during the activation of well-learned routine 
behaviours, but are enlisted in novel or unfamiliar circumstances in which no 
previously established routines for responding exist. In other words, executive 
functioning allows humans to respond to situations in a flexible manner, to create and 
adapt plans and to base their behaviour on internally held ideas rather than being 
governed exclusively by external stimuli.  
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Such cognitive abilities subsumed under the rubric of „executive functioning‟ 
include attentional control, strategic goal planning, abstract reasoning, cognitive 
flexibility, hypothesis generation, temporal response sequencing, as well as the ability 
to organise and adaptively use information contained in the working memory (Fuster, 
1989; Stuss & Benson, 1984, 1986). Thus executive dysfunction may be reflected by 
poor planning and organisation, difficulties generating and implementing strategies 
for problem-solving, perseveration, reduced self-control, impulsivity, inability to use 
feedback to correct errors, and rigid or concrete thought processes (Lezak, 1995; Stuss 
& Benson, 1986).  
In daily life, individuals must rely on such processes when automatic or 
previously learned behaviours can no longer achieve a goal, for example, when there 
is a need to override habitual responses, solve new problems or shift between different 
tasks. This capability is crucial in changing environments where there is a constant 
need to adapt behaviour by detecting and focusing on the goal-relevant information 
and selecting the most appropriate behaviour (Mansouri, Tanaka & Buckly, 2009). 
Executive functions thus allow the individual to select and schedule appropriate 
sequences of actions when effective new plans of action have been formulated 
(Kempton et al., 1999).  
 
5.1  Neuroanatomy of executive functions 
Executive functions were thought to be subserved primarily, if not solely, by 
the frontal lobes since at least the 19th century when Phineas Gage demonstrated 
dramatic changes in self-regulatory function after a dynamic tamping rod was 
propelled through his frontal lobe (Damasio et al., 1994). There is now convincing 
evidence that executive functions depend, in large part, upon the integrity of the 
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prefrontal cortex (Stuss, 2002), as well as its connections with the parietal and 
temporal lobe structures, the limbic structures such as the amygdala and the 
hippocampus, and the striatum (Kempton et al., 1999). Damage in this area can 
consequently result in impairment in planning and problem-solving, impulsive, 
disinhibited or disorganised behaviour, cognitive rigidity, as well as a reduced ability 
to self-regulate and consider the outcomes of behaviours (Blair, 2004).  
According to Royall et al. (2002), the role of the prefrontal cortex in executive 
functioning is due to its unique structure and pattern of connectivity. However, while 
the prefrontal cortex is the primary brain region related to executive functioning, it 
should be noted that such abilities are not governed solely by the prefrontal cortex and 
that this region of the brain is also responsible for other „non-executive‟ functions 
(Duffy & Campbell, 1994). The prefrontal cortex is richly and reciprocally 
interconnected with almost every cortical and subcortical neural region. 
Consequently, damage to these other areas adversely affects executive functioning 
(Fuster, 2001). Specifically, structures such as the anterior cingulate (Devinsky, 
Morrell & Vogt, 1995), the striatum (Owen et al., 1992), the thalamus (Alexander, 
Crutcher & DeLong, 1990), and the cerebellum (Allen, Buxton, Wong & Courchesne, 
1997) are all involved, at least in part, in governing executive abilities. Nevertheless, 
while executive functions are not the sole domain of the prefrontal cortex, this region 
of neural tissue is considered to be the primary cortical substrate that subsumes these 
related cognitive functions. Looking more specifically at the prefrontal cortex, while 
research suggests that the orbitofrontal region of the prefrontal cortex is related to 
emotional regulation and impulsivity, thereby increasing susceptibility to aggressive 
impulses, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex has primarily been linked to executive 
functions (Giancola, 1995; Mattson & Levin, 1990; Smith & Jonides, 1999). 
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 Neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that many executive processes evoke 
activity in a network of brain regions (Miller & Cohen, 2001) that include the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and related subcortical regions including the basal 
ganglia and thalamus, and selected temporal and parietal regions (Berman et al., 1995; 
Casey et al., 2001; Kirino, Belger, Goldman-Rakic & McCarthy, 2000; McCarthy, 
Luby, Gore & Goldman-Rakic, 1997; Monchi, Petrides, Petre, Worsley & Dagher, 
2001). Converging evidence from patient studies have shown that damage to this 
network results in impairments to behavioural flexibility and to anticipation of future 
consequences (Knight & Stuss, 2002; Lhermitte, 1986). 
Measures of executive functioning are typically derived from tests that assess 
programming and planning of goal-oriented motor behaviour skills, modulation of 
behaviour in light of expected future consequences, anticipation of events in 
regulating behaviour, learning contingency rules and using feedback cues, inhibition, 
cognitive flexibility, abstract reasoning, problem-solving, sustained attention and 
concentration (Cauffman, Steinberg & Piquero, 2005). Alvarez and Emory (2006) 
completed a qualitative review of three popular executive function measures: the 
WCST, phonemic verbal fluency, and the Stroop colour-word task. They found that 
these tests are sensitive, but not specific, to frontal lobe damage. Overall, they found 
that individuals with frontal lobe lesions perform more poorly than healthy controls 
on these tests, although several studies indicate that patients perform within normal 
limits (e.g., Ahola, Vikki & Servo, 1996; Damasio, 1994; Eslinger & Damasio, 1985; 
Heck & Bryer, 1986; Shallice & Burgess, 1991). These results suggest that such tests 
should not be used as frontal lobe tests per se, but rather as tests of specific executive 
functions such as problem-solving and cognitive flexibility. Stuss and Alexander 
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(2000) support this claim, arguing that “there is no frontal homunculus, no unitary 
executive function (p. 291). 
 
5.2  Executive functioning measures 
5.2.1  Verbal Fluency Test 
The Verbal Fluency Test is used to assess the ability to update working 
memory and flexibility of verbal thought processes. Alvarez and Emory (2006) in 
their review of the task reported that ten (out of ten) studies found that persons with 
frontal lobe lesions produce significantly fewer words than healthy controls, and eight 
(out of nine) studies indicate that person with frontal lobe lesions perform worse than 
persons with non-frontal lobe lesions. In support of these findings, Henry and 
Crawford (2004) conducted a meta-analysis of 31 studies and found that individuals 
with focal frontal lesions had larger deficits in verbal fluency as compared to healthy 
controls. 
Studies which have examined whether the frontal lobes are activated during 
verbal fluency performance in healthy adult populations have found increased 
activation in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Frith et al., 1995; Frith, Friston, 
Liddle & Frackowiak 1991; Warkentin & Passant, 1997), anterior cingulate (Frith et 
al., 1991; 1995; Phelps, Hyder, Blamire & Shulman, 1997), and left inferior frontal 
gyrus (Paulesu et al., 1997; Phelps et al., 1997). The findings of increased activation 
in frontal areas along with the finding of Parks et al. (1988) of increased overall 
frontal lobe activation in frontal areas suggest that an intact frontal cortex, especially 
in the left hemisphere, is required for verbal fluency performance. Further research 
has implicated the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, more specifically, in verbal fluency 
functioning. rCBF and PET studies revealed significant flow augmentation and 
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increased activity in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex during word fluency tasks (Cantor-
Graae, Warkentin, Franzen & Risberg, 1993; Warkentin, Risberg, Nilsson, Karlson & 
Graae, 1991).  
 
5.2.2 Trail Making Test 
The letter-number switching condition of the Trail Making Test is a 
neuropsychological measure of the ability to initiate, switch and stop a sequence of 
complex purposive behaviour that requires attention and concentration skills (Moffitt 
& Henry, 1989). This ability to think flexibly (also referred to as set shifting) is 
considered to be an integral component of executive functioning and has been found 
to be sensitive to frontal lobe damage (e.g., Boll, 1981). Zakzanis, Mraz, and Graham 
(2005) revealed distinct left-sided dorsolateral and medial frontal activity when 
comparing performance on Part B versus Part A of the trail making test in healthy 
young adults. Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, Moll, Bramati and Andreiuolo (2002) also 
found activation in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and supplementary motor 
area/cingulate sulcus in normal adults.  
Stuss and colleagues, in earlier research, found that patients with damage in 
dorsolateral frontal areas were most impaired on Part B of the trail making test in 
comparison to patients with damage to other areas of the brain, including the medial 
and orbital regions of the frontal cortex (Stuss, Floden, Alexander, Levine & Katz, 
2001a). These findings are in line with clinico-anatomic and functional neuroimaging 
data that point to a critical role of the dorsolateral and medial prefrontal cortices in the 
regulation of cognitive flexibility (e.g., Moll et al., 2002; Shibuya-Taoshi, et al., 2007; 
Szatkowska, Szymanska, Bojarski & Grabowska, 2007; Zakzanis et al., 2005).  
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5.2.3 Tower of Hanoi 
Tower of Hanoi investigates planning and spatial problem-solving ability and 
is considered to be especially sensitive to frontal system dysfunction (Grafman et al., 
1992; Goel & Grafman, 1995; Morris, Miotto, Feigenbaum, Bullock & Polkey, 1997). 
Using a simplified version of this task which he termed the Tower of London, 
Shallice (1982) demonstrated that certain patients with frontal lesions showed 
pronounced impairments in planning that could not be accounted for in terms of any 
more basic perceptual or memory problems. Further studies, some of which have used 
a computerised version of the Tower of London or Tower of Hanoi, have both 
replicated findings of deficits in patients with frontal lesions (Carlin et al., 2000; Goel 
& Grafman, 1995; Owen et al., 1990; Yochim, Baldo, Kane & Delis, 2009), and also 
demonstrated frontal activation on PET imaging when normal volunteers perform this 
task (Morris, Ahmed, Syed & Toone, 1993; Rowe, Owen, Johnsrude & Passingham, 
2001; van den Heuvel et al., 2003). 
More specific analyses of the separable regions of the prefrontal cortex 
involved in the Tower of Hanoi are limited, however research utilising the Tower of 
London indicate predominant dorsolateral involvement in this task. Owen, Doyon, 
Petrides and Evans (1996) found activation of left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, as 
well as several activations in right premotor and parietal cortices that may be 
associated with visuo-spatial maintenance. Similarly, Baker et al. (1996) using PET 
found that performance was associated with bilateral premotor and dorsolateral frontal 
cortex, anterior cingulated gyrus, bilateral medial and superior parietal cortex, and 
lateral occipital cortex. They also found that increasing task difficulty was associated 
with relative increases in frontal, premotor, and medial parietal cortices and robust 
activations in right dorsolateral prefrontal and bilateral premotor cortex. Similarly, 
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Dagher, Owen, Boecker and Brooks (1999) found that increased task complexity 
correlated with increased activation in bilateral premotor, dorsolateral prefrontal, and 
rostral anterior cingulate cortex, and right dorsal caudate nucleus. 
More recently, Lazeron et al. (2000) found increased activity in bilateral 
dorsolateral frontal cortex, left anterior cingulate cortex, left insula, and bilateral 
cuneus and precuneus and left angular gyrus. Similar results were also reported by 
Cazalis et al. (2003). Van den Heuvel et al. (2005) found that planning and task 
complexity on the Tower of London task were associated with activation in right and 
dorsolateral frontal cortex respectively. 
 
5.2.4  Stroop Colour-Word Interference Task 
A major role of the frontal lobes is to control response options (Fuster, 1997; 
Stuss, Shallice, Alexander & Picton, 1995) through marshalling inhibitory processes, 
establishing response selection, or maintaining constant activation of the intended 
goal. In general, brain imaging data support the sensitivity and specificity of the 
Stroop task to frontal lobe functioning. The Stroop task has been reported to 
distinguish patients with frontal lobe damage from healthy controls (Stuss et al., 
2001a; Vendrell et al., 1995), and patients with lesions in other areas (Perret, 1974; 
Stuss et al., 2001a). Frontal patients also often fail to inhibit the dominant response in 
the interference condition of the task (Holst & Vilkki, 1998; Spreen & Strauss, 1998).  
More specifically, the Stroop task has been consistently shown to recruit the 
anterior cingulate cortex as well as other frontal regions, particularly regions of the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (see Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004; MacLeod & 
McDonald, 2000 for reviews). The anterior cingulate is a critical brain region for 
adequate performance on the Stroop task given its role in selective attention (Peterson 
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et al., 1999), and studies have shown that patients with lesions of the anterior 
cingulate cortex present with profound increases in the level of interference that they 
show during incongruent Stroop trials (Stuss et al., 2001a; Swick & Jovanovic, 2002). 
Several studies also indicate that the Stroop test activates the middle frontal 
gyrus (Banich et al., 2000; Bush et al., 1998; Leung, Skudlarski, Gatenby, Peterson, & 
Gore, 2000; Peterson et al., 1999), medial frontal cortex, and dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (Evan Nee, Wager, & Jonides, 2007). Performance on the Stroop Test has also 
been found to be accompanied by right frontal activation as measured by PET (Bench 
et al., 1993; Taylor, Kornblum, Lauber, Minoshima, & Koeppe, 1997).  
Evan Nee et al. (2007) completed a quantitative meta-analysis on 47 
neuroimaging studies involving tasks purported to require the resolution of 
interference, including the Stroop, flanker, go/no-go, stimulus-response compatibility, 
Simon, and stop-signal tasks. They found activation in the right dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex and left premotor/supplementary motor area which is consistent with the idea 
that these regions are implicated in the resolution of interference during response 
selection (Bunge, Hazeltine, Scanlon, Rosen & Gabrieli, 2002; Durston, Thomas, 
Worden, Yang & Casey, 2002a; Durston et al., 2002b; Praamstra, Kleine & 
Schnitzler, 1999). Activation was also found in the anterior cingulate cortex, which 
again highlights its function as a monitor involved in the resolution of response 
conflict (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter & Cohen, 2001).  
 
5.2.5  The Brixton Test 
The Brixton Test is a concept attainment task. The task assesses mental 
flexibility, the ability to use feedback to shift cognitive sets and goal-directed 
behaviour. This class of test, of which the WCST is the most well-known example, is 
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known to present problems for patients with frontal lobe lesions (Stuss et al., 2000). 
By comparison with the WCST, the Brixton Test improves the potential 
discriminability of different patterns of functional deficit (e.g., induction vs. 
inhibition), by increasing the range of the possible choices on each trial. A wider and 
more abstract set of rules is used, which places greater stress on the inductive 
component. Furthermore, in contrast to the WCST, the rule that is currently in 
operation cannot be triggered by a perceptually salient aspect of the stimuli. 
Four groups of subjects (one control group and three neurological lesion 
groups) were used as an initial standardisation sample for the Brixton Test (Burgess & 
Shallice, 1997). The lesion groups were divided into anterior (lesion involving the 
frontal lobes), posterior (lesions elsewhere in the cortex not involving the frontal 
lobes), and bifrontal (bilateral frontal lobe lesions with no posterior involvement). The 
control participants consisted of healthy volunteers who had no previous history of 
neurologic or psychiatric disorder, epilepsy, or drug or alcohol abuse problems. The 
authors found that the unilateral anterior subjects were significantly poorer than the 
posteriors or the controls, with the posteriors not significantly different from the 
controls. The bifrontal group achieved the lowest score, however the contrast with the 
unilateral anterior group failed to reach significance. The split-half reliability of the 
Brixton Test for the control group was found to be 0.62 (p<.001), and overall test-
retest reliability to be 0.71 (p<.001).  
 
 5.3 Executive functioning and aggression – a review of previous research 
Although the causes of interpersonal aggression are multifactorial, research 
suggests an association between low executive functioning and aggressive behaviour 
(see Giancola, 1995; Moffitt, 1993 for reviews). Individuals with disorders 
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characterised by antisocial behaviour such as APD (Dolan & Park, 2002), substance 
use disorders (Giancola & Moss, 1998), CD (Giancola & Mezzich, 2000; Moffitt, 
1993) and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD: Barkley, 1997) have all 
demonstrated poor performance on neuropsychological tests of executive functioning. 
However, although executive functioning has been linked to disinhibited and 
antisocial behaviour more broadly, only a few studies have examined its relationship 
to aggressive behaviour more specifically. 
 The study of clinical populations characterised by aggression has supported 
the importance of executive functioning in the mediation of aggressive behaviour. 
While there is little evidence that psychopathy is associated with impaired executive 
functions (see Blair & Frith, 2000 for review), there have been reports of impairments 
in antisocial groups more broadly defined (e.g., Dinn & Harris, 2000). A recent 
review concluded that executive function is impaired in APD, with an estimated effect 
size of .62 (Morgan & Lilienfeld, 2000).  
More precise information about the nature of neuropsychological function in 
antisocial groups is provided by Dolan and Park (2002). This study involved 
offenders specifically diagnosed with DSM-IV APD (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994) but not other Axis II disorders who had been screened for current 
Axis I disorders, previous drug or alcohol dependence, learning disability, medication 
and neurological damage. The tasks were selected as being putatively associated with 
both dorsolateral and ventromedial frontal lobe function, and included the Tower of 
London planning test (Owen, Downes, Sahakian, Polkey & Robbins, 1990) and a 
visual discrimination learning paradigm that tests the ability to shift an attentional set 
on the basis of feedback information (Owen, Roberts, Polkey, Sahakian & Robbins, 
1991). The battery also included a Go/No-Go task. The inhibitory aspects of such 
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tasks depend on inferior portions of the frontal lobes (Aron, Fletcher, Bullmore, 
Sahakian & Robbins, 2003). Comparison with non-offender controls matched for age 
and IQ demonstrated that the APD offenders were impaired at formulating sequences 
of actions to solve problems on the Tower of London planning test, and that they were 
impaired at shifting a learnt attentional bias in visual discrimination learning. These 
two deficits are consistent with the proposal that APD involves dysfunction of 
circuitry encompassing the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. In addition, on the Go/No-
Go task, the offenders made consistently more errors of commission, suggesting 
dysfunction in more inferior frontal areas. Further to such findings, CD adolescent 
males (Lueger & Gill, 1990) and females (Giancola & Mezzich, 2000) have also been 
shown to perform poorly on neuropsychological tests of executive functioning.  
Further experimental studies have provided additional evidence supporting the 
aggression-executive function relationship. Aggression has been linked to low scores 
on tests of executive functioning in samples of boys (Giancola et al., 1996; Seguin, 
Pihl, Harden & Tremblay, 1995), adolescent girls (Giancola, Mezzich & Tarter, 
1998a), adult men (Giancola & Zeichner, 1994; Hoaken, Assaad & Pihl, 1998; Lau & 
Pihl, 1996; Lau, Pihl & Peterson, 1995) and adult women (Hoaken et al., unpublished 
observations, as cited in Hoaken, Shaughnessy & Pihl, 2003). Foster, Hillbrand and 
Silverstein (1993) were also able to predict future aggression using 
neuropsychological measures in a sample of men who had previously committed 
violent crimes. 
 
5.4  Executive functioning and impulsive- and premeditated-aggression 
While there is a large body of literature reporting neuropsychological 
correlates of violence and aggression, there are few authors in the aggression 
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literature who have reported deficiencies associated specifically with either 
impulsive- or premeditated-aggressive individuals. For example, some studies have 
found that the reduced frontal functioning is present in patients presenting with 
impulsive-aggression, but not premeditated-aggression (see Blair, 2004 for review). 
Using the SHAPS, Dolan and Anderson (2002) grouped male personality 
disordered offenders into high and low impulsive aggressors. They found a negative 
correlation between impulsivity and aggression with executive function. Similarly, 
problems in executive functioning were also found to be a predictor of reactive 
aggression in adolescent boys at risk for substance abuse (Giancola et al., 1996). 
Similar results have been found in other samples utilising a similar 
classification system as those above. For example, Stanford et al. (1997) found that 
impulsive-aggressive college students exhibited executive control deficits in the areas 
of verbal strategic processing and impulse control. Barratt et al. (1997b) also 
documented an inverse relationship between impulsive-aggression and verbal skills in 
impulsive-aggressive inmates compared with non-impulsive (premeditated) 
aggressive inmates and non-aggressive controls. Villemarette-Pittman et al. (2002) 
showed that the verbal deficits observed in impulsive aggressive college students 
varied according to the degree of executive demands of the task. Consequently, they 
concluded that the poorer scores were a result of executive dysfunction and not solely 
a problem in verbal ability.  
Broomhall (2005), in his investigation of reactive (i.e., impulsive) versus 
instrumental (i.e., premeditated) violent offenders, found that the primarily reactive 
group was significantly impaired on tasks that involved higher-order executive 
functions such as verbal inhibition, maintenance of set, cognitive flexibility and the 
ability to see future consequences. The primarily instrumental group, on the other 
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hand, were largely intact on executive measures. Similarly Brower and Price (2001) 
suggest that prefrontal network dysfunction seems to be most specifically associated 
with a recurrent, impulsive subtype of aggression. 
However, while a number of studies have attempted to delineate the abnormal 
clinical and neurological features that characterise impulsive-aggressive behaviour 
(Coccaro, 1989; Houston & Stanford, 2001; Stanford et al., 2001), few investigations 
have attempted to document those features that are clinically relevant to individuals 
that engage in premeditated aggressive acts. The only paper comparing premeditated-
aggressive individuals to non-aggressive controls reports no difference on a variety of 
neuropsychological tests, except for a single subscale of the WCST, in which the 
premeditated group exhibited greater failure to maintain set than controls (Stanford et 
al., 2003b).  
The other studies to have investigated premeditated-aggression suffer from a 
number of methodological limitations. Firstly, the majority of studies have utilised 
offender samples (e.g., Broomhall, 2005). This population is associated with a number 
of potential confounding variables (e.g., low IQ) making generalisations of findings to 
a psychiatric or community sample tentative. Secondly, much of the aggression 
literature implies some link between psychopathy and aggression (Hare, 1993). While 
individuals who meet criteria for psychopathy may indeed engage in overt aggressive 
behaviour (premeditated or impulsive), it is not required or necessarily even a 
common characteristic of the classification. Therefore, accurate study requires explicit 
identification of the type and degree of aggressive behaviour exhibited.  
In summary, neuropsychological assessment has shown a clear link between 
impulsive-aggressive behaviour and problems in executive functioning, while few if 
any cognitive deficits have been demonstrated in premeditated aggressive individuals. 
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Accordingly, a recent review of frontal lobe dysfunction in violent and criminal 
behaviour recommends that neuropsychiatric evaluations of violent patients should 
include neuropsychological assessment of executive function “particularly in cases 
involving recurrent, impulsive aggression” (Brower & Price, 2001, p. 725). 
 
5.5  The relationship between executive functioning deficits and aggression 
The relationship between poor executive function and aggression, according to 
contemporary theories, may be related to poor strategy formulation, cognitive 
inflexibility, impulsiveness, and deficiencies in generating alternate non-aggressive 
socially appropriate responses in provocative situations (Dolan & Anderson, 2002). 
For example, although patients with frontal lobe damage are frequently aware that 
their aggressive reactions are inappropriate, they have an impaired ability to self-
modulate emotions and behaviours in accord with internal need states and the 
exigencies of the outside world (Golden et al., 1996).  
To formulate a general plan, the categorisation of a series of actions is central 
to achieving the objective, and clinical studies have implicated the prefrontal cortex in 
such processes. An aspect of behavioural problems observed in patients with frontal 
lobe lesions is a failure to achieve an objective of goal-oriented behaviour through a 
series of simple actions (Burgess & Shallice, 1966). Frontal patients also have 
difficulty arranging a set of simple open-ended tasks in an appropriate temporal order 
to achieve a behavioural goal (Shallice & Burgess, 1991). Clinical reports further 
suggest that patients with prefrontal lesions show impairment when formulating a 
coherent and structured action plan (Sirigu et al., 1995; Zalla, Plassiart, Pillon, 
Grafman & Sirigu, 2001). 
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Ineffectual hypothesis generation, concept formation, and set shifting skills 
along with poor judgement may also undermine one‟s ability to generate alternative 
behavioural responses, and to engage in them, in provocative situations. Inadequate 
planning, organisation, and temporal ordering skills may further compromise one‟s 
ability to correctly execute a series of responses in the proper sequence and manner in 
order to avoid an aggressive interaction. Finally, compromised behavioural inhibition 
may allow hostile cognitions and affective states to manifest themselves as overt 
aggressive/violent acts (Giancola, 1995). 
Thus, it can be suggested that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex plays an 
important role in the mediation of aggressive behaviour. The dorsolateral region of 
the prefrontal cortex has been shown to be the neural substrate that subserves the 
executive cognitive functions, which involve the self-regulation of goal-directed 
behaviour. Environmental determinants may also play a strong role in the expression 
of aggression, that is, aggressive behaviour usually occurs in the context of a 
provocative environment (Murdoch, Pihl & Ross, 1990). As such, Giancola (1995) 
concludes that the combined effects of dorsolateral prefrontal cortical deficits and a 
provocative/frustrating environment contribute to the propensity for aggressive 
behaviour. That is, deficient self and social monitoring, abstract reasoning, and 
attention skills may compromise one‟s ability to read and correctly interpret 
potentially ambiguous social cues which can conceivably lead to misunderstandings 
and possibly aggression in conflict situations.  
A further explanation for the relationship between executive functioning and 
aggression has been related to the concept of impulsivity. More specifically, it has 
been hypothesised that aggressive, low-executive functioning individuals are less able 
to inhibit impulsive behaviours (Lau et al., 1995). Lau and Pihl (1996) tested this 
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hypothesis by examining whether a monetary incentive could decrease aggressive 
responding in males. Individuals with low executive functioning (unlike those with 
high executive functioning) were unable to inhibit aggressive responding in the 
presence of monetary reward. The authors suggested that this inability might be due to 
a failure to use inhibitory feedback cues to regulate behaviour.  
 
5.6  Limitations of other studies 
While research has documented a relationship between aggressive behaviour 
and executive functioning deficits, such studies do suffer from some methodological 
shortcomings. Firstly, much research has focused on conduct problems, which may or 
may not have included aggression. Secondly, they may not have used a 
comprehensive assessment of executive function with well-validated tests. Executive 
function is a complex construct involving several dissociable abilities (Robbins, 
Weinberger, Taylor & Morris, 1996) and using one test of a component of executive 
function cannot be claimed to be a test of the entire construct. Therefore, it is 
necessary to administer a number of different neuropsychological tests of executive 
functions. Given these factors, there may have been a lack of sensitivity and 
specificity of measurement of both aggression and executive function in several 
studies that have failed to find the expected relationships. 
 A further limitation of previous studies surrounds the issue of comorbidity.  
Many of the disorders investigated in previous studies on antisocial behaviour feature 
an „impulsive‟ component such as drug abuse, alcohol intoxication and abuse, and 
pathological gambling. Antisocial behaviour can also be comorbid with other mental 
illnesses such as bipolar disorders, schizophrenia, and ADHD (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000). While these conditions in themselves are not necessarily risk 
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factors for aggressive behaviour, poor frontal lobe function has nonetheless been 
implicated in all of these conditions. It is important to note, however, that some of the 
demonstrated dysfunction may be dominantly orbitofrontal rather than dorsolateral. 
As noted previously, a number of studies examining participants without 
significant psychopathology have found some evidence for a relationship between 
subclinical impairment in executive functioning and antisocial and violent behaviour 
(Giancola & Zeichner, 1994; Lau et al., 1995; Moffitt & Henry, 1989; Seguin et al., 
1995; Stanford et al., 1997), providing an empirical foundation for research on the 
epidemiology of impaired executive functioning as a risk factor for aggressive 
behaviour in the general population. Unfortunately, however, most research on the 
aggression-executive functioning relationship has been limited to clinical, 
incarcerated, and other small non-representative samples (Hawkins & Trobst, 2000; 
Morgan & Lilienfeld, 2000). Such research does not take into account those 
individuals who behave aggressively yet have not come into contact with the criminal 
justice or mental health systems.  
As executive functioning is involved in the planning, initiation, and regulation 
of goal-directed behaviour (Milner, 1995), deficits in its function often contribute to 
poor behavioural self-regulation, social skills, and judgement. A „clinical impairment‟ 
in executive functioning typically results from damage, often due to injury, in the 
frontal lobes of the brain. „Subclinical impairment‟ in executive functioning, on the 
other hand, is not readily observable or easily diagnosable and may be affected by a 
range of hereditary, behavioural, and environmental factors (Paschall & Fishbein, 
2002). In a review of frontal lobe damage and antisocial behaviour, Kandel and Freed 
(1989) argued that although hard neurological signs may not be evident, minimal 
brain dysfunction can still influence behaviour. It is thus imperative to investigate 
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whether previously demonstrated executive deficits are present in individuals who are 
functioning „normally‟ by societal standards. This being said, it is acknowledged that 
it is difficult to ascertain from questionnaire responses the exact level of clinical 
impairment evident in the experimental groups without concurrent behavioural 
evidence. 
 
5.7  Aim and hypotheses 
 There is ample evidence that individuals with antisocial behaviour show 
impaired performance on measures of executive functioning. However, it should be 
noted that the frontal lobe positions have been relatively underspecified, typically, 
they do not distinguish between different forms of executive dysfunction or different 
regions of the prefrontal cortex. In addition, it remains unclear whether executive 
dysfunction relates to antisocial behaviour more broadly or to other characteristics, 
such as aggression, which may contribute to antisocial behaviour. Therefore, the 
purpose of the current study is to examine functional neuropsychological deficits (i.e., 
deficits with no identified organic aetiology such as head injury), namely executive 
functions, in impulsive-aggressive and premeditated-aggressive individuals, as well as 
controls. A number of well-validated tests of executive function were chosen to assess 
the performance of the groups across a range of executive abilities. 
While previous studies on aggression have demonstrated prefrontal deficits 
more broadly, it is the aim of the current study to focus on the separable role of the 
dorsolateral prefrontal system to determine if deficits in this region are related to 
impulsive-aggression and/or premeditated aggression. As previously mentioned, the 
orbital region of the prefrontal cortex has been found to be related to emotional 
regulation and impulsivity, thereby increasing susceptibility to aggressive impulses, 
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whereas the dorsolateral region of the prefrontal cortex has been found to be primarily 
responsible for aggressive behaviour due to impairments in executive functioning 
(Giancola, 1995). The focus of this study is thus on the role of the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex through executive functions in the expression of impulsive- and 
premeditated-aggression. 
 Based on the research outlined above, it is hypothesised that in comparison to 
controls, executive functioning deficits (e.g., planning, problem-solving, inhibition, 
cognitive flexibility, set-shifting) will be present in impulsive-aggressive individuals, 
given their hostile impulsive reaction in response to provocation which is 
demonstrated without forethought or planning (Giancola, 2000). This is in contrast to 
premeditated-aggression, characterised primarily by planned and controlled 
aggressive actions directed at attaining a particular goal. By definition, premeditated-
aggression is characterised by intact planning abilities and the cognitive regulation of 
behaviour. It is therefore expected that premeditated-aggressive individuals will not 
demonstrate executive functioning deficits in comparison to controls. 
 
5.8  Method 
5.8.1  Participants 
An initial pool of 484 students from the University of Tasmania was screened 
using the Aggression Questionnaire – Short Form (BPAQ-SF: Bryant & Smith, 2001). 
Aggression scores were non-normally distributed, with skewness of .796 (SE = .115) 
and kurtosis of .375 (SE = .23). 
Based on questionnaire responses, 100 participants (female = 68, male = 32) 
were selected and placed into one of two groups; aggressive (n = 70), and non-
aggressive controls (n = 30). The group selection criterion was one standard deviation 
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(SD = 7.43) above the mean (M = 24.14) on the BPAQ-SF for the aggressive group 
(BPAQ-SF = 31) and one standard deviation below the mean for the control group 
(BPAQ-SF = 17). The aggression scores differed significantly between the aggressive 
group (M = 37.59, SD = 5.75) and control group (M = 15.2, SD = 1.73), F(1, 99) = 
435.93, MSE = 10523.52, p<.001, 2 = .816. 
The aggressive group was further divided into predominantly impulsive-
aggressive and predominantly premeditated-aggressive using the Impulsive-
Premeditated Aggression Scale (IPAS; Stanford, Houston, Mathias, Villemarette-
Pittman, Helfritz & Conklin, 2003a). The IPAS was developed with 15 items related 
to impulsive-aggression and 15 items to premeditated-aggression. However, based on 
the original factor analysis, it is unclear which items specifically refer to each subtype 
as the item principal components analysis identified three factors (impulsive 
aggression, premeditated aggression, familiarity with target/remorse/agitation), rather 
than the proposed two. Consequently, a series of items were selected which had clear 
face validity as reflecting the theoretical constructs of impulsive- and premeditated-
aggression. From these, only those that shared variance to form clear impulsive-
aggressive and premeditated-aggressive in the four factor analyses (Haden, Scarpa & 
Stanford, 2008; Kockler, Stanford, Nelson, Meloy & Sanford, 2006; Mathias et al., 
2007, Stanford et al., 2003a) conducted on the scale to date were selected, and only if 
they obtained loadings greater than 0.4 on three of the four analyses. This identified 
eight impulsive and nine premeditated items (see Table 5.1). 
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Table 5.1 
The Impulsive-Premeditated Aggression Scale (Stanford et al., 2003a) 
    
Impulsive Items 
1. I became agitated or emotionally upset prior to the acts* 
2. I feel I lost control of my temper during the acts* 
3. I consider the acts to have been impulsive* 
4. When angry I reacted without thinking* 
5. I usually can‟t recall the details of the incidents well* 
6. I feel some of the incidents went too far* 
7. My behaviour was too extreme for the level of provocation* 
8. I was in a bad mood the day of the incident* 
9. I feel I acted out aggressively more than the average person during the last 6 months 
10. I knew most of the persons involved in the incidents 
11. I typically felt guilty after the aggressive acts 
12. I was concerned for my safety during the acts 
13. I was in control during the aggressive act 
14. I understood the consequences of the acts before I acted 
15. I was confused during the acts. 
Premeditated Items 
1. I think the other person deserved what happened to them during some of the incidents* 
2. I am glad some of the incidents occurred* 
3. Some of the acts were attempts at revenge* 
4. I feel my actions were necessary to get what I wanted* 
5. I felt my outbursts were justified* 
6. I wanted some of the incidents to occur* 
7. I planned when and where my anger was expressed* 
8. Prior to the incidents, I knew an altercation was going to occur* 
9. Sometimes I purposely delayed the acts until a later time* 
10. The act led to power over others or improved social status for me 
11. I was under the influence of alcohol or other drugs during the acts 
12. Anything could have set me off prior to the incident 
13. I felt pressure from others to commit the acts 
14. The acts were a „release‟ and I felt better afterwards 
15. My aggressive outbursts were usually directed at a specific person 
    
* Items from the IPAS used in the grouping of the aggression groups.  
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Participants were placed into either predominantly impulsive-aggressive or 
predominantly premeditated-aggressive if there was a difference of 25% or greater 
between their scores on the two subscales, based on the methods of Andreasen and 
Olsen (1982) and Slaghuis and Bakker (1995). This method led to the exclusion of 15 
participants from the 70 aggressive individuals initially identified. The final sample 
consisted of 38 impulsive-aggressive, 17 premeditated-aggressive and 30 control 
participants. The number of males and females in each group is shown in Table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2 
Number of males and females in the three participant groups and total sample 
  
Impulsive-
Aggressive 
Premeditated-
Aggressive 
Control Total 
     
Males  9 11 9 29 
Females 29 6 21 56 
      
 
Mean aggression scores on the BPAQ-SF for the three participant groups are 
shown in Table 5.3. There was a significant difference in aggression scores between 
the three groups, F(2, 84) = 189.68, MSE = 4782.43, p<.001, 2 = 822. Post hoc 
Tukey tests indicated that the impulsive-aggressive and premeditated-aggressive 
groups had significantly higher aggression scores than the control group (ps < .05). 
There were no significant differences in BPAQ-SF scores between the males and 
females in the impulsive-aggressive group, F(1, 37) = .33, MSE = 9.94, p = .57, 2 = 
.009, premeditated-aggressive group, F(1, 16) = .2, MSE = 10.59, p = .66, 2 = .013, 
or total sample, F(1, 84) = .71, MSE = 98.75, p = .4, 2 = .008, however in the control 
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group, males had significantly higher aggression scores than females, F(1, 29) = 10.3, 
MSE = 31.56, p = .003, 2 = .269. 
 Participants‟ ages ranged from 17 to 30 years with a mean age of 19.89 years 
(SD = 2.56). Mean ages for each participant group are presented in Table 5.3. There 
was no significant difference in age between the three participant groups, F(2, 84) = 
.15, MSE = .98, p = .86, 2 = .004. 
Inclusion into this study required all participants to be between 17 and 30 
years of age, speak English as their first language and have no history of neurological 
conditions or head injury. Head injury was defined as being knocked unconscious for 
any period of time, having been diagnosed with concussion by a physician, or having 
suffered trauma to the head severe enough to require medical attention. Participants 
were also excluded if they scored lower than 8 (scaled score) on the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale – Third Edition (WAIS-III; Wechsler, 1997) Vocabulary and Digit 
Span subtests which were completed during the testing sessions to rule out a general 
cognitive or memory deficit. 
 
Table 5.3 
Mean (and standard deviation) scores on the Aggression Questionnaire – Short Form 
and ages for the three participant groups and total sample 
  
Impulsive-
Aggressive 
Premeditated-
Aggressive 
Control Total 
     
BPAQ-Revised 37.47 (5.47) 38.18 (7.23) 15.50 (2.08) 29.86 (11.77) 
Males 36.56 (4.25) 38.82 (6.97) 17.00 (1.12) 31.34 (10.94) 
Females 37.76 (5.83) 37.17 (8.06) 14.76 (1.95) 29.07 (12.24) 
Age 19.87 (2.71) 19.95 (1.97) 20.07 (2.72) 19.89 (2.56) 
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5.8.2  Materials 
5.8.2.1 Questionnaires 
Aggression Questionnaire – Short Form (BPAQ-SF: Bryant & Smith, 2001). 
For the purpose of selecting participants who were characteristically aggressive, the 
BPAQ-SF was selected. The BPAQ-SF, a condensed version of the original 29-item 
Buss-Perry Aggression Questionnaire (BPAQ; Buss & Perry, 1992), is a 12-item self-
report measure that records aggressive feelings and behaviours. Items on both forms 
of the questionnaire load onto four dimensions of aggression: physical aggression, 
verbal aggression, anger and hostility. Buss and Perry propose that each subscale 
represents a different element of aggression; the physical and verbal aggression 
subscales reflect the instrumental or motor behavioural elements of aggression, the 
hostility subscale reflects the cognitive elements of aggression, while anger reflects 
the emotional or affective elements and connects the cognitive and behavioural 
elements.  
 The BPAQ-SF includes 12 items from the BPAQ, assessed using a 5-point 
Likert scale, ranging from 1 (very unlike me) to 5 (very like me). In a study 
comparing the two measures, Bryant and Smith (2001) found comparable internal 
consistency (alpha coefficients) among the factors on the measures (Physical 
Aggression, .79, .80; Verbal Aggression, .83, .80; Anger, .76, .76; and Hostility, .75, 
.70). The BPAQ-SF shows similar factor loadings for males and females (Bryant & 
Smith, 2001). Diamond, Wang and Buffington-Vollum (2005) further investigated the 
BPAQ-SF with a sample of male offenders incarcerated in a psychiatric prison 
hospital. The four-factor structure was confirmed with this sample; however, 
exchanging one item on the Bryant and Smith Anger scale, “I flare up quickly and get 
over it quickly”, with “Sometimes I feel like a powder keg about to explode” 
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improved the fit of the model and increased the reliability of that scale. Reliabilities 
were comparable to the original form of the BPAQ when corrected for attenuation.  
 The authors of the original BPAQ (Buss & Perry, 1992) report strong internal 
consistency for each of the four subscales and total aggression scores, with alphas 
ranging from .72 (verbal aggression) to .89 (full score). Test-retest correlations were 
also sound, ranging from .72 to .80, indicating stability over time. Correlations 
between self-report and peer nomination were significant, indicating strong 
reliabilities for individuals to self-report their aggressive traits. These findings have 
been replicated in many studies, finding internal consistency and stability over time 
for the measure (e.g., Garcia-Leon et al., 2002; Harris, 1997; Williams, Boyd, 
Cascardi & Poythress, 1996). Further factor analyses have found similar scale 
structure to that originally claimed for the questionnaire (Harris, 1997). 
The Impulsive-Premeditated Aggression Scale (IPAS: Stanford et al., 2003a). 
The IPAS is a 30-item, self-report questionnaire that classifies an individual‟s 
aggressive behaviour as predominantly impulsive or predominantly premeditated in 
nature. Participants are asked to consider their aggressive acts during the last six 
months and complete the IPAS in relation to those acts. Of the 30 items, 15 items 
focus on impulsive aggression characteristics such as “when angry I reacted without 
thinking”, and 15 items focus on premeditated aggression characteristics, such as “I 
planned when and where my anger was expressed”. The items are scored on a 5-point 
Likert scale (5 = strongly agree, 4 = agree, 3 = neutral, 2 = disagree, 1 = strongly 
disagree). The content of the scales are based on previous scales and studies that have 
attempted to differentiate impulsive and premeditated aggressive participants (Barratt 
et al., 1999; Barratt et al., 1997b; Heilbrun et al., 1978; Heilbrun, Knopf & Bruner, 
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1976; Linnoila et al., 1983; Stanford, Greve & Dickens, 1995; Stanford et al., 1997; 
Virkkunen, De Jong, Bartko & Linnoila, 1989b; Vitiello et al., 1990). 
Stanford et al. (2003a), in their study of men referred for aggression problems, 
found that that the IPAS demonstrated adequate reliability coefficients (Cronbach‟s αs 
= .77 for the impulsive scale and .82 for the premeditated scale). The impulsive and 
premeditated scales were not significantly correlated (r = -.02). The authors also 
reported strong construct and concurrent validity for the IPAS scales. These findings 
have been replicated in later studies, finding adequate internal consistency in a 
forensic sample (impulsive α = .72; premeditated α = .81) (Kockler et al., 2006) and 
in treated opiate-dependent individuals (impulsive α = 74; premeditated α = .75) 
(Conner, Houston, Sworts & Meldrum, 2007). Test-retest analyses also indicate good 
stability, with impulsive and premeditated correlation coefficients .63 and .70 
respectively. Also consistent with prior studies of the IPAS, the impulsive and 
premeditated scales were found to be poorly correlated, supporting the conception that 
these scales assess different types of aggression (Conner et al., 2007). 
 The I7 Impulsivity Questionnaire (Eysenck, Pearson, Easting & Allsopp, 
1985). The I7 Impulsivity Questionnaire is a 54-item self-report measure which 
consists of three subscales: impulsiveness, venturesomeness and empathy. High 
reliability is reported for each of the subscales for both males and females, with alpha 
coefficients for impulsivity and venturesomeness reported to be around .80 and 
empathy at .69. A moderate correlation was found between impulsiveness and 
venturesomeness (r = .38), reflecting the association between the two subscales in 
terms of a combined impulsivity trait. The authors conclude that this self-report 
measure robustly assesses three important characteristics in impulsivity research: 
impulsiveness, venturesomeness, and empathy. It is the inclusion of empathy that 
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makes this scale of further relevance for the current investigation into aggression, as 
lack of empathy can be a defining characteristic of premeditated aggression (Meloy, 
1997). 
 
5.8.2.2 Executive function measures 
The Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System (D-KEFS; Delis, Kaplan & 
Kramer, 2001). The D-KEFS is a set of nine standardised tests for assessing executive 
functions in children and adults. The tests measure a range of verbal and non-verbal 
executive functions, with each test designed to stand alone or be administered with 
others from the battery. These tests are predominantly an updated version of 
commonly used stand-alone tests of executive functioning with better standardisation 
and quantitative error scoring. Each of the nine tests were standardised on over 1700 
children and adults aged nine to 89 years. Two subtests from the D-KEFS were 
chosen for the current study; Verbal Fluency Test and the Trail Making Test.  
D-KEFS Verbal Fluency Test. The D-KEFS Verbal Fluency Test is modelled 
on the Controlled Oral Word Association Test (COWAT) which was developed by 
Benton and his colleagues (Benton & Hamsher, 1976; Spreen & Benton, 1969). The 
Verbal Fluency Test is comprised of three conditions; letter fluency, category fluency 
and category switching. Only letter fluency was chosen for the current study given its 
sensitivity to frontal involvement (Benton, 1968). In this task, the participant is asked 
to name in 60 seconds as many words as they can that begin with a specified letter 
over three trials (F, then S, then A). The participant is constrained by two rules: words 
cannot include the names of people, places, or numbers, and they cannot provide 
grammatical variants of previous responses (e.g., take, and then taking, takes).  
 74 
 D-KEFS Trail Making Test. The D-KEFS Trail Making Test involves a series 
of five conditions: visual scanning, number sequencing, letter sequencing, number-
letter switching and motor speed. In all five conditions the stimuli are spread over an 
11 x 17-inch area, which provides longer trails and more interference stimuli than the 
traditional Trail Making Test (Delis et al., 2001). In the Visual Scanning condition, 
participants are required to cross out all the 3s that appear on the response sheet, 
which are mixed among a collection of other numbers and letters. In the Number 
Sequencing condition, participants draw a line connecting the numbers 1-16 in order, 
with distracter letters appearing on the same page. The Letter Sequencing condition 
requires participants to connect the letters A through P, with distracter numbers 
present on the same page. In the Number-Letter Switching condition, participants 
switch back and forth between connecting numbers and letters (i.e., 1, A, 2, B, etc., to 
16, P). Finally, a Motor Speed condition is administered in which participants trace 
over a dotted line connecting circles on the page as quickly as possible, in order to 
gauge their motor drawing speed.  
Each condition is preceded by a short practice trial. In all conditions, 
participants were instructed to work as quickly and as accurately as possible. In all but 
the Visual Scanning condition, the examiner corrected any mistakes by placing an 
“X” over a wrong connection and participants were asked to continue from the last 
correct connection. The stopwatch remained running during such corrections. Success 
at the task is measured by time to completion for each condition. 
The D-KEFS Trail Making Test was modelled after the traditional Trail 
Making Test (Reitan & Wolfson, 1985; see review of test history in Delis et al., 
2001), with some important modifications in order to address some limitations of the 
traditional test. For example, the D-KEFS Trail Making Test contains both number 
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sequencing and letter sequencing conditions that are completed prior to the switching 
condition. In addition, the stimulus pages for the number sequencing and letter 
sequencing conditions contain both numbers and letters, and taken together, the two 
conditions match the switching conditions well in terms of the number of stimuli to 
visually scan and the number of lines that need drawing. The D-KEFS Trail Making 
Test was also created to isolate set-shifting abilities from other component skills 
required for the task such as visual scanning and motor speed.   
 Tower of Hanoi (Goel & Grafman, 1995). The Tower of Hanoi task requires 
the manipulation of several disks onto three rods in order to recreate a given 
configuration, across three levels of increasing complexity. There are three constraints 
on the transformation of the start state into the goal state: (1) only one disk may be 
moved at a time; (2) any disk not being currently moved must remain on a peg; and 
(3) a larger disk may not be placed on a smaller disk.  
The Tower of Hanoi task is widely used as an experimental and diagnostic 
tool in the neuropsychological literature to gauge planning and problem-solving 
abilities (Grafman et al., 1992; Shallice, 1982, 1990; Spitz, Minsky & Bessellieu, 
1985). The rational underlying this interpretation seems to be that, to successfully 
complete the task, participants need to "look ahead" several levels and solve the 
problem in their heads, before physically moving any disks. If they are unable to solve 
the problem, it follows they were incapable of searching through the moves in their 
heads, and therefore they are argued to have a "planning" or "look ahead" deficit 
(Goel, Pullara, & Grafman, 2001).  
The Tower of Hanoi task was presented on a Pentium 90 computer with a 17” 
monitor. Participants used a keyboard to indicate their responses. 
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Stroop Colour-Word Interference Task (Stroop, 1935). The Stroop task 
measures freedom from distractibility, selective attention, ability to resolve response 
conflict, and response inhibition (MacLeod, 1991; Perret, 1974). While the Stroop 
task is made up of three conditions, it is the interference condition which is of 
particular importance in this study as it measures the participant‟s ability to inhibit a 
dominant response (i.e., reading the word) while attending to the less salient feature of 
the stimuli in naming the colour in which the word is printed. This condition involves 
filtering out distracting irrelevant information that can compete with the appropriate 
response, with the target and distractor being different attributes of the same stimulus. 
The task therefore also places great demand on selective attention in order to filter out 
the distracting information. In this task, lower number of errors (the dependent 
variable) indicates superior inhibitory ability.  
The Stroop task was presented on a Pentium 90 computer with a 17” monitor 
and participants used a keyboard to indicate their responses.  
The Brixton Test (Burgess & Shallice, 1997). The Brixton Test consists of a 
56-page stimulus booklet. Each page displays the same basic array of ten circles set in 
two rows of five, with each circle numbered from one to ten. On each page, one of the 
circles is filled with a blue colour, with the position of this filled circle changing (on 
most occasions) from one page to the next. The changes in position are governed by a 
series of simple rules that vary without warning. The participant is shown one page at 
a time and is asked to decide where the next filled position will be, basing the 
selection on an apparent pattern or rule derived from the previous pages. The blue 
circle moves on each succeeding card following seven rules of five different kinds. 
Participants‟ answer to the first item is disregarded as it is always a guess. On trials in 
which there is a rule change, the correct answer is not the actual position where the 
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blue circle goes next, but where the blue circle would go if the rule change had not 
occurred. 
Using the method described in the test manual, the total errors were recorded 
and these errors (maximum 54) were converted to scaled scores (e.g., 0 to 7 raw errors 
were converted to a scaled score of 10, which is classified as „very superior‟ 
performance). An overall standardised scaled score based on a scale ranging from 1 
(impaired) to 10 (very superior) was used for analysis. 
 
5.8.2.3 Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Third Edition (Wechsler, 1997) 
Two subtests from the WAIS-III were selected as control measures. The 
Vocabulary subtest was included to provide an indication of participants‟ general 
intellectual functioning given its correlation of .90 with WAIS-III Full Scale IQ 
(Wechsler, 1997). Although Milner and Petrides (1984) argued that intelligence is 
independent of executive function, the capacity for understanding and remembering a 
set of complex instructions and rules involved in some of the executive tasks included 
in this study could presumably be affected by poor intelligence (Seguin, Boulerice, 
Harden, Tremblay & Pihl, 1999). Vocabulary measures expressive vocabulary, verbal 
knowledge and fund of information. For this subtest, participants were required to 
define words that were orally presented.  
Digit Span involves repeating digits in increasing spans in forward and 
backward orders. This task was used as a measure of verbal working memory and 
attentional capacity for verbal information. The number of fully correct responses for 
both forwards and backwards order was used as an estimate of the participant‟s 
working memory capacity (higher score indicates better performance) (Wechsler, 
1997). 
 78 
5.8.3  Procedure 
The BPAQ-SF was used to recruit participants from undergraduate 
psychology classes at the University of Tasmania. Following the screening process, 
select individuals who qualified as aggressive or control participants were invited to 
participate in the executive functioning tasks. Approval from the Human Research 
Ethics Committee (Tasmania) Network was obtained before recruitment procedures 
took place (see Appendix A for approval letter). All participants received course 
credit or a small payment for their participation. 
Informed consent was obtained from all individuals prior to participation (see 
Appendix B for participant information sheet and Appendix C for consent form). 
Participants were tested individually in a quiet room in the School of Psychology at 
the University of Tasmania and completed the tasks in a counterbalanced order. Each 
task was explained and comprehension was ensured before beginning each task. The 
experimenter was blind as to the group the participant was assigned to. 
Tower of Hanoi: Participants completed a computerised version of the Tower 
of Hanoi. The task entailed a brown platform mounted with three vertical rods being 
presented centrally on the screen. The first stage involved three rings (differing in 
circumference) stacked on the left-most rod (smaller rings were always stacked on top 
of larger rings). Participants were instructed to reproduce the same stacking 
configuration of rings on the right-most rod by moving the rings according to three 
rules outlined above. Three trials were conducted. The first involved three rings, the 
second involved four rings, and the third trial involved five rings. If participants had 
not finished the five rings condition within 100 moves, the task was ended. 
Performance on this task was assessed by the total number of moves taken to 
complete the task, with low number of moves indicative of efficiency at problem-
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solving. The time taken between the manipulation of the first disk and time taken for 
subsequent execution of the task was also measured, with quicker times signifying 
better performance.  
Stroop Colour-Word Interference Task: A computerised version of the Stroop 
task was used. Participants were seated in front of a computer monitor, approximately 
60cm from the screen. In the first condition (colour naming), participants reported 
which of four colour stimuli (RED, BLUE, GREEN, YELLOW) appeared on the 
screen by pressing the corresponding number (1, 2, 3 or 4) on the keyboard to patch of 
colours which were numbered across the bottom of the screen. In the second condition 
(colour word naming), participants were presented with colour words and were 
required to respond to which of four colour words printed on the screen, again by 
pressing the corresponding key. The first two conditions consisted of two blocks of 30 
trials each. For the second condition, of the 60 trials, 40 trials consisted of the colour 
word being printed in an incongruent colour, while 20 trials consisted of the colour 
word being printed in the congruent colour.  
In the final condition (interference), participants were required to report the 
colour of which the word was printed in, ignoring what the actual colour word was by 
pressing the corresponding key. This condition consisted of four blocks of 30 trials. 
Of the 120 trials, 88 trials consisted of the word being printed in an incongruent 
colour, while 32 trials consisted of the colour word being printed in the congruent 
colour. The latter condition of the task measures the participant‟s ability to inhibit a 
dominant response (i.e. reading the word) while attending to the less salient aspect of 
the colour. For each condition, participants were instructed to respond to the stimuli 
as quickly and accurately as possible by pressing the appropriate key. 
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After completion of the executive function measures, participants completed 
the WAIS-III Vocabulary and Digit Span subtests, the BPAQ, I7 and the IPAS. 
Participants were fully debriefed at completion of the testing session. 
 
5.9  Results 
5.9.1  Participants 
Mean scores on the BPAQ and I7 Impulsivity Questionnaire (see Table 5.4) 
were analysed using separate one-way ANOVAs. On the BPAQ, a significant effect 
was found for the physical aggression, F(2, 84) = 52.50, MSE = 1927.94, p<.001, 2 = 
.561, verbal aggression, F(2, 84) = 93.06, MSE = 795.18, p<.001, 2 = .694, hostility, 
F(2, 84) = 35.05, MSE = 1063.45, p<.001, 2 = .461, and anger subscales, F(2, 84) = 
107.72, MSE = 1272.71, p<.001, 2 = .724, as well as total aggression, F(2, 84) = 
107.35, MSE = 17574.93, p<.001, 2 = .724. Post hoc Tukey‟s indicated that the 
impulsive-aggressive and premeditated-aggressive groups had significantly higher 
scores than the control group on all subscales (ps<.05).  
While there are no widely accepted scores on the BPAQ indicative of clinical 
significance, the original article by Buss and Perry (1992) reported a mean score of 73 
for a college population aged 18-20 which is comparable to the present study. 
Similarly Smith and Waterman (2004) reported a mean score of 72.13 for their sample 
of undergraduate students. In comparison, the mean BPAQ score for the violent and 
non-violent offenders in their study was 85.97 and 78.24 respectively. Thus, the 
BPAQ scores for the impulsive-aggressive (M = 88.61) and premeditated-aggressive 
(M = 91.00) participants in the current sample are comparable to violent offenders.  
On the I7 Impulsivity Questionnaire, a significant effect was found for the 
impulsivity, F(2, 84) = 19.22, MSE = 333.93, p<.001, 2 = .319,  venturesomeness, 
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F(2, 84) = 3.29, MSE = 56.83, p = .042, 2 = .074, and combined impulsivity-
venturesomeness subscale, F(2, 84) = 10.17, MSE = 531.67, p<.001, 2 = .199. No 
significant effect was found for empathy, F(2, 84) = 1.26, MSE = 14.92, p = .291, 2 
= .030. Post hoc Tukeys indicated that on the impulsivity subscale, the impulsive-
aggressive group had significantly higher scores than the other two participant groups, 
and the premeditated-aggressive group had significantly higher scores than the control 
group (ps<.05). On the venturesomeness subscale, the premeditated-aggressive group 
had significantly higher scores than the control group (ps<.05). On the combined 
subscale, the impulsive-aggressive and premeditated-aggressive groups had 
significantly higher scores than the control group.  
 
Table 5.4 
Means (and standard deviations) for the Aggression Questionnaire – Full Scale and 
I7 Impulsivity Questionnaire for the three participant groups 
  
Impulsive-
Aggressive 
Premeditated-
Aggressive 
Control Total 
     
BPAQ     
     Physical Aggression 27.61 (6.82) 27.24 (7.03) 13.40 (4.16) 22.52 (9.04) 
     Verbal Aggression 17.74 (2.33) 19.18 (3.13) 9.20 (3.44) 15.01 (5.22) 
     Hostility 22.37 (6.06) 23.35 (6.64) 12.23 (3.82) 18.99 (7.41) 
     Anger 22.68 (3.16) 23.00 (4.86) 11.33 (2.76) 18.74 (6.47) 
     Total Aggression 88.61 (13.03) 91.00 (15.20) 46.83 (10.91) 74.34 (24.05) 
     
I7      
     Imp-Vent 21.18 (7.15) 20.12 (6.64) 13.50 (7.30) 18.26 (7.98) 
     Impulsivity 12.21 (3.91) 9.29 (4.41) 5.90 (4.35) 9.40 (4.99) 
     Venturesomeness 8.97 (4.37) 10.82 (3.52) 7.60 (4.21) 8.86 (4.27) 
     Empathy 13.81 (3.31) 12.24 (3.88) 13.17 (3.36) 13.27 (3.46) 
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Eysenck et al. (1985) report means and standard deviations for males and 
females for each of the subscales of the I7 Impulsivity Questionnaire. In comparison 
to these means, on the impulsivity and venturesomeness subscales, the impulsive-
aggressive and premeditated-aggressive group had higher scores. On the empathy 
subscale, the impulsive-aggressive and control groups had higher scores.   
 
5.9.2  Executive function measures 
For the Trail Making Test and Brixton Test, completion times and number of 
errors were respectively converted to standard scores as described in their manuals. 
Success on the Stroop task was measured by the number of errors made in each of the 
three conditions. Mean scores (see Table 5.5) were analysed using separate one-way 
ANOVAs (see Table 5.6 for results of ANOVAs). 
Tukey post hoc tests were conducted where the ANOVA was significant 
(ps<.05). The results of the analyses revealed that for Trails Switching, the impulsive-
aggressive group scored significantly lower than the control group. The premeditated-
aggressive group did not differ significantly from the other groups. On Tower of 
Hanoi three-rings the impulsive-aggressive group took significantly more moves than 
the control group to complete the task, and on the five-rings condition, the impulsive-
aggressive group took significantly more moves than both the premeditated-
aggressive and control groups. No significant group differences were found for the 4-
rings condition. The impulsive-aggressive group produced significantly fewer words 
than the premeditated-aggressive and control groups on the Verbal Fluency Test. On 
the Stroop task, the impulsive-aggressive group made significantly more mistakes 
than the control group on the interference condition. The premeditated-aggressive 
group did not differ from either the impulsive-aggressive or control groups.  
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5.9.3  Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Third Edition 
The premeditated-aggressive group scored significantly higher than the 
impulsive-aggressive group on Vocabulary and Digit Span. The control group did not 
differ significantly from the impulsive-aggressive or premeditated-aggressive groups 
on either subtest (all ps>.05). Mean scores on the WAIS-III subtests for the three 
participant groups fell within the „average‟ range. No participant scored below the 
average range on either subtest.  
ANCOVAs were conducted to determine if group differences on the executive 
function measures remained significant after controlling for the WAIS-III measures. 
The covariate Vocabulary was not significant for any of the variables, Verbal 
Fluency, F(1, 81) = 3.63, MSE = 196.22, p  = .06, Trails Switching, F(1, 81) = .33, 
MSE = 1.58, p = .568, Tower of Hanoi 3 rings, F(1, 81) = .48, MSE = 6.12, p = .489, 
Tower of Hanoi 5 rings, F(1, 81) = .05, MSE = 19.48, p = .832, Stroop Interference, 
F(1, 81) = 1.11, MSE = 12.76, p = .296. Group differences remained significant after 
controlling for Vocabulary on Verbal Fluency, F(2, 81) = 12.2, MSE = 658.83, 
p<.001, Trails Switching, F(2, 81) = 5.28, MSE = 25.49, p = .007, Tower of Hanoi 3 
rings, F(2, 81) = 5.64, MSE = 71.47, p = .005, Tower of Hanoi 5 rings, F(2, 81) = 8.7, 
MSE = 3737.5, p<.001, and Stroop Interference F(2, 81) = 7.29, MSE = 84.1, p = 
.001. 
The covariate Digit Span was not significant for any of the variables, Verbal 
Fluency, F(1, 81) = 1.93, MSE = 106.58, p = .168, Trails Switching, F(1, 81) = 1.05, 
MSE = 5.04, p = .308, Tower of Hanoi 3 rings, F(1, 81) =.02, MSE = .22, p = .895, 
Tower of Hanoi 5 rings, F(1, 81) = .52, MSE = 222.92, p = .472, Stroop Interference, 
F(1, 81) = 3.33, MSE = 37.39, p = .072. Group differences remained significant after 
controlling for Digit Span on Verbal Fluency, F(2, 81) = 12.36, MSE = 681.13, 
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p<.001, Trails Switching, F(2, 81) = 4.81, MSE = 22.98, p = .011, Tower of Hanoi 3 
rings, F(2, 81) = 5.09, MSE = 64.82, p = .008, Tower of Hanoi 5 rings, F(2, 81) = 9.8, 
MSE = 4187.36, p<.001, Stroop Interference, F(2, 81) = 6.62, MSE = 74.32, p = .002. 
 
Table 5.5 
Means (and standard deviations) for the three participant groups on the executive 
function and WAIS-III measures 
  
Impulsive- 
Aggressive 
Premeditated- 
Aggressive 
Control Total 
     
Verbal Fluency 31.53 (6.53) 41.82 (6.04) 40.17 (9.11) 36.64 (8.72) 
Trails      
     Visual Scanning 11.66 (1.28) 11.94 (1.34) 11.20 (2.17) 11.55 (1.67) 
     Number Sequencing 11.39 (1.59) 10.94 (1.25) 10.73 (2.36) 11.07 (1.85) 
     Letter Sequencing 11.71 (1.47) 11.65 (1.22) 11.03 (1.87) 11.46 (1.59) 
     Switching 8.79 (2.22) 10.06 (2.97) 10.60 (1.54) 9.68 (2.31) 
     Motor 12.08 (1.15) 11.76 (1.21) 11.60 (1.69) 11.84 (1.38) 
Tower of Hanoi     
     3 rings moves (no.) 11.39 (4.48) 9.35 (2.64) 8.63 (2.47) 10.01 (3.73) 
     4 rings moves (no.) 29.45 (14.34) 22.24 (14.23) 22.53 (10.01) 25.56 (13.27) 
     5 rings moves (no.) 79.21 (21.97) 59.76 (17.20) 59.00 (20.56) 68.19 (22.68) 
     3 rings time (sec.) 37.36 (23.99) 33.35 (22.23) 30.00 (21.39) 33.94 (22.72) 
     4 rings time (sec.) 92.26 (61.86) 91.82 (135.84) 75.77 (62.28) 86.35 (81.25) 
     5 rings time (sec.) 
256.58 
(134.97) 
274.06 
(337.71) 
201.93 (99.66) 
240.79 
(184.53) 
Stroop (errors)     
     Patch 0.55 (0.80) 0.47 (0.87) 0.73 (1.23) 0.60 (0.98) 
     Colour 1.47 (2.57) 1.23 (1.35) 0.83 (1.29) 1.20 (1.97) 
     Interference 7.53 (3.87) 5.71 (3.12) 4.17 (2.85) 5.98 (3.68) 
Brixton  7.29 (1.75) 7.65 (1.62) 7.63 (1.33) 7.48 (1.58) 
WAIS-III     
     Vocabulary 10.71 (1.29) 12.47 (2.35) 11.37 (1.79) 11.29 (1.82) 
     Digit Span 10.05 (1.68) 12.00 (2.57) 11.03 (2.04) 10.78 (2.12) 
          
 85 
Table 5.6 
Results of ANOVAs for the executive function and WAIS-III measures 
 
F MSE p 2 
     
Verbal Fluency 16.36 911.79 <.001*** .285 
Trails     
     Visual Scanning 1.22 3.36 .301 .029 
     Number Sequencing 1.13 3.85 .329 .027 
     Letter Sequencing 1.69 4.22 .191 .040 
     Switching 6.06 28.98 .004** .129 
     Motor 1.11 2.10 .335 .026 
Tower of Hanoi     
     3 rings moves (no.) 5.45 68.53 .006** .117 
     4 rings moves (no.) 3.09 518.49 .051 .070 
     5 rings moves (no.) 9.83 4177.81 <.001*** .193 
     3 rings time (seconds) 0.87 452.31 .422 .021 
     4 rings time (seconds) 0.39 2599.1 .680 .009 
     5 rings time (seconds) 1.08 36792.06 .344 .026 
Stroop     
     Colour Matching 0.47 0.45 .629 .011 
     Colour Naming 0.88 3.45 .418 .021 
     Interference 8.26 95.39 .001** .168 
     Interference Time 0.32 27255.27 .724 .008 
Brixton 0.51 1.28 .604 .012 
WAIS-III     
     Vocabulary 6.18 18.32 .003** .131 
     Digit Span 5.87 23.66 .004** .125 
      
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p <.001. 
  
5.10  Discussion 
 This study investigated executive functioning in impulsive- and premeditated-
aggressive individuals. While previous research has established a relationship 
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between neuropsychological dysfunction and aggression (e.g., Houston et al., 2003), 
the purpose of the current study was to extend this research to delineate the 
relationship between impulsive- and premeditated-aggression and possible executive 
deficits. Results support and extend previous findings, demonstrating that impulsive-
aggressive individuals perform more poorly than both premeditated-aggressive 
individuals and controls on measures of executive functioning, including cognitive 
flexibility, planning, problem-solving, and flexibility of verbal thought processes. 
Consistent with previous work, premeditated aggressors did not differ significantly 
from normal controls on these measures (Barratt et al., 1997b; Stanford et al., 2003b). 
 The current study was also intended to rectify certain methodological 
limitations of past research distinguishing between measures of dorsolateral and 
orbitofrontal functioning. The tasks chosen for the current study were predominantly 
measures of dorsolateral functioning, and thus indicate that deficits in dorsolateral 
functioning may be a key factor in the expression of impulsive-aggression. Such 
hypotheses do not hold for premeditated-aggression, however, with such individuals 
demonstrating no deficits on dorsolateral prefrontal measures.  
The findings of dorsolateral cognitive deficits cannot be attributed to a general 
cognitive impairment in impulsive-aggressive individuals relative to the control 
group. This is indicated by the fact that on those measures not related to frontal lobe 
function (such as the four baseline conditions on the Trail Making Test), there was no 
deficit. In addition, a general intellectual or memory impairment in the impulsive-
aggressive group was not demonstrated in their performance on the WAIS-III 
Vocabulary and Digit Span subtests.   
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5.10.1  Verbal Fluency Test 
On the Verbal Fluency Test, the impulsive-aggressive group produced 
significantly fewer words than the premeditated-aggressive and control groups, 
indicating poorer verbal fluency and verbal strategic processing.   
Impaired executive function can have a significant effect on the expression of 
other cognitive modalities, and within the impulsive-aggressive population, verbal 
impairments and abnormalities of language processing regions of the brain have been 
demonstrated to be one of the most compromised (Barratt et al., 1997a; Barratt et al., 
1997b; New et al., 2002, 2004; van Elst, Woermann, Lemieux, Thompson & Trimble, 
2000; Villemarette-Pittman et al., 2002; Woermann et al., 2000). More specifically, it 
is in the domain of verbal mediation where their deficit may have significant effects 
on social interactions. 
 Prefrontal verbal cognitive processes play an important role in the modulation 
of emotional processes in humans. While the nature of the language processing 
abnormalities and the connection between language processing and the modulation of 
impulsive aggression remain to fully elucidated, several hypotheses emerge from this 
finding. Language processing regions may mediate executive abilities important to the 
regulation of aggressive impulses, such as deductive reasoning, cognitive restraint of 
aggression, cognitive modulation of emotion, and/or reflective functioning. 
Furthermore, deficient modulation of verbal expression may also lead to increased 
frustration in provocative situations (Miller, Collins & Kent, 2008).  
Verbal skill deficits may also contribute to impulsive-aggressive behaviour 
through an inability to use verbal internal controls to inhibit inappropriate behaviour 
(Dolan & Anderson, 2002). Language-based mechanisms of self-control range from 
virtually automatic motor programming for inhibiting simple behaviours (e.g., “No”) 
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to thinking through the presenting situation and evaluating the range of possible 
responses before responding in a particular way to that situation.  
Such theories were also proposed by Tarter, Hegedus, Winsten and Alterman 
(1984) and Yeudall (1980) who suggested that verbal deficits prevent children from 
developing internal verbally-based means of inhibiting antisocial impulses.  
Mungas (1988) proposed that poor expressive verbal skills preclude more adaptive, 
verbal mediation of behaviour, especially in emotionally charged situations. One‟s 
behaviour can thus suffer from a lack of internal verbal synthesis that would normally 
precede and guide behaviour (Fuster, 1997). Therefore, as a group, impulsive-
aggressive individuals may be vulnerable to poor internal modulation of their 
behaviours. It may be that they cannot „talk‟ themselves through alternate solutions or 
responses, nor can they adequately utilise verbal negotiation in a conflict situation. 
They may employ mostly unsuccessful problem-solving strategies that further limit 
their ability to resolve problems.  
 
5.10.2  Trail Making Test 
On the Trail Making Test, the impulsive-aggressive group scored significantly 
lower than the premeditated-aggressive and control groups on the letter-number 
switching condition. This deficit in the ability to shift set (also known as cognitive 
flexibility) suggests impairment in the ability to constantly change response given the 
environmental demands faced by the individual. 
This result supports the findings of Stanford et al. (1997) who also reported 
deficits on the Trail Making Test Part B in a sample of students classified as 
impulsive-aggressive by self-report. In contrast, however, Stevens, Kaplan and 
Hesselbrock (2003), in their investigation of executive functioning in APD found no 
significant group differences on the task between APD men, men who had a previous 
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diagnosis of CD, and controls. This suggests that a deficit in set-shifting may be 
related to aggressive behaviour specifically rather than merely the presence of 
antisocial behaviour which may or may not have an aggressive component.  
Mental flexibility is a core component of effective executive functioning. It 
allows an individual to determine and employ alternative solutions to novel social 
situations. Cognitive flexibility involves the individual‟s awareness of possible 
options and alternatives in any given situation, a willingness to be flexible and adapt 
to the situation, as well as self-efficacy in being flexible (Chesebro & Martin, 2003).  
Poor cognitive flexibility may be a risk factor for aggression through its 
impact on problem-solving abilities (Lezak et al., 2004). That is, a lack of cognitive 
flexibility, or mental rigidity, may preclude impulsive-aggressive individuals from 
generating and employing non-aggressive solutions to confrontational situations. 
Perseveration on a current course of action, or the lack of ability to switch attention, 
may lead to dysfunctional problem-solving actions which cause interpersonal conflict. 
In contrast, for non-aggressive individuals, although aggression is a viable option, it 
appears that by being cognitively flexible, they are able to access a wide range of 
options which is sufficient enough to enable them to find more effective ways of 
dealing with situations (Chesebro & Martin, 2003).  
Such hypotheses regarding the effect of cognitive rigidity on aggression can 
only be associated with the expression of impulsive-aggression, as the premeditated-
aggressive group did not present with deficits on the Trail Making Test. This is in line 
with Pham, Vanderstukken, Philippot and Venderlinder (2003) in their assessment of 
planning and cognitive flexibility in a group of criminal psychopaths. The results of 
Pham et al. confirmed their hypothesis that psychopaths would perform similarly to 
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controls on measures of flexibility. This result would be expected, however, given the 
premeditation and planning involved in such aggressive acts.   
This theory is supported by Deu (1998) in his research on cognitive flexibility 
and criminality. He reported that those offenders with high cognitive flexibility were 
more likely to report that they would reoffend as they were better able to devise ways 
of eluding detection. In line with this, McGuire (2001) found that cognitive rigidity 
resulted in a lack of consideration of alternatives and consequences. 
These results, taken together, suggest that a rigidity of response without 
considering alternative responses, may contribute to aggressive social responses. With 
less adept interpersonal problem-solving skills, impulsive-aggressive individuals do 
not learn to deal with conflicts in a pro-social manner. According to cognitive social 
learning theory, however, effective problem-solving is not an automatic response, but 
is a learned skill and as such can be acquired (McGuire, 2001; Hollin, 2001). 
  
5.10.3  Tower of Hanoi  
On the Tower of Hanoi three-ring and five-ring conditions, the impulsive-
aggressive group took significantly more moves than the premeditated-aggressive and 
control groups to complete the task, indicating poorer problem-solving and planning 
abilities in this group. On the four-ring condition, there were no significant 
differences between the groups.  
These findings suggest that impulsive-aggressive individuals have particular 
difficulties with problems requiring higher level planning ability. Although they are 
able to solve as many problems as controls (i.e., all participants were able to solve the 
3-, 4-, and 5-ring problems), they solved these problems with a significantly higher 
number of moves. This pattern is similar to that reported in individuals with APD 
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(Dolan & Park, 2002), frontal lobe patients (Owen et al., 1990) and chronic 
schizophrenics (Pantelis et al., 1997) using the similar Tower of London task. 
Furthermore, research suggests that compared with non-aggressive controls, 
aggressive offenders use a limited range of alternatives to solve interpersonal 
problems, rely more on verbal and physical aggression, and consider fewer 
consequences of their actions (Slaby & Guerra, 1988). 
 The prefrontal cortex engages in temporally oriented programming to 
accomplish tasks. Deficits in prefrontal functioning, therefore, often result in 
disorganisation and impaired problem-solving (Hall, 1993; Stuss & Benson, 1984), 
and a failure to anticipate consequences (Kandel & Freed, 1989). Even when coupled 
with a normal IQ, these problems may be significant. The ability to plan behaviour is 
a critical executive function used in everyday life, and involves activities such as 
thinking ahead, setting goals, determining a course of action, and using logic to 
proceed through a task or problem. Deficits in the ability to plan may result in 
inappropriate or self-defeating behaviour and a lessened capacity to self-correct, learn 
and think flexibly which will be particularly detrimental in situations lacking clear 
rules and structure. The inability to generate a suitable response may exacerbate 
frustration and the tendency to reflexive emotional responding (Hawkins & Trobst, 
2000).   
 Although the impulsive-aggressive group did take a significantly greater 
number of moves to complete at least two of the Tower problems, they did not take a 
significantly longer period of time to do so. The absence of significantly lengthened 
thinking times suggests that they impulsively make moves before they have generated 
an appropriate solution to the problem. This is in contrast to the premeditated-
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aggressive and control groups who spent a longer period of time planning their moves 
in order to complete the task using fewer moves. 
Planning on the Tower of Hanoi task also places a significant load on spatial 
working memory and neuroimaging studies indicate that working memory tasks 
engage the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex among other areas (Barch et al., 1997; Cohen 
et al., 1994; Courtney, Ungerleider, Keil & Haxby, 1996; Jonides et al., 1993). 
However, it is important to note that the impulsive-aggressive group did not differ 
from controls on the WAIS-III Digit Span subtest, a specific measure of working 
memory. This suggests that the impaired performance demonstrated by this group on 
the Tower task could be placed on their lack of planning and “looking ahead” 
abilities, a functional deficit in neural networks involving the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex.  
 
5.10.4  Stroop Colour-Word Interference Task 
 Impulsive-aggressive individuals had significantly greater difficulty inhibiting 
a prepotent response than controls, which could not be accounted for by differences in 
reaction time on the Stroop Task. Difficulty inhibiting a prepotent response during the 
Stroop task may indicate dysfunction in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, while it 
could also represent selective attention deficits attributed to the anterior cingulate 
cortex. Given the non-significant group differences on the two baseline conditions, 
the result cannot be attributed to a general deficit in colour recognition or colour-word 
reading.  
The inability to inhibit inappropriate or exaggerated responses may have a 
particularly salient influence in propelling one toward violent responding. This deficit 
may result in an inability to maintain emotional equilibrium, and an inability to 
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control the behavioural expression of mood changes (Golden et al., 1996). Grafman et 
al. (1996) argue that in the normal brain “when schema-like knowledge (which would 
include rules of behaviour), stored in the frontal lobes, is activated, it leads to an 
inhibition of more primitive reactions (e.g., violent or aggressive behaviour) to 
environmental provocation” (p. 1231). They further state that the knowledge stored in 
the frontal lobes plays an executive role over one‟s behaviour and takes the form of 
understanding plans and social rules that have an overall goal rather than simply 
reacting to environmental provocations or demands as they arise. Hence, if such 
knowledge contained in the frontal lobes is less accessible due to dysfunction in this 
region, the inhibitory benefit of such information is diminished and inappropriate 
behaviours are more likely to emerge. Thus, individuals with frontal lobe impairment 
may experience heightened and exaggerated emotional responses to events, have 
difficulty inhibiting these response, and respond in accord with these emotions in an 
exaggerated or inappropriate fashion.  
Interestingly, the premeditated-aggressive group did not differ from either the 
impulsive-aggressive or control group. This finding is in contrast with the self-report 
measure of impulsivity, the I7 Impulsivity Questionnaire, in which the impulsive-
aggressive group had significantly higher impulsivity scores than the premeditated-
aggressive and control group. On the combined impulsivity-venturesomeness scale, 
however, both aggressive groups had significantly higher scores than the control 
group. It may be that the higher levels of characteristic venturesomeness lead the 
premeditated-aggressive groups to higher error rates on this task rather than 
characteristic impulsivity leading to a failure to inhibit responses. That is, this group 
may not have been concerned about making a higher number of mistakes on the task 
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given the lack of negative outcomes. In comparison, the impulsive-aggressive group 
made significantly higher number of mistakes due to their impulse control deficits.   
 Executive cognitive deficits may manifest as an impulsive behavioural style, 
and, in line with this, the impulsive-aggressive individuals scored significantly higher 
on a self-report measure of impulsive behaviour than did the premeditated-aggressive 
and control individuals. Executive functioning also involves resistance to interference 
from automatic responses (Barkley, 1996) and it may be that this cognitive control 
system is involved in regulating aggression (Eisenberg, Smith, Sadovsky & Spinrad, 
2004; Posner & Rothbart, 2000). Some theorists have argued that cognitive control 
resources must be recruited in order to resolve conflict between two response options 
(Wilkowski, Robinson & Troop-Gordon, 2010). In tasks such as the Stroop task, 
participants‟ responses are slowed considerably when response conflict is first 
introduced. However, response conflict is immediately registered within the anterior 
cingulate cortex (Botvinick, Nystrom, Fissell, Carter & Cohen, 1999), leading to the 
recruitment of cognitive control resources within the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(Botvinick et al., 2001).  
 This proposed cognitive control system can be used to regulate aggressive 
behaviour in that once an individual has recruited this system, they should be more 
able to inhibit socially inappropriate behaviours (Wilkowski & Robinson, 2010). In 
support of this proposition, Wilkowski and Robinson (2008) found that individuals 
reporting low trait anger demonstrated superior abilities in resolving response conflict 
following the activation of hostile thoughts. Thus in respect to the current findings, it 
may be that impulsive-aggressive individuals are less able to resolve this response 
conflict, leading to heightened aggressive responding in social situations.  
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5.10.5  The Brixton Test 
 No significant group differences were found on the Brixton Task. While the 
Brixton Test has not been used in previous studies on aggression, this non-significant 
finding is inconsistent with previous studies using the WCST (e.g., Dolan & 
Anderson, 2002). The Brixton Test examines the ability to discern a rule set, adhere to 
it, and adjust it in the event of a rule change. However, as mentioned previously, the 
Brixton Test places greater emphasis on the inductive reasoning component of the 
task through increasing the set of rules used. In the Brixton Test, the rules which have 
to be attained pertain to the relationship between succeeding stimuli stressing the 
inductive process, in contrast to the WCST in which the rules directly relate to 
perceptual features on each card. Furthermore, the stimuli are less prone to 
automatically trigger over-learned stimulus-response associations and thus are less 
liable to induce perseverative behaviour (Reverberi, Lavaroni, Gigli, Skrap & 
Shallice, 2005). Thus, the observed result may be caused by the aggressive 
individuals not having a specific deficit in inductive reasoning, in contrast to the 
observed concept attainment impairment as measured by the WCST. Alternatively, as 
suggested above, the deficit observed on the WCST may be related to antisocial traits 
more broadly rather than to aggression per se. 
 A further explanation for this result lies in the specificity of the task to the 
frontal lobes more broadly in contrast to the predominant dorsolateral involvement in 
the other executive tasks used in this study. Thus it may be that the impulsive-
aggressive individuals have a more focal dysfunction related to this region rather than 
the frontal lobes as a whole. Further research delineating the specific regions of the 
brain involved in the Brixton Test is needed to clarify such hypotheses as well as for 
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broader neuropsychological assessments of individuals with injury to the prefrontal 
cortex. 
A related explanation is that the task demands of the Brixton Test are not 
sufficiently sensitive to adequately discriminate highly educated subjects. The Brixton 
Test was standardised using samples of individuals with lesions to various areas of the 
brain. Significant injury to the frontal lobes would be expected to produce more 
profound deficits in comparison to individuals with proposed sub-clinical impairment 
in this region. The overall high cognitive and functional level of these participants 
suggests that possible frontal deficits may be subtle and merely represent the low end 
of the normal range of functioning. Subtle deficits, however, can have profound 
effects on behaviour. Further research is nevertheless required before any reasonable 
speculation can be advanced.  
 
5.10.6  Personality measures 
 On the impulsivity-venturesomeness subscale of the I7 Impulsivity 
Questionnaire, the impulsive-aggressive and premeditated-aggressive groups had 
significantly higher scores than the control group, and on the venturesomeness 
subscale, the premeditated-aggressive group had significantly higher scores than the 
control group. With regard to the findings from both the BPAQ and I7 questionnaires, 
it is not surprising that individuals displaying aggressive behaviour would show 
significant personality pathology. Individuals displaying chronic aggression problems, 
regardless of the type of aggressive behaviour, tend to score higher on these 
personality constructs (Houston & Stanford, 2001; Mathias & Stanford, 1999; 
Stanford, Greve, Mathias & Houston, 1998; Stanford et al., 2003b). Villemarette-
Pittman et al. (2002) found that impulsive-aggressive college students scored higher 
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than controls on all personality measures (BPAQ, Lifetime History of Aggression 
Questionnaire, Barratt Impulsiveness Scale). Similarly, Houston et al. (2003) found 
that individuals classified as Primary Aggressors (both impulsive and premeditated 
aggressive) scored significantly higher on measures of aggression, anger, hostility, 
neuroticism, and lifetime history of aggression than those deemed Secondary 
Aggressors.  
On the impulsivity subscale, the impulsive-aggressive group had significantly 
higher scores than the premeditated-aggressive and control groups. This finding is not 
surprising given the recognised impulsive-aggressive behaviour demonstrated by this 
group. Barratt (1991) suggested that impulsive aggression is related to both the level 
of impulsiveness or impulse control, and the anger level of the individual. Later, he 
proposed a more specific explanation of the relationship, proposing that some people 
are predisposed to responding to certain stimuli or situations with feelings of anger 
that may lead to an aggressive response (Barratt, 1994). If such a predisposition is 
combined with a high level of impulsivity, then the difficulty of inhibiting responses 
that is characteristic of impulsive-aggressive individuals involves a low response 
control and this facilitates aggressive behaviour. From this viewpoint, impulsivity is 
related to situational control while anger is related to emotional drive.  
On the venturesomeness scale, the premeditated-aggressive group had 
significantly higher scores than the other two groups. This finding is comparable to 
that of Alexander, Allen, Brooks, Cole and Campbell (2004) in their study of 
aggression, self-control and instrumental views. The authors reported that in an 
offender sample, instrumental beliefs (i.e., the view that aggression is an instrumental 
act aimed at imposing control) were associated with impulsive risk seeking. Such 
findings suggest that premeditated aggressors do not demonstrate the normal 
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avoidance to possible disadvantageous consequences arising from risky situations. 
Such situations include dangerous recreational activities as indicated in the I7 and can 
also relate to the demonstration of planned aggressive acts.  
On the empathy subscale of the I7 Impulsivity Questionnaire, there was no 
significant difference found between the three participant groups. This result is 
surprising given the proposed link between premeditated-aggression and psychopathy, 
a personality pathology characterised by a lack of empathy and remorse. One 
potential explanation is that although they do engage in premeditated-aggressive acts, 
the higher levels of empathy present in this group may prevent them from engaging in 
more serious aggressive acts which have the potential to cause serious harm to others. 
Such restraint may have resulted in this population not coming into contact with law 
enforcement authorities or the recognition of a clinically significant impairment in 
this sample. In contrast, the levels of empathy present in the impulsive-aggressive 
group were expected given the identified guilt and remorse used to characterise this 
group. 
 
5.10.7  Psychopathy and Antisocial Personality Disorder 
Studies specifically focusing on dorsolateral prefrontal functioning in 
psychopathic populations have produced conflicting findings largely due to the 
variation in diagnostic criteria for psychopathy and differences in the nature of the 
comparison group (Devonshire, Howard & Sellars, 1988; Gorenstein, 1982; Hare, 
1984; Lapierre et al., 1995). Psychopathy assessed using the Hare Psychopathy 
Checklist – Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 1991) emphasises the interpersonal (callous-
unemotional) aspects of antisocial behaviour rather than the behavioural components, 
such as aggression, which receive more emphasis in the criteria for DSM-IV-TR APD 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000) and other measures of psychopathy such as 
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the SHAPS (Blackburn, 1982). The majority of studies, using the PCL-R report no 
differences on tests of executive functioning with psychopaths compared with non-
psychopaths, suggesting that PCL-R psychopathy may be specifically linked with 
deficits in orbitofrontal function (Lapierre et al., 1995) and/or amygdala dysfunction 
(Blair, 2001) rather than dorsolateral prefrontal function. It can be suggested then that 
aggression, which constitutes a behavioural component of psychopathy, is associated 
with dorsolateral prefrontal deficits. 
APD is a heterogeneous disorder and different aspects of its complex clinical 
presentation may reflect dysfunction in discrete neural systems. Similar to 
psychopathy, DSM-IV-TR APD (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) does not 
require an individual to be aggressive to receive a diagnosis. In a recent study, 
Crowell, Kieffer, Kugeares and Vanderploeg (2003) found that APD individuals 
performed at comparable levels to psychiatric and normal controls on measures of 
executive function. In contrast, Dolan and Anderson (2002) found that subjects with 
APD displayed impairments on executive tasks. These findings suggest that executive 
dysfunction may be differentially present in antisocial individuals depending on the 
aetiology of those antisocial traits and behaviours. Therefore, a more focused analysis 
on specifically characteristic aggression provides much more detailed insight into the 
causes of antisocial behaviour more broadly. Such non-significant findings in recent 
studies of executive functioning in antisocial populations may thus merely be due to 
the lack of characteristic aggression in the sample. 
The results of this study therefore suggest that executive functioning deficits 
are more likely to be related to the actual behaviour of aggression, rather than to 
diagnostic labels that are only correlated with aggression. As aggressive behaviour is 
not a necessary diagnostic feature of any of these externalising psychiatric disorders, 
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it is possible that participants in the studies that reported negative findings were less 
aggressive than those in the studies that reported positive findings. This argument is 
supported by a study showing that, compared with psychiatric patients arrested for 
non-violent crimes; only those arrested for violent crimes exhibited executive 
functioning deficits (Krakowski et al., 1997). As outlined previously, further support 
has been reported in normal young adult men (Giancola & Zeichner, 1994; Hoaken et 
al., 1998; Lau & Pihl, 1996; Lau et al., 1995), women (Hoaken et al., unpublished 
observations, as cited in Hoaken et al., 2003), and preadolescent boys (Seguin et al., 
1995), preadolescent boys at high risk for a substance use disorder (Giancola et al., 
1996), and adolescent girls with a substance use disorder (Giancola, Mezzich & 
Tarter, 1998b). 
 
5.10.8  The link between executive functioning deficits and impulsive-aggression 
These results suggest that inefficient executive functioning, evidenced by 
deficits in dorsolateral functioning is a contributing factor in the development and 
maintenance of the antisocial behaviour displayed by impulsive aggressors. It is 
proposed that such executive dysfunction may interfere with their ability to set and 
achieve goals, adaptively self-regulate behaviour, and consider the future implications 
of these behaviours.  
Impairment in the ability to change behaviour in response to environmental 
changes in combination with verbal fluency deficits could produce significant 
difficulties in social situations. When faced with a social situation involving conflict, 
impulsive-aggressive individuals may become confused by multiple environmental 
changes (for example, differing arguments), and provoke or be provoked into 
aggressive behaviour. In support of this, by the definition used in this research, the 
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aggression demonstrated by the impulsive-aggressors is defined by a high level of 
spontaneity, lack of planning and heightened agitation following a provocation or 
conflict (Houston et al., 2003). 
As such, it would appear that impulsive-aggressive individuals, due to possible 
dorsolateral dysfunction in combination with numerous social and psychosocial 
influences, display a type of „acquired sociopathy‟, which Damasio et al. (1990) 
described as reactive, emotionally-driven aggression toward a person related to 
inhibitory dyscontrol. In comparison, premeditated-aggression, which is associated 
with Factor 1 psychopathy features, may be related to the temporal, premotor cortices 
and the amygdala, given its characteristic goal-directed motor behaviour and lack of 
empathy and remorse. Further research involving more thorough neuroimaging 
techniques in conjunction with the neuropsychological tests would be required to shed 
more light on such hypotheses regarding premeditated aggression. 
With regard to the way in which low executive functioning contributes to 
aggressive behaviour, Giancola (1995) has advanced a heuristic model arguing that, 
given a sufficiently provoking environmental context, compromised executive 
functioning contributes, in part, to the elicitation of physically aggressive behaviour 
by reducing behavioural inhibition and the ability to generate non-aggressive 
alternative forms of behaviour. For example, impaired self-monitoring, abstract 
reasoning, and attentional skills may impede the ability to correctly interpret 
potentially ambiguous social cues during interpersonal interactions, which may lead 
to misattributions in the perception of threat or hostility in conflict situations. In 
addition, ineffectual hypothesis generation, poor concept formation, and cognitive 
inflexibility, as identified in the current study, may impair one‟s ability to generate 
and implement alternative non-aggressive behavioural responses in hostile 
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interpersonal situations. Inadequate planning and organisation capacities may further 
compromise one‟s ability to correctly executive a series of responses in the 
appropriate sequence and manner in order to avoid an aggressive interaction. Finally, 
compromised cognitive control over behaviour may allow aggressive cognitions and 
affect to manifest as overt aggression. 
Knowledge stored in the prefrontal cortex plays a managerial role in the 
control of behaviour and takes the form of understanding, planning, and 
understanding social rules. This knowledge enables humans to engage in a series of 
behaviours that have an overall goal, rather than simply reacting to the moment-by 
moment provocations or demands of the environment. Within this framework, it 
would be expected that prefrontal dysfunction would impair the ability to access and 
sustain such managerial knowledge and would thus bias the regulation and expression 
of behaviour away from plans, social rules, and mental schemas towards 
environmental hyper-responsiveness, making impulsive aggression more likely 
(Grafman et al., 1996).  
The ability to defuse a hostile situation, which may involve de-escalating 
hostility in another individual, is crucial for the inhibition of an aggressive reaction. 
Without de-escalation, prolongation of the encounter could heighten frustration and 
anger in the individual, which would lead him or her to a reactive aggressive 
response. In order to inhibit such a reaction, the individual must be able to employ 
his/her executive abilities to defuse the situation. The ability to defuse a hostile social 
situation requires a number of executive abilities including hypothesis generation, 
strategic planning, social problem-solving, and abstract reasoning, in order to develop 
a viable plan to deal with the situation in a non-aggressive manner. Once the plan has 
been formulated it must be implemented and the individual must remain resistant to 
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distracting or interfering stimuli through the use of attentional control. An inability to 
resist interference, for example, further provocations from the other individual, may 
cause a deviation from the intended plan, which may cause the individual to say or do 
something inconsistent with his or her desired goal (i.e., non-aggressive response). 
While the plan is being implemented, the individual must monitor internal and 
external states in order to determine how the plan is proceeding. Difficulties in 
external monitoring may interfere with the ability to read and correctly interpret 
potentially ambiguous social cues, which can lead to misunderstandings and 
misattributions and consequent inappropriate aggressive responses. 
Finally, the individual must evaluate feedback information derived from self- 
and social-monitoring. If the feedback information is consistent with the goals of the 
plan (i.e., defusing the situation), the plan will continue to be executed until the goal 
is attained. If the feedback information indicates that the plan is not effective, the 
individual must be able to generate new plans and shift from one possible solution to 
the next until an adequate plan is devised and implemented. Low executive 
functioning in the form of cognitive inflexibility and poor hypothesis generation is 
likely to lead to rigid and concrete thinking. This will leave the individual unable to 
effectively deal with rapid changes in the environment that require novel, immediate 
solutions to resolve potentially aggressive situations. The failure to generate such 
solutions may prolong a hostile interaction, possibly leading to increased frustration 
and the propensity for heightened aggressive responses (Giancola, 2000).  
 
5.10.9  Conclusion 
Researchers have come to appreciate that the prefrontal region can be 
fractioned into anatomically and functionally distinct subsystems, namely the 
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orbitofrontal and dorsolateral systems. Following Lapierre et al. (1995), this study 
attempted to address this distinction by including neurocognitive tasks considered 
sensitive to dysfunction in the discrete dorsolateral subsystem, although, as noted 
previously, the localising value of such tasks remains controversial.  
 Overall, these results demonstrate that impulsive-aggressive individuals 
display impairments on tests of planning, problem-solving, flexibility of verbal 
thought processes and cognitive flexibility known to relate to dorsolateral prefrontal 
function. Consistent with previous literature, the predominantly premeditated-
aggressive group did not differ from controls on measures of executive function. 
Thus, while previous studies have emphasised the role of the orbitofrontal cortex in 
impulsive-aggression, these results have also implicated the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex through its role in executive functions. 
The overall finding that impulsive-aggressive individuals have impairments in 
executive functions fits with neuroimaging studies reporting selective structural 
(Raine et al., 2000) and functional prefrontal deficits (Goyer et al., 1994) in 
populations characterised by impulsive-aggression. The convergence of these findings 
suggests that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex plays a key role in the expression of 
impulsive-aggression through the mediation of executive functions. An association 
between impulsive-aggressive behaviour and impairment in executive functions most 
probably reflects an inability to organise several parameters simultaneously and 
anticipate consequences of actions in order to solve interpersonal problems. The 
capacity to reflect on the interpersonal conflict may be overwhelmed when in social 
situations which call for a more adaptive response leading to the expression of 
impulsive-aggression (Block, 1995; Lapierre, et al., 1995). 
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The present results also indicate a pattern of personality differences between 
impulsive- and premeditated-aggressive individuals and non-aggressive controls. 
These results, in conjunction with previous work (Barratt et al., 1997b; Stanford et al., 
2003b), suggest a distinctive personality style may be associated with aggressive 
behaviour, regardless of the type of aggression displayed. Considering these findings, 
it is hypothesised that the individual‟s capacity to control his/her behaviour plays a 
key role in the manifestation of aggressive behaviour. Those who display 
predominantly impulsive-aggressive behaviour are characterised by a number of 
cognitive deficits that seem to contribute to their loss of behavioural control. 
Conversely, premeditated-aggressive individuals appear to have an intact behavioural 
control system. These results thus provide some insight as to the underlying 
mechanisms of different aggressive subtypes, and allow for more accurate evaluation 
and treatment of such problem behaviour (Stanford et al., 2003a). 
 The finding of neuropsychological deficits in the current sample of impulsive-
aggressive individuals is particularly striking in light of the general effectiveness and 
high functioning of this population. The impulsive-aggressive individuals in the 
current study, who, by societal standards, are functioning „normally‟, as opposed to 
incarcerated populations, have demonstrable neurocognitive weakness. Furthermore, 
their impulsive-aggressive behaviour is associated with specific neuropsychological 
deficits that are independent of brain trauma. While the sample size is relatively 
small, the consistency of the finding is suggestive of a shared pathology involving 
specific executive control processes. These findings are consistent with the 
neuropsychological and psychophysiological findings in impulsive-aggressive 
incarcerated criminals and support the notion of a specific behavioural syndrome 
associated with spontaneous aggressive outbursts (Barratt et al., 1997b).  
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In conclusion, the results of this study suggest that the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortical dysfunction may contribute to the expression of impulsive-aggression. To 
further delineate the specific role of the prefrontal cortex in both impulsive- and 
premeditated-aggression, the following study will explore abilities localised to the 
orbitofrontal cortex, namely the ability to correctly interpret emotions in facial 
expressions and the attribution of emotions to ambiguous faces of emotion.  
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Chapter 6 
Study 2: Emotion Recognition and Aggression Attribution 
 
As previously discussed, a significant body of evidence indicates that the likelihood 
of acting aggressively is related to some functional capacity of the frontal lobe. 
Studies of violent offenders using both structural (Raine et al., 2000; Relkin, Plum, 
Mattis, Eidelberg & Tranel, 1996) and functional (Raine, et al, 1998; Søderstrom et 
al., 2000) imaging techniques have consistently shown abnormalities in frontal lobe 
structures in individuals who have histories of violence. Additionally, lesion studies 
(Damasio et al., 1994) and neuropsychological studies (Lapierre et al., 1995) have 
provided evidence of the relationship between the prefrontal cortex and the propensity 
for disinhibited aggressive behaviour. 
 To date, the predominant explanation for the demonstrated relationship 
between prefrontal abnormalities and aggressive behaviour has been executive 
dysfunction (Giancola, 2000). However, another possibility that has not been 
addressed in great detail is that aberrations in aspects of the prefrontal cortex may 
interfere with other cognitive and/or perceptual abilities. Disturbances of higher 
cognition and social behaviour have long been recognised as common sequelae of 
lesions or deficits in the prefrontal cortex. These behavioural changes have been 
linked with damage involving orbitofrontal or ventromedial prefrontal cortex, but the 
specific emotional, cognitive, and/or physiological processes that may be disrupted 
have not been well elucidated.  
Several mechanisms have been proposed to explain the observed deficits in 
social behaviour following orbitofrontal or ventromedial damage lesions: impaired 
decision-making due to a lack of a „somatic marker‟ (Bechara et al., 1994; Damasio et 
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al., 1990); the inability to alter behaviour appropriately in response to a change in 
reinforcement contingencies (Rolls, 1996; Rolls et al., 1994); deficits in the ability to 
represent the mental states of others or „theory of mind‟ (Stone et al., 1998); or the 
ability to access social knowledge (Grafman et al., 1996; Hornak et al., 1996). Still 
other theorists have attributed orbitofrontal patients‟ poor social behaviour to an 
inability to use emotional information to guide behaviour (e.g., Bechara et al., 2000a).  
Since the classic publication of Dodge (1986), social information processing 
has been assumed to constitute an important mechanism in the maintenance of 
aggressive behaviour patterns and therefore has often been formulated as the target of 
cognitive-behavioural interventions. If distinct forms of social information processing 
are found to characterise the different subtypes of aggression, this may have major 
implications for the interventions adopted in connection with aggressive behaviour.  
One aspect of social behaviour needing further study is the ability to perceive 
and identify another person‟s affective or emotional state (affect perception). Facial 
expressions are non-verbal communicative displays vital in social cognition, allowing 
the transmission of information regarding internal emotional states and emotions to 
others in social situations (Blair et al., 1999). They can be considered as aspects both 
of an emotional response and of social communication (Adolphs, 2002a). In 
particular, one‟s ability to recognise facial expressions allows inferences to be made 
about moods and feelings, and in some cases may significantly influence the 
comprehension of language (Kolb, Wilson & Taylor, 1992).  
The ability to adequately identify facial expressions of emotion is a problem 
that has been associated with a broad range of behavioural abnormality and 
psychopathology, including major depression (Surguladze et al., 2004), bipolar 
disorder (Getz, Shear & Strakowski, 2003; Venn et al., 2004), anorexia nervosa 
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(Kucharsak-Pietura, Nikolaou, Masiak & Treasure, 2004), schizophrenia (Kohler & 
Brennan, 2004), adult ADHD (Rapport, Friedman, Tzelepis & Van Voorhis, 2002), 
alcoholism (Frigerio, Burt, Montagne, Murray & Perrett, 2002; Townshend & Duka, 
2003), and opiate dependence (Kornreich et al., 2003), all of which may or may not 
involve aggressive behaviour. Given this, an investigation into the specific 
relationship between aggression and emotion recognition is needed.   
  
6.1  Neural systems involved in emotion recognition 
Functional neuroimaging and lesions studies have identified neural systems 
responsive to human facial expressions (Davidson, Abercrombie, Nitschke & Putnam, 
1999; Gur et al., 2002; Phillips et al., 1999; Wright, Martis, Shin, Fischer & Rauch, 
2002). While it is recognised that there are areas in the primate temporal visual cortex 
where faces are represented, and there is a specialised population of neurons 
concerned with facial expression (Allison, Puse & McCarthy, 2000; Rolls, 1992), 
animal, neuroimaging, and human lesion studies consistently attribute impaired 
emotion recognition to dysfunction within a frontolimbic circuit that entails the 
orbitofrontal cortex, the amygdala, ventral striatum, and anterior cingulate (Phillips, 
Drevets, Rauch & Lane, 2003). There is a direct projection from the temporal visual 
cortex areas into the orbitofrontal/inferior frontal cortex. In addition, there is a route 
via the amygdala, where face-responsive cells are also found, to the orbitofrontal 
cortex (Rolls, 1990; 1999). Rolls, Critchley, Browning and Inoue (2006) also found a 
number of face-responsive neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex, and they are also 
present in adjacent prefrontal cortical areas. This suggests that information about 
faces, for example about expressions of emotion, may reach the orbitofrontal cortex, 
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where it could be used to provide reinforcing signals when social and emotional 
behaviour must be altered.  
The suggestion of amygdala involvement is prompted by knowledge that this 
structure is crucial for processing threatening stimuli (e.g., Adolphs & Tranel, 2000; 
Adolphs et al., 1999; LeDoux, 1998). Calder et al. (1996) report on patient DR who 
had bilateral damage to the amygdala, and showed a recognition impairment for 
angry, fearful, disgusted, expressions. Similarly, Scott et al. (1997) report that the 
same patient was impaired in the recognition of the sounds of anger and fear, as well 
as angry, fearful, and sad tones of voice. Using fMRI with a facial matching and 
emotion identification task, Hariri, Bookheimer and Mazziotta (2000) reported that 
matching angry and frightened expressions was associated with bilaterally increased 
activation in the amygdala. However, cognitive processing of the facial expressions 
led to an attenuation of the amygdala response that was associated with engagement 
of the right prefrontal cortex.  
Various frontal lobe regions have been active during a range of tasks involving 
emotional faces: the right anterior cingulate cortex and bilateral inferior frontal gyri 
during facial expression matching (George et al., 1993); the lateral orbitofrontal 
cortex and anterior cingulate cortex when matching fearful and neutral faces 
(Vuilleumrier, Armony, Driver & Dolan, 2001); the left ventral prefrontal cortex and 
left anterior cingulate cortex when making gender discriminations between angry 
faces (Blair et al., 1999); and the bilateral inferior frontal gyri during observation and 
imitation of emotional faces (Carr, Iacoboni, Dubeau, Mazziotta & Lenzi, 2003).  
Nakamura et al. (1999) and Narumoto et al. (2000) reported right prefrontal 
response during elevation of facial expressions, while Sprengelmeyer et al. (1998) 
reported a study of six healthy adults performing a gender discrimination task of faces 
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expressing disgust, fear, and anger compared with neutral expressions. The fMRI data 
showed left inferior frontal activation for all three emotions, with different patterns 
for each emotion in other cortical and subcortical regions. More recently, Heberlein, 
Padon, Gillihan, Farah and Fellows (2008) compared emotion recognition 
performance of subjects with lesions confined to the ventromedial prefrontal regions 
to those with lesions elsewhere in the prefrontal cortex. They found that emotion 
recognition was impaired following ventromedial, but not dorsal or lateral, prefrontal 
damage. This impairment was demonstrated for the six emotions used in the task.  
While some studies outlined above have linked impairments in recognising 
facial emotion to the prefrontal cortex broadly (Kolb & Taylor, 2000), most of the 
evidence points to those sectors of the prefrontal cortex connected with the amygdala 
and other structures that regulate emotion and autonomic function; principally ventral 
and medial sectors (Ongur & Price, 2000). Hornak et al. (1996) first explicitly 
demonstrated impaired recognition of emotion from facial expressions, and from the 
voice, following damage to the orbitofrontal cortex. Their patients had unilateral and 
bilateral damage to medial and lateral aspects of the orbital cortex (right unilateral 
damage was more frequently associated with impaired emotion recognition than was 
left unilateral damage) and such impairments occurred independently of perceptual 
impairments in facial recognition, voice discrimination or sound recognition. Poor 
performance on both expression tests was correlated with the degree of alteration of 
emotional experience reported by the patients. The authors also reported that patients‟ 
experience of certain emotions, particularly fear, decreased considerably following 
their lesion, suggesting that the orbitofrontal cortex may participate in both experience 
and recognition of emotion. A comparison group of patients with brain damage 
outside the ventral frontal lobe region, without these behavioural problems, was 
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unimpaired on the face expression identification tests, was significantly less impaired 
at vocal expression identification and reported little subjective emotional change.  
The most detailed lesion study to date compared emotion recognition from 
face and vocal stimuli in groups with damage to the bilateral orbitofrontal cortex, 
unilateral orbitofrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, and dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (Hornak et al., 2003). They found that some patients with bilateral lesions of 
the orbitofrontal cortex had deficits in voice and face expression identification, 
impairments in social behaviour and significant changes in their subjective emotional 
state. Patients with unilateral lesions of the antero-ventral part of the anterior 
cingulate cortex and/or medial prefrontal cortex were in some cases impaired on voice 
and face expression identification, had some change in social behaviour, and had 
significant changes in their subjective emotional state. Patients with dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex lesions or with medial lesions outside the anterior cingulate cortex 
and medial prefrontal areas were unimpaired on any of these measures of emotion.  
 The results of Hornak et al. (2003) thus confirm that damage restricted to the 
orbitofrontal cortex can produce impairments in face and voice expression 
identification, both of which may be primary reinforcers. The system is sensitive, in 
that even patients with unilateral orbitofrontal cortex lesions may be impaired. The 
results also show that changes in social behaviour can be produced by damage 
restricted to the orbitofrontal cortex. The patients were particularly likely to be 
impaired on emotion recognition, emotional empathy (they were less likely to comfort 
those who were sad, or afraid, or to feel happy for others who are happy), 
interpersonal relationships (not caring what others think, and not being close to 
his/her family); and were less likely to cooperate with others; were impatient and 
impulsive, and had difficulty in making and keeping close relationships.  
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The significance of these specific neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex is likely 
to be related to the fact that faces convey information that is important in social 
interactons, both by conveying face expression, which can indicate reinforcement, and 
by encoding information about which individual is present (Rolls, 2007). This 
suggests that the orbitofrontal cortex is a vital system in emotion-related learning 
(Rolls, 1990; 1995).  
Although it is clear that the ability to adequately identify facial expressions is 
not exclusively mediated by the prefrontal cortex, there is compelling neuroimaging 
evidence to suggest that this region plays a significant role in the successful 
identification of facial expressions of emotion. For example, Phan, Wager, Taylor and 
Liberzon (2002) conducted a meta-analysis of 55 PET and fMRI studies of neural 
regions activated by emotional stimuli (most typically facial expressions). They 
concluded that medial prefrontal cortex is most consistently activated by emotional 
stimuli, suggesting it has a central role in emotional processing.  
 
6.2  Separable neural systems for different emotional expressions 
Growing evidence suggests that the recognition of different emotional states 
involves at least partly separable neural circuits. Patients with bilateral damage to the 
amygdala show impaired processing of fear relative to other expressions of emotion 
(Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio & Damasio, 1994). Consistent with this, amygdala 
activation occurs specifically during the presentation of fearful facial expressions of 
emotion in healthy volunteers (Morris et al., 1996). Amygdala activation is also 
evident during perception of sad facial expressions (Blair et al., 1999). In contrast, the 
anterior insula and dorsal striatum are implicated in the processing of disgust (Gray, 
Young, Barker, Curtis & Gibson, 1997; Phillips et al., 1997, 1998).  
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Evidence concerning the processing of other key emotions, though limited, is 
growing. Neuroimaging implicates the medial frontal cortex in the processing of 
angry facial expressions (Blair et al., 1999; Phillips et al, 1999). Blair et al. (1999) 
found the right orbitofrontal cortex and anterior cingulate showed an enhanced 
response to angry expressions which correlated with expression intensity. The 
involvement of the anterior cingulate in the processing of anger accords with its well-
known participation in the regulation of emotion and expression of emotional 
responses (Bush, Luu & Posner, 2000; Devinsky et al., 1995). Transcranial Magnetic 
Stimulation (TMS) research has supported this, finding that TMS over the medial 
frontal cortex impaired the processing of angry, but not happy, facial expressions of 
emotion. This effect was largest for difficult discriminations from neutral faces 
(Harmer, Thilo, Rothwell & Goodwin, 2001). 
The medial and orbital regions are richly interconnected, especially via the 
ventromedial part of the frontal lobe, suggesting that a lesion in either might be 
expected to disrupt some of the same functions (Cavada, Company, Tejedor, Cruz-
Rizzolo & Reinoso-Suarez, 2000; Koski & Paus, 2000; Ongur & Price, 2000). 
Nevertheless, these regions can be distinguished from each other by their specific 
pattern of connections with other parts of the brain, including sensory, limbic, and 
striatal-thalamic structures (Ongur & Price, 2000). To this extent, they would be 
expected to contribute differently to emotional processing.  
The data thus indicate dissociable neural substrates that differentially 
responded to these distinct emotional expressions. These dissociable neural patterns 
are in keeping with the suggestion that there are distinct neural systems which 
respond to basic expressions of emotion (e.g., Adolphs, Damasio, Tranel & Damasio, 
1996).  
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6.3  The relationship between emotion recognition and aggression 
Theories of social competence postulate that social perception skills (i.e., 
facial affect recognition) are an important factor in mediating social skill and social 
adjustment (Wallace, 1984). Facial expressions of emotions are crucial in social 
cognition, communicating information to others, providing indicators of affective 
disposition in others and modulating behaviour according to the social context (Eimer 
& Holmes, 2007). In this way, activation of these neurons which are involved in facial 
expression recognition acts as a reinforcer. Certainly, in primate social interaction, 
individuals are constantly updating their evaluation of other individuals in terms of 
the reinforcers received. The rapid learning of associations between representations of 
expression and reinforcers in the orbitofrontal cortex is likely to be a vital part of this 
process. 
There is a strong relationship between identifying emotional states and 
emotional experience. Adults have a tendency to mirror the facial expression of those 
whom they are interacting with (McHugo & Smith, 1996) and, in turn, lead to 
corresponding emotional changes (Levenson, Ekman & Friesen, 1990). Adults with 
focal frontal lesions and traumatic brain injury implicating the frontal lobes can 
experience reduced somatic responses to emotional material (Croker & McDonald, 
2005; Hornak et al., 1996; McDonald, 2005; Saunders, McDonald & Richardson, 
2006). Furthermore there is a relationship between responsivity and recognition 
accuracy (Croker & McDonald, 2005). This is consistent with Phillips et al. (2003) 
who argued that the ventral frontal system mediates both the early appraisal of 
emotionally significant stimuli, as well as the affective responses to those stimuli. 
The display of sad expressions has long been linked to the inhibition of 
aggression and the elicitation of prosocial behaviour (e.g., Miller & Eisenberg, 1988; 
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Eisenberg et al., 1989). Following with this, Blair (1995) postulated the existence of a 
violence inhibition mechanism in humans which would be activated by non-verbal 
communication of distress, including sad or fearful facial expressions. Angry facial 
expressions, on the other hand, are displayed to curtail the behaviour of others in 
situations where they have broken the social rules or social expectations (Averill, 
1982). They are also thought to be important signals to modulate current behavioural 
responding, particularly in situations involving hierarchy interactions (Blair & 
Cipolotti, 2000; Lerner & Keltner, 2001).  
As accurate interpretation of facial expressions is important for social 
interaction, one would expect that individuals who have trouble interpreting facial 
expressions of emotions would be less socially competent and fail to adequately 
modulate behaviour according to social context (Weiss et al., 2006). 
Misinterpretations of social cues, such as angry and fearful facial expressions, may 
lead to inappropriate reactions in social interactions, such as acting in a way that 
causes harm to others. In addition, such individuals might be unaware that their 
behaviour unintentionally engenders fear in others. Aggressive behaviour may thus be 
a result of a failure to benefit from restraint-producing environmental cues that serve a 
regulatory role, such as facial signs of anger.  
In a variety of studies, it has been shown that distortion or misinterpretation of 
social cues can result in the generation of inappropriate social responses, such as 
reacting aggressively or violently in ambiguous social situations (Akhtar & Bradley, 
1991; Dodge et al., 2002). The most comprehensive discussion of social information 
processing and its relationship with aggressive behaviour comes from Dodge (1986), 
and a reformulation of this model by Crick and Dodge (1994). The models propose 
that to react appropriately to social situations, social information has to be processed 
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in an orderly fashion: (1) the information has to be coded accurately; (2) the encoded 
information has to be represented correctly; (3) an interaction goal needs to be 
specified; (4) response alternatives have to be generated; (5) response alternatives 
have to be evaluated and, from these responses, an optimal response has to be 
selected; and (6) the selected response has to be enacted. These initial stages of the 
model thus constitute low-level processing and encoding of the affective cues of 
others.  
According to Dodge (1980), one of the reasons why aggressive children act 
aggressively is that they attribute hostile intentions to others more often than do other 
children. This phenomenon has become widely known as „hostile attribution bias‟. 
Aggressive children have, in fact, been shown repeatedly to interpret ambiguous 
social cues as hostile (Crick & Dodge, 1996; Dodge & Schwartz, 1997; Orobio de 
Castro, Veerman, Koops, Bosch & Monshouwer, 2002) which suggests that deviant 
social information processing plays a role in the development and maintenance of 
aggressive behaviour.  
 Different aspects of social information processing may play a role in the 
manifestation of impulsive- versus premeditated-aggression (Dodge, 1991). 
According to the frustration-aggression theory typically applied to impulsive-
aggression, this form of aggression arises predominantly among individuals who 
show a strong orientation towards negative information during the initial stages of 
information processing, a tendency to interpret this information as threatening and 
frustrating, and a propensity to become emotionally aroused as a result of their 
interpretation of the social information. Via a combination of insufficient information 
processing, temperament, threatening experiences and difficulties in emotion 
 118 
regulation, impulsive-aggressive individuals experience a greater number of situations 
as frustrating and in turn react aggressively.  
In contrast, according to the social-learning theory typically applied to 
premeditated-aggression, distortions arise during the later stages of social information 
processing as previous learning experiences have made aggressive behaviours quickly 
and easily accessible and aggression is expected to produce positive outcomes. That 
is, premeditated-aggression is displayed as a result of positive experiences with 
aggression in other situations (Merk et al., 2005). 
Facial expressions are one way to assess emotion-relevant attributional bias, 
and researchers have demonstrated that individuals perceive pictures of facial 
expressions in a way that is consistent with their perceptual set (Maner et al., 2005). 
Hall (2006) found a significant positive correlation between errors of commission in 
regard to identification of anger from photographs and aggressive attitude and verbal 
aggression in a sample of undergraduate students. She argued that such individuals 
appeared to be primed to perceive the world based on their own negative schema and 
to interpret information around them to conform to these biases. Such findings are 
consistent with those of previous studies indicating that people often interpret the 
behaviour of others based on their own internal feelings and beliefs (Dodge et al., 
2003; Hubbard et al., 2001).  
Regarding these self-schemas, it has been suggested that individuals link past 
experiences to form dominant themes, and that these guide cognitive processing and 
social interactions (Milne & Grafman, 2001). According to Blackburn (1989), with 
widespread experiences, these emotional scripts become over-generalised into social 
interactions. In the case of aggressive individuals, this bias is an attribution of hostile 
intent in social interactions. Novaco and Welsh (1989) propose a similar concept, 
 119 
known as the social-information processing theory, describing the relationship 
between information processing deficits and aggression. These pre-existing belief 
systems, or schemas, influence what a person attends to and how they encode and 
store the information. For example, aggressive reactions to an aversive interpersonal 
situation can increase an individual‟s expectancy that others will behave aversively. 
These expectancies in turn can effectively increase the likelihood that the individual 
will react in an aggressive manner in future interpersonal situations that are not 
necessarily of an aversive nature (Huesmann, 1988). Dodge and Tomlin (1987) 
provide support for this theory finding that when participants were asked to explain 
their decision as to the intent they attributed to peer provocation, aggressive 
participants were more likely to utilise self-schemas rather than the provided cues. 
Social cognitive models propose that this cognitive mediation is a relatively 
automatic process as these individuals will act in accordance with their own schemas, 
which have been learnt and rehearsed throughout life. In support of this hypothesis, 
Dodge and Newman (1981) found that when aggressive subjects were encouraged to 
respond faster, they made greater attributions of hostile intent in interpreting 
frustrating situations when the reason for the conflict was ambiguous. In addition to 
this, Dodge and Coie (1987) found that only impulsive-aggressive children and not 
instrumental-aggressive children demonstrated hostile biases in their attributions of 
peer intentions in provocative situations. It thus appears that faster latency of 
responding facilitates self-schemas of hostile attributions in aggressive subjects.  
Deficiencies in processing and responding to social cues increase the 
likelihood of emergent maladaptive or inappropriate behaviours, as cognitive 
appraisals of events influence behavioural reactions displayed by the individual. 
These reactions then modify subsequent cognitive appraisals of events (Novaco & 
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Welsh, 1989). This self-perpetuating cycle is demonstrated in aggressive reactions to 
an aversive interpersonal situation increasing the individual‟s expectation that others 
will behave aversively. Such expectancies in turn effectively lower the threshold of 
additional aggressive reactions. Cognitive factors and processes may either amplify or 
attenuate aggressive reactions to aversive or negative events. Often, however, 
excessive and inappropriate aggression disrupts non-aversive interpersonal situations.  
Insight into the relationship between cognitive processes and behavioural 
reactions may provide important insights into the potentially significant cognitive 
characteristics of individuals who repeatedly react aggressively in interpersonal 
situations. This bias not only encompasses their appraisals of aversive interpersonal 
situations, but also distorts their appraisal of benign situations. The latter effect may 
prove to be particularly problematic, since a bias to attribute hostility might easily 
increase incorrect appraisals of both aversive interpersonal situations without hostile 
intent and non-aversive interpersonal situations, which do not warrant such 
attributions (Nasby, Hayden & DePaulo, 1980). 
As discussed previously, the orbitofrontal cortex has been implicated in the 
recognition of emotional expressions (Hornak et al., 1996). The orbitofrontal cortex is 
also shown to be involved in the mediation of behavioural extinction and the reversal 
of behaviour to stimuli (e.g., faces) when the reinforcement contingencies change 
(Dias et al., 1996a; Rolls, 1996). It thus has an important role in social and emotional 
behaviour. Blair et al. (1999) suggest that the orbitofrontal cortex response to angry 
expression observed in their study is a reflection of a behavioural extinction/response 
reversal effect of these stimuli. They propose that the orbitofrontal cortex, when 
activated by angry expression stimuli, acts to suppress current behaviour through 
inhibition or by activation of alternative behavioural responses. In this way, angry 
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expressions are displayed to inhibit the behaviour of others in social situations and, in 
this sense, effectively terminate the ongoing behaviour of others (Averill, 1982). 
Angry expressions thus serve as a cue for behaviour extinction and/or reversal 
learning. 
In normal social and emotional behaviour, humans must continuously react to 
the signals provided by facial expressions and emotions are often considered to be 
states elicited by rewarding and punishing stimuli. For example, the fear is a state 
elicited by stimuli learned to be associated with punishment, and joy is a state 
associated with rewarding stimuli. Because emotions are related to rewarding and 
punishing events which ultimately alter the probability of behaviour occurring, any 
failure to correct behaviour when the reinforcing value of environmental stimuli 
changes will lead to inappropriate emotional and social behaviour. A tendency to 
attribute hostility to ambiguous stimuli within the environment may contribute to 
aggressive behaviour. As impulsive-aggressive individuals may be more likely to 
encounter aggressive social cues through their misattribution of ambiguous cues, 
these individuals are consequently likely to respond in a similarly aggressive manner 
to both aggressive and neutral cues, compared with other individuals. Furthermore, 
this response could be a „first-strike‟ self-defensive action common to individuals 
with impulsive-aggressive personality traits. 
Research supports the association between face decoding deficits and 
subjective emotional changes and observable changes in behaviour. Hornak et al. 
(1996) found that the greater total alteration in emotional experience (increase or 
decrease in both positive and negative emotions) as reflected in a subjective emotional 
changes questionnaire, the worse the performance on each of the tests of expression 
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identification. This correlation suggests that for some patients with frontal damage, 
the expression identification deficit may be part of a wider emotional disturbance.  
Individuals with disorders marked by antisocial behaviour frequently show 
impairment in recognising displays of facial affect. For example, Blair and Cipolotti 
(2000) reported on a patient with sociopathy and episodic aggression following a right 
hemisphere trauma who experienced severe difficulty in the recognition of angry and 
disgusted facial expressions. Walz and Benson (1996) demonstrated that aggressive 
men with mental retardation did not have greater difficulty with emotion labelling and 
discrimination compared to peers, but had a negative emotional bias for ambiguous 
facial expressions. Aggressive subjects were more likely to state that a face was 
expressing anger when they were unsure of the emotion.  
These findings are consistent with Dodge‟s (1993) and McNiel, Eisner and 
Binder‟s (2003) model of social information processing, in which they predict that a 
cognitive style characterised by hostile attributions increases the risk of violence. 
Although Dodge and McNeil et al. did not study facial expressions of emotion 
directly, they found that in ambiguous situations, aggressive individuals attend to 
fewer emotional cues, interpret actions and intentions of others as involving anger, 
and display deficits in what is described as affective perspective taking.  
 More recently, Mah, Arnold and Grafman (2005) compared the performance 
of patients with ventromedial prefrontal cortex or dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
lesions with healthy volunteers on the Tests of Social Intelligence (O‟Sullivan & 
Guilford, 1976). As hypothesised, only patients with ventromedial prefrontal lesions 
showed specific impairments in the ability to use non-verbal cues to interpret 
emotional expression, as well as the ability to complete a socially meaningful story by 
interpreting the feelings and behaviour of characters. The authors argued that the 
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results suggested deficient social knowledge, namely difficulty interpreting non-
verbal emotional expression, contribute to the aberrant social behaviour observed 
following ventromedial prefrontal cortex lesions.  
 Mitchell, Avny and Blair (2006) presented results from patient CL, who had 
„acquired psychopathy‟ following an orbitofrontal cortex lesion. CL showed 
impairment in the identification of fearful, happy, surprised, disgusted, and angry 
facial expressions, and in comparison to psychopathic individuals, CL was 
significantly impaired for happy and angry facial expressions. In combination with 
their other findings, the authors concluded that a failure to recognise disapproving 
social cues will compromise the ability to adjust behaviour in response to changing 
social demands. 
While the above studies have demonstrated a relationship between emotion 
recognition deficits and antisocial behaviour in individuals with damage to the 
orbitofrontal or ventromedial prefrontal cortex, only one study has investigated the 
relationship in aggressive individuals without neurological damage specifically. 
Hoaken et al. (2007) investigated possible facial expression identification deficits in 
violent and non-violent offenders. They found that the violent offender group was 
significantly poorer at the interpretation of facial expressions of emotion than either 
non-violent offenders or controls. When they assessed which attributions the groups 
made of neutral faces, they found that the non-violent and control groups were most 
likely to attribute an emotion seemingly irrelevant to aggression (most often 
„sadness‟), whereas violent offenders were more likely to respond „disgust‟. Although 
this response does not clearly demonstrate a tendency of these participants to 
systematically interpret hostility, it does suggest that they have a tendency to less 
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positively interpret the emotions of others. This can be seen as theoretically consistent 
with a propensity for acting aggressively.  
In sum, the preceding evidence suggests that aggressive reactions are often 
prompted by an interpretation that another person is acting with hostile intent towards 
the individual. Characteristic impulsivity may strengthen the tendency to make such 
attributions through faster responding. Impulsive-aggression can also be characterised 
as a defensive reaction to a perceived threatening stimulus. The perception of threat 
and experience of anger consequently causes the individual to act aggressively, either 
in defence or in retaliation. Errors and biases in interpreting threats are thus 
hypothesised to account for the inappropriate display of impulsive-aggression. 
 
6.4  Aim and hypotheses 
The present study investigated emotion recognition in impulsive-aggressive 
and premeditated-aggressive individuals in comparison to controls using an emotion 
recognition task and an aggression rating task. Given the scarcity of research on 
emotion recognition in aggressive populations, the current study sought to investigate 
whether impulsive-aggressive individuals show greater impairment in one aspect of 
social cognition, namely the ability to interpret facial expressions of emotion, relative 
to premeditated-aggressive individuals and controls. As the predominant focus of the 
current research is on the role of the orbitofrontal cortex, a particular focus was on the 
interpretation of aggressive and neutral faces. Possible dysfunction in the 
interpretation of other emotions would also be explored. 
A relationship between orbitofrontal damage and the display of impulsive-
aggression has been established (e.g., Rolls et al., 1994). Furthermore, individuals 
with damage to the orbitofrontal cortex have been shown to misinterpret facial 
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expression of emotion (e.g., Hornak et al., 1996). It was therefore hypothesised that 
impulsive-aggressive individuals, due to possible dysfunction in orbitofrontal 
functioning, would be impaired on facial expression recognition, specifically the 
interpretation of aggressive and possibly neutral expressions, relative to premeditated-
aggressive individuals and controls.  
Furthermore, impulsive-aggressive individuals have been shown to 
misattribute hostile intent in benign social situations. Thus, on the aggression rating 
task, it was hypothesised that the impulsive-aggressive individuals would rate the 
neutral faces as significantly more aggressive than would the premeditated-aggressive 
and control participants.  
Differences in responses at the 1000ms and 2000ms stimulus durations on the 
emotion recognition task and aggression rating task would be investigated to 
determine if shorter processing time hinders the correct interpretation of the faces. 
This is based on Dodge and Coie‟s (1996) argument that faster latency of responding 
would facilitate a reliance on self-schemas and therefore a hostile attribution of intent. 
 
6.5  Method 
6.5.1  Participants 
An initial pool of 435 students from the University of Tasmania were screened 
using the BPAQ-SF (Bryant & Smith, 2001). The sample was recruited from a 
different cohort than that in Study 1. Aggression scores were non-normally 
distributed, with skewness of .534 (SE = .118) and kurtosis of -.583 (SE = .23). 
Based on questionnaire responses, 100 participants (female = 59, male = 41) 
were selected and placed into one of two groups; aggressive (n = 70), and non-
aggressive controls (n = 30). Participants were selected and grouped according to the 
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selection criteria detailed in Chapter 5. The aggression scores differed significantly 
between the aggressive group (M = 37.3, SD = 4.82) and control group (M = 15.27, 
SD = 1.93), F (1, 87) = 584.01, MSE = 10208.05, p<.001, 2 = .856. Using the IPAS 
(Stanford et al, 2003a), the aggressive group was further divided into predominantly 
impulsive-aggressive and predominantly premeditated-aggressive utilising the 
grouping criteria as for Study 1. This method led to the exclusion of 13 participants 
from the 70 aggressive individuals initially identified. Further exclusion criteria for 
this study are outlined in Chapter 5. The final sample consisted of 35 impulsive-
aggressive, 22 premeditated-aggressive and 30 control participants. The number of 
males and females in each group is shown in Table 6.1.  
 
Table 6.1 
Number of males and females in the three participant groups and total sample 
  
Impulsive-
Aggressive 
Premeditated-
Aggressive 
Control Total 
     
Males 13 13 11 37 
Females 22 9 19 50 
      
 
Mean aggression scores on the BPAQ-SF for the three participant groups are 
shown in Table 6.2. There was a significant difference in aggression scores between 
the three groups, F(2, 86) = 299.26, MSE = 4637.95, p<.001, 2 = .877. Post hoc 
Tukeys indicated that the impulsive-aggressive and premeditated-aggressive groups 
had significantly higher aggression scores than the control group (ps<.05). There was 
no significant difference in BPAQ-SF scores between the males and females in the 
impulsive-aggressive group, F(1, 34) = .004, MSE = .12, p = .95, 2 = .000, 
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premeditated-aggressive group, F(1,21) = 1.01, MSE = 14.03, p = .33, 2 = .048, 
control group, F(1, 29 ) = 1.99, MSE = 7.17, p = .17, 2 = .066, or total sample, F(1, 
86) = .92, MSE = 113.55, p = .34, 2 = .011.  
 Participants‟ ages ranged from 17 to 30 years with a mean age of 19.86 years 
(SD = 2.72). Mean ages for each participant group are presented in Table 6.2. The 
premeditated-aggressive group was significantly older than the impulsive-aggressive 
and control groups, F(2, 87) = 4.02, MSE = 27.72, p = .02, 2 = .087. 
 
Table 6.2. 
Mean (and standard deviations) scores on the Aggression Questionnaire – Short 
Form and ages for the three participant groups and total sample 
  
Impulsive-
Aggressive 
Premeditated-
Aggressive 
Control Total 
     
BPAQ-Revised 37.46 (5.15) 36.18 (3.72) 15.27 (1.93) 29.48 (11.09) 
Males 37.50 (4.66) 35.22 (3.42) 14.89 (1.97) 30.81 (10.72) 
Females 37.38 (6.10) 36.85 (3.91) 15.91 (1.76) 28.50 (11.36) 
Age 19.49 (1.92) 21.23 (3.94) 19.30 (2.10) 19.86 (2.72) 
      
 
6.5.2  Materials 
6.5.2.1 Questionnaires 
The BPAQ-SF (Bryant & Smith, 2001) was used for the purpose of selecting 
participants who were characteristically aggressive. The IPAS (Stanford et al., 2003a) 
was employed to characterise the aggressive acts as predominantly impulsive 
aggressive or predominantly premeditated in nature. Participants also completed the 
BPAQ (Buss & Perry, 1992) and I7 Impulsivity Questionnaire (Eysenck et al., 1985) 
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upon completion of the computer tasks. All questionnaires are outlined in detail in 
Chapter 5. 
 
6.5.2.2 Facial recognition tasks 
Emotion recognition task: Stimuli for the emotion recognition task comprised 
56 faces conveying one of seven different emotions: sad, angry, disgusted, surprised, 
frightened, happy and neutral. Faces were black and white photographs obtained from 
Ekman and Friesen‟s (1976) slides, which were digitised for computer presentation. 
Faces were selected from the Ekman and Friesen pool based on piloting studies in 
which individuals (n = 100) were asked to indicate which facial expression was being 
depicted by choosing from a list of seven expressions (aggressive, disgusted, 
frightened, happy, neutral, surprised, sad). Faces identified with most accuracy were 
chosen for the tasks. The final 56 face stimuli was made up of four female faces and 
four male faces, each portraying one of each emotion listed above (see Appendix D 
for facial stimuli). The Ekman and Friesen faces have been widely used and validated 
as accurate depictions of emotional affect, and thus provide a reliable and valid means 
of assessing facial-affect recognition deficits.  
Aggression rating task: Following the emotion recognition task, participants 
completed an aggression-rating task. The task consisted of 50 facial stimuli obtained 
from Ekman and Friesen‟s (1976) collection, depicting one of five facial expressions: 
aggressive, disgusted, frightened, happy, or neutral. The five female faces and five 
male faces each portrayed one of each emotion listed above. The facial stimuli chosen 
for this task were taken from the pilot study described above (see Appendix E for 
facial stimuli). 
 129 
Both tasks were presented on a Pentium 90 computer with a 15” monitor. 
Participants used the computer keyboard to indicate their responses. 
 
6.5.2.3 Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Third Edition (Wechsler, 1997) 
  Two subtests from the WAIS-III were selected as control measures. As 
outlined in Chapter 5, Vocabulary was used as a measure of general intellectual 
functioning, while Digit Span was used as a measure of verbal working memory and 
attentional capacity for verbal information (Wechsler, 1997). 
 
6.5.3  Procedure 
The BPAQ-SF was used to recruit participants from undergraduate 
psychology classes at the University of Tasmania. Following the screening process, 
participants who qualified as aggressive or control participants were invited to 
participate in the emotion recognition and aggression rating tasks, as well as the tasks 
completed for Study 3 (outlined in Chapter 7). Approval from the Human Research 
Ethics Committee (Tasmania) Network was obtained before the recruitment 
procedures took place (see Appendix A for approval letter).  
 All participants received course credit for their participation. Informed written 
consent was obtained from all individuals prior to participation (see Appendix F and 
G for participant information sheets and consent forms). Participants were tested 
individually in a quiet room in the School of Psychology at the University of 
Tasmania. Participants completed the tasks for Study 2 and Study 3 in the same 
testing session. Presentation of the tasks was counterbalanced. 
 Participants were seated in front of a computer monitor, approximately 60cm 
from the screen. The emotion recognition task was explained and participants were 
instructed to respond to the face by pressing the corresponding key to the emotion that 
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they thought the face was depicting. Participants used both of their index, middle, and 
ring fingers on the numbers one through to six on the number keys at the top of the 
keyboard to indicate their response.  
 The emotion recognition task entailed a face being presented centrally for 
either 1000ms or 2000ms, followed by a list of six emotions (sad, angry, frightened, 
disgusted, surprised, happy), numbered one through to six. The order in which the 
emotion list was presented was randomised for each face, and the stimulus duration 
was counterbalanced. The faces were approximately 220 mm in height and 140 mm 
wide, presented on a white background. The inter-trial interval was 1500ms. The task 
consisted of 56 trials. The dependent variables for this task were the number of 
incorrect responses to the non-neutral stimuli, and the nature of responses to the 
neutral stimuli. 
Participants then completed the aggression rating task. This task entailed a 
face being presented centrally on the computer screen for either 1000ms or 2000ms 
(counterbalanced order), followed by a 5-point Likert scale (1 = not at all aggressive, 
2 = a little aggressive, 3 = quite aggressive, 4 = very aggressive, 5 = extremely 
aggressive). Participants placed their two index fingers, two middle fingers, and left 
ring finger on the numbers one through to five at the top of the keyboard and were 
required to press the corresponding number to the perceived level of aggressiveness 
for each face. The inter-trial interval was 1500ms. The task consisted of 50 trials. The 
dependent variable was mean aggressiveness ratings of each face type. 
Following completion of the computer tasks for Study 2 and Study 3, 
participants completed the WAIS-III Vocabulary and Digit Span subtests, and the 
BPAQ, IPAS, and I7 Impulsivity questionnaires. Participants were fully debriefed at 
the end of the testing session. 
 131 
6.6  Results 
6.6.1  Participants 
Mean scores on the BPAQ and I7 Impulsivity Questionnaire were analysed 
using separate one-way ANOVAs. On the BPAQ, a significant effect was found for 
the physical aggression, F(2, 86) = 94.44, MSE = 1841.3, p<.001, 2 = .692, verbal 
aggression, F(2, 86) = 82.98, MSE = 830.93, p<.001, 2 = .664, hostility, F(2, 86) = 
44.32, MSE = 1058.84, p<.001, 2 = .513, anger subscales, F(2, 86) = 178.23, MSE = 
1514.63, p<.001, 2 = .809, and total aggression, F(2, 86) = 343.15, MSE = 20187.46, 
p<.001, 2 = .891. Post hoc Tukeys indicated that the impulsive-aggressive and 
premeditated-aggressive groups had significantly higher scores than the control group 
on all subscales (ps<.05). Comparable to the mean aggression scores for the sample in 
Study 1, the mean scores of the impulsive-aggressive and premeditated-aggressive are 
analogous to Smith and Waterman‟s (2004) sample of violent offenders. 
On the I7 Impulsivity Questionnaire, a significant effect was found for the 
combined impulsivity-venturesomeness subscale, F(2, 86) = 3.14, MSE = 161.74 p = 
.048, 2 = .070, impulsivity, F(2, 86) = 7.77, MSE = 149.38 p = .001, 2 = .156, and 
empathy, F(2, 86) = 6.04, MSE = 62.99, p = .004, 2 = .126. No significant effect was 
found for venturesomeness, F(2, 86) = .1, MSE = 1.83, p = .9, 2 = .002. Post hoc 
Tukeys indicated that on the combined subscale, there was no significant difference 
between the groups (ps>.05), however a trend was shown for the impulsive-
aggressive group to have significantly higher scores than the control group. On the 
impulsivity subscale, the impulsive-aggressive group had significantly higher scores 
than the premeditated-aggressive and control groups (ps<.05). On the empathy 
subscale, the premeditated-aggressive group had significantly lower scores than the 
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impulsive-aggressive and control groups (ps<.05). Mean scores for both 
questionnaires are shown in Table 6.3.  
 
Table 6.3 
Means (and standard deviations) for the subscales of the Aggression Questionnaire – 
Full Scale and I7 Impulsivity Questionnaire for the three participant groups 
Subscale 
 
Group 
 
 
Total 
 
  
Impulsive-
Aggressive 
Premeditated-
Aggressive 
Control  
 
BPAQ 
    
     Physical  23.91 (5.03) 26.31 (5.55) 11.3 (2.12) 20.17 (7.87) 
     Verbal 17.62 (3.81) 19.00 (3.41) 9.03 (1.88) 15.01 (5.39) 
     Hostility 24.20 (5.84) 22.27 (4.84) 13.20 (3.51) 19.92 (6.93) 
     Anger 22.20 (2.96) 21.31 (3.93) 9.47 (1.78) 17.59 (6.60) 
     Total  87.94 (9.11) 88.91 (7.46) 43.00 (5.74) 72.69 (22.96) 
     
I7      
     Imp-Vent 20.31 (6.72) 17.77 (7.06) 15.87 (7.74) 18.14 (7.35) 
     Impulsivity 10.97 (3.97) 8.14 (4.02) 6.77 (5.06) 8.80 (4.72) 
     Venturesomeness 9.34 (4.01) 9.64 (4.56) 9.10 (4.29) 9.33 (4.21) 
     Empathy 15.00 (3.20) 12.05 (4.10) 14.50 (2.46) 14.08 (3.41) 
          
 
 
6.6.2  Emotion recognition task 
Response: Mean number of correct responses were analysed with three-way 
repeated measures ANOVAs for group by face type by stimulus duration (see Table 
6.4 for means and standard deviations).  
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Table 6.4 
Mean (and standard deviations) number of correct responses (maximum = 4) on the 
emotion recognition task for the three participant groups 
Face Type Group Total 
  
Impulsive 
Aggressive 
Premeditated 
Aggressive 
Control  
     
Aggressive      
1000ms 2.86 (0.94) 2.91 (0.75) 2.97 (0.67) 2.91 (0.80) 
2000ms 3.00 (0.73) 3.09 (0.75) 3.10 (0.75) 3.06 (0.74) 
Total 2.92 (0.56) 3.00 (0.56) 3.03 (0.45) 2.98 (0.52) 
Disgusted      
1000ms 2.94 (1.19) 2.95 (1.09) 2.97 (0.85) 2.95 (1.04) 
2000ms 2.63 (1.09) 2.41 (1.05) 2.67 (1.18) 2.59 (1.11) 
Total 2.79 (0.83) 2.68 (0.91) 2.82 (0.74) 2.77 (0.81) 
Frightened      
1000ms 2.63 (1.21) 2.45 (1.37) 2.40 (1.22) 2.51 (1.25) 
2000ms 2.86 (1.09) 2.50 (1.14) 2.73 (1.17) 2.72 (1.13) 
Total 2.74 (0.97) 2.48 (1.18) 2.57 (1.02) 2.62 (1.04) 
Happy     
1000ms 3.91 (0.28) 3.81 (0.39) 3.80 (0.41) 3.85 (0.36) 
2000ms 3.39 (0.32) 3.77 (0.43) 3.93 (0.25) 3.87 (0.33) 
Total 3.90 (0.20) 3.80 (0.30) 3.87 (0.22) 3.86 (0.24) 
Surprised     
1000ms 3.37 (0.65) 3.36 (0.73) 3.47 (0.73) 3.40 (0.69) 
2000ms 3.03 (1.10) 3.36 (1.00) 3.53 (0.57) 3.29 (0.94) 
Total 3.20 (0.77) 3.36 (0.77) 3.50 (0.57) 3.35 (0.71) 
Sad     
1000ms 2.97 (1.10) 2.95 (1.13) 3.03 (1.10) 2.99 (1.09) 
2000ms 3.00 (0.77) 3.05 (0.95) 3.97 (0.81) 3.00 (0.82) 
Total 2.99 (0.66) 3.00 (0.89) 3.00 (0.87) 2.99 (0.79) 
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Analyses for correct response revealed a significant effect of face type, F(4, 
84) = 32.46, MSE = 47.44, p<.001, 2 = .279. Paired-samples t-tests indicated that 
participants made significantly more correct responses when interpreting the happy 
face than the five other face types. Surprised faces were interpreted with significantly 
more accuracy than the aggressive, disgusted, frightened and sad faces, the sad faces 
were interpreted with significantly more accuracy than the frightened face, and the 
aggressive face was interpreted with significantly more accuracy than the frightened 
and disgusted faces (all ps<.05). While some of these results would not remain 
significant after bonferroni adjustment, this adjustment can be regarded as too 
conservative, and thus will not be adopted in the current analyses (Howell, 2007). See 
Table 6.5 for results of t-tests. 
A significant face type by stimulus duration interaction was also found, F(4, 
84) = 3.30, MSE = 2.26, p = .011, 2 = 038 (see Figure 6.1). Paired samples t-tests 
indicated that participants were significantly more accurate when interpreting the 
disgusted face at the 2000ms stimulus duration than the 1000ms stimulus duration, 
t(86) = 2.42, p = .017. There were no significant differences between responses at the 
1000ms and 2000ms stimulus durations for the aggressive, t(86) = -1.23, p = .223, 
frightened, t(86) = -1.76, p = .082, happy, t(86) = -.42, p = .672, surprised, t(86) = 1.3, 
p = .198, or sad faces, t(86) = -.10, p = .924. No other significant main effects or 
interactions were found for response on the emotion recognition task. 
In order to assess the nature of the responses to the eight neutral faces, a 
MANOVA was conducted to investigate whether the groups differed on frequencies 
of the six emotions participants attributed to the neutral faces. That is, a count was 
conducted for each of the participant‟s responses to the neutral faces as being „angry‟, 
„happy‟, etc (see Table 6.6 for mean frequency of ratings for each face type).  
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Table 6.5 
Paired samples t-test results for response for each face type 
Face 1 Face 2 t df p 
     
Aggressive Disgusted 2.02 86 .047* 
 Frightened 3.06 86 .003** 
 Happy -14.25 86 .000*** 
 Surprised -3.86 86 .000*** 
 Sad -.118 86 .907 
Disgusted Frightened 1.18 86 .241 
 Happy -12.88 86 .000*** 
 Surprised -4.90 86 .000*** 
 Sad -1.85 86 .068 
Frightened Happy -11.13 86 .000*** 
 Surprised -4.79 86 .000*** 
 Sad -3.04 86 .003** 
Happy Surprised 6.55 86 .000*** 
 Sad 9.97 86 .000*** 
Surprised Sad 2.88 86 .005** 
         
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p <.001. 
 
At the separate 1000ms and 2000ms stimulus durations, no significant group 
differences were found (all ps>.05) (see Table 6.7 for results of ANOVAs). When the 
stimulus durations were collapsed, the groups differed in how frequently they 
interpreted the neutral faces as displaying frightened, F(2, 84) = 3.23, MSE = .59, p = 
.045, 2 = .071. Post hoc Tukeys indicated that the premeditated-aggressive group 
were more likely to interpret the neutral faces as frightened than controls (ps<.05). No 
group differences were found for the aggressive, F(2, 84) = 1.7, MSE = 4.46, p = 
.188, 2 = .039, disgusted, (2, 84) = 1.36, MSE = 1.37, p = .262, 2 = .031, happy, (2, 
 136 
84) = .103, MSE = .40, p = .902, 2 = .002, surprised, (2, 84) = 1.07, MSE = .28, p = 
.347, 2 = .025, or sad, (2, 84) = 1.78, MSE = 7.42, p = .175, 2 = .041, facial 
expressions.  
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Figure 6.1. Mean number of correct responses (maximum = 4) for each face type at 
the 1000ms and 2000ms stimulus durations. 
 
 To test the hypothesis for this task, paired-samples t-tests were conducted to 
determine the face type participants attributed to the neutral face most often. As 
shown in Table 6.8, participants attributed „sad‟ to the neutral faces most often and 
significantly more than the other five face types.  
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Table 6.6 
Mean (and standard deviations) frequency of responses to the neutral face on the 
emotion recognition task for the three participant groups 
Face Type Group Total 
  
Impulsive 
Aggressive 
Premeditated 
Aggressive 
Control  
     
Aggressive      
1000ms 0.83 (0.99) 1.00 (1.02) 0.77 (0.99) 0.85 (0.96) 
2000ms 0.80 (0.93) 1.27 (1.16) 0.70 (0.84) 0.89 (0.98) 
Total 1.63 (1.61) 2.27 (1.83) 1.47 (1.46) 1.74 (1.63) 
Disgusted      
1000ms 0.31 (0.58) 0.05 (0.80) 0.47 (0.73) 0.41 (0.69) 
2000ms 0.29 (0.46) 0.46 (0.67) 0.50 (0.78) 0.40 (0.64) 
Total 0.60 ( .78) 0.96 (1.05) 0.97 (1.19) 0.82 (1.01) 
Frightened      
1000ms 0.03 (0.17) 0.14 (0.35) 0.03 (0.18) 0.06 (0.23) 
2000ms 0.11 (0.32) 0.23 (0.43) 0.03 (0.18) 0.12 (0.32) 
Total 0.14 (0.36) 0.36 (0.66) 0.07 (0.25) 0.17 (0.44) 
Happy     
1000ms 0.91 (1.15) 0.64 (0.85) 0.70 (1.06) 0.77 (1.04) 
2000ms .091 (1.12) 0.96 (1.29) 1.00 (1.11) 0.95 (1.15) 
Total 1.83 (2.08) 1.59 (1.74) 1.70 (1.95) 1.72 (1.93) 
Surprised     
1000ms 0.17 (0.45) 0.14 (0.35) 0.10 (0.40) 0.14 (0.41) 
2000ms 1.14 (0.36) 0.05 (0.21) 0.03 (0.18) 0.08 (0.27) 
Total 0.31 (0.58) 0.18 (0.50) 0.13 (0.43) 0.22 (0.52) 
Sad     
1000ms 1.74 (1.40) 1.59 (1.10) 1.93 (1.23) 1.77 (1.26) 
2000ms 1.74 (1.17) 1.05 (1.13) 1.73 (1.26) 1.56 (1.22) 
Total 3.49 (2.29) 2.64 (1.71) 3.67 (1.95) 3.33 (2.06) 
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Table 6.7 
ANOVA results for responses to the neutral face for the main effect of participant 
group at the 1000ms and 2000ms stimulus durations 
 Face Type df F MSE p 2 
    
 
 
Aggressive 
   
 
 
1000ms 2, 84 0.39 0.36 0.68 .009 
2000ms 2, 84 2.46 2.29 0.09 .055 
Disgusted 
   
 
 
1000ms 2, 84 0.62 0.3 0.54 .014 
2000ms 2, 84 1.01 0.41 0.37 .024 
Frightened 
   
 
 
1000ms 2, 84 1.7 0.09 0.19 .039 
2000ms 2, 84 2.4 0.24 0.10 .054 
Happy 
   
 
 
1000ms 2, 84 0.58 0.63 0.56 .014 
2000ms 2, 84 0.04 0.06 0.96 .001 
Surprised 
   
 
 
1000ms 2, 84 0.24 0.04 0.79 .006 
2000ms 2, 84 1.56 0.12 0.22 .036 
Sad 
   
 
 
1000ms 2, 84 0.47 0.77 0.62 .011 
2000ms 2, 84 2.78 3.95 0.07 .062 
            
 
 
 
 
 
 139 
Table 6.8 
Paired samples t-test results for frequency of response for each face type when 
interpreting the neutral face 
Face 1 Face 2 t df p 
     
Aggressive Disgusted 4.25 86 .000*** 
 
Frightened 8.6 
86 
.000*** 
 
Happy 0.04 
86 
0.971 
 
Surprised 7.79 
86 
.000*** 
 
Sad -4.89 
86 
.000*** 
Disgusted Frightened 5.74 
86 
.000*** 
 
Happy -3.61 
86 
.001** 
 
Surprised 5.15 
86 
.000*** 
 
Sad -9.32 
86 
.000*** 
Frightened Happy -7.06 
86 
.000*** 
 
Surprised -0.67 
86 
0.508 
 
Sad -13.64 
86 
.000*** 
Happy Surprised 7.11 
86 
.000*** 
 
Sad -4.27 
86 
.000*** 
Surprised Sad -13.1 
86 
.000*** 
          
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p <.001. 
 
Reaction Time: Mean reaction times were analysed with three-way repeated 
measures ANOVAs for group by face type by stimulus duration (see Table 6.9 for 
means and standard deviations).  
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Table 6.9 
Mean (and standard deviations) reaction times on the emotion recognition task for the 
three participant groups 
Face Type Group Total 
  
Impulsive 
Aggressive 
Premeditated 
Aggressive 
Control  
Aggressive      
1000ms 2211.24 (845.55) 2383.61 (1101.13) 2773.74 (1602.79) 2449.55 (1228.53) 
2000ms 1989.27 (1084.74) 2194.76 (772.33) 2461.26 (1081.25) 2204.09 (1025.79) 
Total 2100.25 (860.24) 2304.10 (787.44) 2617.50 (1176.70) 2330.16 (980.49) 
Disgusted      
1000ms 2147.30 (792.28) 2208.84 (1026.03) 2304.68 (848.57) 2217.26 (864.56) 
2000ms 1948.24 (773.18) 2109.13 (874.75) 2101.85 (825.32) 2041.11 (810.90) 
Total 2047.77 (698.48) 2171.67 (832.54) 2203.26 (708.11) 2132.72 (732.31) 
Frightened      
1000ms 2298.14 (1149.74) 2494.60 (850.00) 2862.81 (1280.45) 2543.09 (1148.70) 
2000ms 2127.09 (851.01) 2355.17 (836.43) 2344.82 (847.00) 2258.74 (843.28) 
Total 2212.62 (922.84) 2489.93 (836.04) 2603.82 (939.06) 2417.64 (913.93) 
Happy     
1000ms 1571.72 (356.18) 1844.72 (560.28) 1835.38 (639.53) 1730.36 (530.69) 
2000ms 1668.32 (625.63) 1789.80 (404.44) 1871.06 (567.20) 1768.70 (559.26) 
Total 1620.02 (440.41) 1803.99 (430.91) 1853.22 (508.88) 1746.95 (469.76) 
Neutral     
1000ms 2955.53 (1182.57) 3474.48 (2080.79) 3837.87 (2013.88) 3390.05 (1764.13) 
2000ms 2979.72 (1508.19) 3027.43 (1372.27) 3472.16 (2219.81) 3163.15 (1756.77) 
Total 2967.63 (1155.64) 3196.73 (1468.49) 3655.02 (1866.92) 3262.59 (1523.19) 
Surprised     
1000ms 2047.77 (853.34) 2072.28 (560.13) 2079.65 (689.60) 2064.88 (726.33) 
2000ms 1847.25 (734.95) 2061.36 (724.08) 2255.94 (958.93) 2042.10 (827.66) 
Total 1947.51 (727.55) 2142.98 (649.93) 2167.79 (723.95) 2072.90 (707.07) 
     
 
 
 141 
Table 6.9 continued 
Face Type Group Total 
  
Impulsive 
Aggressive 
Premeditated 
Aggressive 
Control  
Sad     
1000ms 2245.36 (1050.87) 2612.95 (1783.10) 2562.12 (1133.66) 2445.62 (1287.06) 
2000ms 1918.09 (692.94) 2124.99 (1130.28) 2454.14 (1239.50) 2155.60 (1035.25) 
Total 2081.72 (722.92) 2591.77 (1706.44) 2508.13 (1116.57) 2357.74 (1179.40) 
All Face 
Types 
    
1000ms 2211.01 (656.09) 2490.23 (906.21) 2608.04 (876.55) 2418.55 (81313) 
2000ms 2068.28 (682.44) 2281.44 (720.89) 2423.03 (739.81) 2244.51 (720.89) 
     
 
Analyses for reaction time revealed a significant main effect of face type, F(4, 
306) = 42.22, MSE = 6.1, p<.001, 2 = .337. Paired samples t-tests indicated that 
participants responded significantly faster to the happy face type than the other six 
face types. Surprised and disgusted faces were responded to significantly faster than 
the aggressive, frightened, neutral and sad faces. Aggressive, sad and frightened faces 
were responded to significantly faster than neutral faces. See Table 6.10 for results of 
the t-tests. 
A significant effect of stimulus duration was found, F(1, 83) = 17.99, MSE = 
9039449.44, p<.001, 2 = .178. Participants responded significantly faster when faces 
were presented for 2000ms than 1000ms. No other significant main effects or 
interactions were found for reaction times on the emotion recognition task. 
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Table 6.10 
Paired samples t-test results for reaction time for each face type 
Face 1 Face 2 t df p 
     
Aggressive Disgusted 2.85 86 .005** 
 Frightened -1.08 86 .283 
 Happy 7.17 86 .000*** 
 Neutral -7.88 86 .000*** 
 Surprised 3.39 86 .001** 
 Sad -0.23 86 .817 
Disgusted Frightened -3.40 86 .001** 
 Happy 6.47 86 .000*** 
 Neutral -8.74 86 .000*** 
 Surprised 0.84 86 .404 
 Sad -2.02 86 .046* 
Frightened Happy 9.03 86 .000*** 
 Neutral -6.42 86 .000*** 
 Surprised 4.86 86 .000*** 
 Sad 0.49 86 .000*** 
Happy Neutral -11.33 86 .000*** 
 Surprised -5.13 86 .000*** 
 Sad -5.19 86 .000*** 
Neutral Surprised 8.37 86 .000*** 
 Sad 5.85 86 .000*** 
Surprised Sad -2.61 86 .011* 
         
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p <.001. 
 
6.6.3  Aggression rating task 
Participants‟ raw aggressiveness ratings and reaction times were collated for 
the five face types, and means and standard deviations calculated for each group. 
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Means were analysed with three-way repeated measures ANOVAs for group by face 
type by stimulus duration.  
Response: Analyses for response revealed a significant effect of face type, F(3, 
283) = 509.22, MSE = 172.9, p<.001, 2 = .858. Paired-samples t-tests indicated that 
participants rated aggressive faces as significantly more aggressive than frightened, 
t(86) = 27.53, p<.001, happy, t(86) = 33.44, p<.001, and neutral faces, t(86) = 27.11, 
p<.001, disgusted faces as significantly more aggressive than frightened, t(86) = 
23.31, p<.001, happy, t(86) = 28.92, p<.001, and neutral faces, t(86) = 21.94, p<.001, 
frightened faces as significantly more aggressive than happy faces, t(86) = 9.26, 
p<.001, and neutral faces as significantly more aggressive than frightened, t(86) = -
5.17, p<.001, and happy faces, t(86) = -14.81, p<.001. No other significant main 
effects or interactions were found for response on the aggression rating task (see 
Table 6.11 for means and standard deviations). These findings support the validity of 
the face stimuli to be used in the current investigation. 
To further investigate group differences relevant to the research hypothesis, 
separate univariate ANOVAs were completed for each face type. A significant effect 
of group was found for the neutral face type, F(2, 86) = 3.17, MSE = 0.71, p = .047, 
2 = .070. Post hoc Tukeys indicated that the premeditated-aggressive groups rated 
the neutral faces as significantly more aggressive than did the control group (p<.05). 
No effect of group was found for the aggressive, F(2, 86) = 2.1, MSE = 0.72, p = 
0.13, 2 = .048, disgusted, F(2, 86) = 0.56, MSE = 0.24, p = 0.57, 2 = .013,  
frightened, F(2, 86) = 0.37, MSE = 0.09, p = 0.69, 2 = .009, or happy face types, 
F(2, 86) = 1.03, MSE = 0.003, p = 36, 2 = .024.  
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Table 6.11 
Mean (and standard deviations) responses for the three participant groups on the 
aggressive rating task 
Face Type Group Total 
  
Impulsive 
Aggressive 
Premeditated 
Aggressive 
Control  
     
Aggressive      
1000ms 3.19 (0.70) 3.17 (0.64) 2.85 (0.62) 3.07 (0.67) 
2000ms 3.22 (0.77) 3.21 (0.62) 3.01 (0.68) 3.14 (0.70) 
Total 3.21 (0.67) 3.19 (0.53) 2.93 (0.51) 3.11 (0.59) 
Disgusted      
1000ms 3.06 (0.75) 2.99 (0.72) 2.87 (0.60) 2.97 (0.69) 
2000ms 3.10 (0.73) 2.99 (0.78) 2.95 (0.80) 3.03 (0.76) 
Total 3.08 (0.67) 2.99 (0.66) 2.91 (0.64) 3.00 (0.65) 
Frightened      
1000ms 1.56 (0.45) 1.49 (0.54) 1.47 (0.54) 1.51 (0.50) 
2000ms 1.50 (0.53) 1.40 (0.55) 1.41 (0.49) 1.44 (0.52) 
Total 1.53 (0.47) 1.45 (0.52) 1.44 (0.48) 1.48 (0.48) 
Happy     
1000ms 1.02 (0.70) 1.04 (0.13) 1.01 (0.04) 1.02 (0.08) 
2000ms 1.01 (0.34) 1.03 (0.09) 1.02 (0.06) 1.02 (0.06) 
Total 1.01 (0.04) 1.03 (0.08) 1.01 (0.04) 1.02 (0.06) 
Neutral     
1000ms 1.86 (0.56) 2.04 (0.68) 1.62 (0.41) 1.82 (.057) 
2000ms 1.69 (0.46) 1.89 (0.63) 1.64 (0.49) 1.72 (0.52) 
Total 1.77 (0.45) 1.96 (0.57) 1.63 (0.41) 1.77 (0.48) 
          
 
Reaction Time: Overall means and standard deviations for reaction times on 
the aggression rating task are shown in Table 6.12.  
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Table 6.12 
Mean (and standard deviations) reaction times for the three participant groups on the 
aggressive rating task 
Face Type Group Total 
  
Impulsive 
Aggressive 
Premeditated 
Aggressive 
Control  
     
Aggressive      
1000ms 921.03 (504.76) 956.21 (654.68) 1294.33 (568.25) 1058.65 (586.55) 
2000ms 661.10 (320.94) 1155.53 (920.23) 1072.19 (590.20) 927.88 (643.78) 
Total 791.06 (382.91) 1055.87 (660.37) 1183.26 (519.49) 993.27 (534.50) 
Disgusted      
1000ms 835.57 (529.29) 1175.83 (703.64) 1288.45 (510.67) 1077.78 (601.18) 
2000ms 838.71 (649.62) 1038.83 (930.91) 1012.63 (550.32) 949.29 (699.29) 
Total 837.14 (532.45) 1107.33 (770.41) 1150.54 (481.46) 1013.53 (597.20) 
Frightened      
1000ms 725.26 (534.71) 9328.78 (532.85) 1015.99 (516.14) 879.50 (537.85) 
2000ms 617.25 (442.95) 790.89 (605.46) 959.52 (939.07) 779.18 (535.84) 
Total 671.25 (443.56) 864.40 (535.56) 987.23 (476.20) 829.23 (493.49) 
Happy     
1000ms 470.20 (230.56) 694.97 (814.51) 580.58 (216.29) 565.10 (454.81) 
2000ms 470.20 (301.60) 523.90 (216.93) 591.54 (258.68) 525.91 (269.72) 
Total 470.56 (242.70) 609.43 (485.39) 586.06 (186.94) 545.50 (310.66) 
Neutral     
1000ms 732.80 (423.29) 804.38 (556.64) 1005.99 (462.13) 845.10 (482.80) 
2000ms 570.12 (259.15) 852.04 (513.43) 972.69 (563.54) 780.23 (479.81) 
Total 651.46 (308.90) 828.21 (506.50) 989.34 (469.48) 812.67 (442.96) 
All Faces     
1000ms 736.97 (342.60) 914.03 (586.58) 1037.07 (331.37) 885.23 (429.71) 
2000ms 631.62 (313.91) 872.24 (509.51) 921.71 (385.87) 792.50 (412.97) 
Total  684.29 (317.77) 893.14 (528.24) 979.39 (345.11) 838.86 (406.92) 
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The analyses revealed a significant main effect of face type, F(4, 305) = 35.11, 
MSE = 6758816.87, p<.001, 2 = .295. Paired samples t-tests indicated that 
participants responded significantly faster to happy faces than aggressive faces, t(86) 
= 9.05, p<.001, disgusted faces, t(86) = 9.98, p<.001, frightened faces, t(86) = 7.17, 
p<.001, and neutral faces, t(86) = -7.17, p<.001. Neutral faces were responded to 
significantly faster than aggressive faces, t(86) = 3.94, p<.001, and disgusted faces, 
t(86) = 4.63, p<.001. Frightened faces were responded to significantly faster than 
aggressive faces, t(86) = 3.39, p = .001, and disgusted faces, t(86) = 3.72, p<.001.  
A significant main effect of stimulus duration was also found, F(1, 84) = 13.3, 
MSE = 1604582.14, p<.001, 2 = .137. Participants responded significantly faster to 
the faces at the 2000ms stimulus duration than the 1000ms stimulus duration. The 
main effect of group was also significant, F(1, 84) = 4.92, MSE = 7467236.68, p = 
0.10, 2 = .105. Post hoc Tukey‟s indicated that control participants took significantly 
longer to respond to the faces than the impulsive-aggressive group. The premeditated-
aggressive group did not differ from the impulsive-aggressive or control groups. 
These effects were modified by a significant face type by stimulus duration by group 
interaction, F (7, 84) = 3.12, MSE = 380480.69, p = .003, 2 = 069 (see Figures 6.2 
and 6.3). Separate ANOVAs were then conducted for each stimulus duration.   
At the 1000ms stimulus duration, a significant main effect of face type was 
found, F(4, 305) = 28.39, MSE = 3891266, p<.001, 2 = .253. Follow-up paired-
samples t-tests indicated that participants responded significantly faster to the happy 
face than the aggressive, disgusted, frightened and neutral faces. Neutral and 
frightened faces were responded to significantly faster than the aggressive and 
disgusted faces (ps<.05). See Table 6.13 for results of the t-tests. The main effect of 
group was also significant, F(2, 84) = 4.31, MSE = 3698064, 2 = .093. Tukey‟s post 
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hoc tests indicated that the control group took significantly longer to respond to the 
faces than the impulsive-aggressive group. These two significant main effects were 
qualified by a significant face type by group interaction, F(7, 305) = 2.19, MSE = 
299744.61, p = .033, 2 = .049. Follow-up univariate ANOVAs for each face type 
indicated that the impulsive-aggressive group responded significantly faster than the 
control group to the aggressive faces, F(2, 86) = 3.98, MSE = 1280077.27, p = .022, 
2 = .084, and disgusted faces, F(2, 86) = 5.50, MSE = 1798164.35, p = .006, 2 = 
.116. No significant group differences were found for the frightened, F(2, 86) = 2.64, 
MSE = 734416.52, p = .059, 2 = .000, happy, F(2, 86) = 1.7, MSE = 346730.73, p = 
.188, 2 = .039, or neutral faces, F(2, 86) = 2.8, p = .066, 2 = .063. 
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Figure 6.2. Reaction times for each face type by each group at the 1000ms stimulus 
duration.   
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Table 6.13 
Paired samples t-test results for face type at the 1000ms stimulus duration 
Face 1 Face 2 t df p 
     
Aggressive Disgusted -0.39 86 .699 
 Frightened 3.01 86 .003** 
 Happy 8.04 86 .000*** 
 Neutral 3.92 86 .000*** 
Disgusted Frightened 3.44 86 .001** 
 Happy 9.71 86 .000*** 
 Neutral 4.45 86 .000*** 
Frightened Happy 6.09 86 .000*** 
 Neutral 0.62 86 .536 
Happy Neutral -6.09 86 .000*** 
         
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p <.001. 
 
 
At the 2000ms stimulus duration, a significant main effect of face type was 
found, F(3, 289) = 16.83, MSE = 3086966.82, p <.001, 2 = .167. Paired samples t-
tests indicated that participants responded to happy faces significantly faster than the 
other face types. Neutral and frightened faces were responded to significantly faster 
than aggressive and disgusted faces. See Table 6.14 for results of the t-tests. A 
significant main effect of group was also found F(1, 84), = 4.95, MSE = 3866686.46, 
2 = .105. Post hoc Tukeys indicated that the control group took significantly longer 
to respond to the faces than the impulsive-aggressive group. The face type by group 
interaction was not significant at the 2000ms stimulus duration. 
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Figure 6.3. Reaction times for each face type by each group at the 2000ms stimulus 
duration.   
 
Table 6.14 
Paired samples t-test results for face type at the 2000ms stimulus duration 
Face 1 Face 2 t df p 
     
Aggressive Disgusted -0.31 86 .761 
 Frightened 2.58 86 .012* 
 Happy 6.03 86 .000*** 
 Neutral 2.23 86 .029* 
Disgusted Frightened 2.67 86 .009** 
 Happy 6.26 86 .000*** 
 Neutral 2.73 86 .008** 
Frightened Happy 5.13 86 .000*** 
 Neutral -0.02 86 .983 
Happy Neutral -5.28 86 .000*** 
         
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p <.001. 
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6.6.4  Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Third Edition  
Univariate ANOVAs revealed no significant differences between the 
participant groups on Vocabulary, F(2, 86) = 1.7, MSE = 6.92, p = .189, 2 = .039, or 
Digit Span, F(2, 86) = .035, MSE = .082, p = .966, 2 = .001. Mean scores for both 
tasks are shown in Table 6.15. 
 
Table 6.15 
Means (and standard deviations) for Vocabulary and Digit Span for the three 
participant groups 
  
Impulsive-
Aggressive 
Premeditated-
Aggressive 
Control Total 
     
Vocabulary 10.71 (2.04) 11.59 (2.58) 10.63 (1.45) 10.91 (2.03) 
Digit Span 10.40 (1.83) 10.50 (1.41) 10.40 (1.22) 10.43 (1.52) 
          
 
6.7  Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to investigate whether impulsive-aggressive 
and/or premeditated aggressive individuals would demonstrate impairment in the 
interpretation of facial expressions of affect. This study also investigated possible 
hostile attribution biases among this population by examining the interpretations each 
group made of the neutral faces they were exposed to and their ratings of aggression 
towards these faces. 
 
6.7.1  Emotion recognition task 
On the emotion recognition task, it was hypothesised that the impulsive-
aggressive group would display a „hostile attribution bias‟; a tendency to view neutral 
 151 
expressions as hostile. The results did not support the hypothesis, instead indicating 
that the three groups were most likely to attribute an emotion seemingly irrelevant to 
aggression (most often „sad‟).   
This result is analogous to that of Hoaken et al. (2007) for their non-violent 
offender and control groups. Their violent offenders, however, most often responded 
with „disgust‟. It is difficult to draw direct comparisons between the current findings 
and that of Hoaken et al., however, given the lack of detail regarding characteristic 
aggression in their sample. While it could be assumed that their offender sample, both 
violent and non-violent, would present with aggression, this was not measured 
specifically. Therefore, a preliminary theory to account for these differences could be 
that individuals displaying severe antisocial behaviour more broadly present with a 
deficit in emotion recognition. In contrast, the present sample, who may not present 
with such significant antisocial behaviours and instead are characterised by high 
levels of trait aggression more specifically, may not have impairments in this area. 
Hoaken et al. (2007) also found that the violent offender group was 
significantly poorer at the interpretation of facial expressions of emotion than either 
non-violent offenders or controls. In the present study, all groups made significantly 
more errors when interpreting the disgusted and frightened faces than the other 
emotional expressions. Within this analysis, the only significant group difference 
showed that the frequency with which the premeditated-aggressive individuals rated 
the neutral faces as frightened was significantly greater than the control group.  
Neuroimaging studies have implicated the amygdala in the processing of 
fearful faces. Similarly, psychopathy has been linked to amygdala deficits (Blair, 
2003a) and has been linked to impairments in the recognition of fearful facial 
expressions (Blair et al., 2004). The finding that the premeditated-aggressive 
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individuals showed a bias towards interpreting fear in neutral faces suggests possible 
amygdala dysfunction in this population. This hypothesis is supported by the 
proposed relationship between psychopathy and the expression of premeditated-
aggression. One important distinction between the study by Blair et al. and the current 
study, however, is that Blair et al. used an emotional expression multimorph task 
consisting of facial images morphed from an emotional expression to neutral affect, 
while the present study utilised a rating task. That is, there are differences in the 
ability to distinguish an emotion from a neutral expression and the ability to provide a 
single categorical label to the stimulus. Furthermore, the psychopathic population 
made a significant greater number of errors when interpreting the fearful face, while 
the current premeditated-aggressive group did not make such errors. While these 
preliminary findings do indeed suggest a relationship between premeditated-
aggression, psychopathy, and the interpretation of fearful facial expressions, more 
detailed analyses are required before more concrete theories can be postulated.  
 Patients with orbitofrontal lesions have been shown to have impairments in the 
recognition of anger and disgust (Blair & Cipolotti, 2000). Furthermore, increases in 
orbitofrontal activity measured with functional imaging have been found in response 
to angry expressions (Blair et al., 1999), and to the actual induction of anger 
(Dougherty et al., 1999; Kimbrell et al., 1999). On the basis of this research, it was 
proposed that the impulsive-aggressive individuals, due to orbitofrontal dysfunction, 
would be impaired in the recognition of angry faces. Furthermore it was suggested 
that impulsive-aggressive individuals would be primed to perceive negative emotion 
in neutral situations, which would explain why impulsive-aggressive individuals seem 
to be easily provoked into negative interactions and conflicts with others. Indeed, Best 
et al. (2002) found that individuals with Intermittent Explosive Disorder, a psychiatric 
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disorder characterised by impulsive-aggression, were biased to label neutral faces 
with „disgust‟ and „fear‟, both negatively valenced expressions. This result was not 
replicated in the current study. 
Decoding facial expressions of emotion is likely to be involved in normal 
social and emotional responses to other individuals. Faces convey reinforcing signals, 
and the orbitofrontal cortex plays a vital role in the learning of the reinforcing signals 
used in social communication (Hornak et al., 1996). The results of this study indicate 
that impulsive- and premeditated-aggressive individuals do not generally have 
impairment in the interpretation of emotions in others. This finding is in contrast with 
Hornak et al. who found a strong association between face decoding deficits and 
subjective and objective reports of emotional changes in behaviour. That is, patients 
with damage to the ventral frontal lobe who had greater alteration in emotional 
experience had poorer performance on facial expression identification. However, this 
result also indicates that those with minimal emotional change were not as impaired 
on this task. Thus, it may be suggested that given the current sample, who while 
having high levels of trait aggression are continuing to function adaptively within the 
community and may only present subclinical impairment, do not demonstrate such 
severe deficits in emotion recognition. In support of this hypothesis, the patients in 
Hornak et al.‟s study suffered significant damage to the ventral region of the 
prefrontal cortex either through head injury or cerebrovascular accident, while the 
current sample had no history of head injury. 
A further suggestion lies in the presence of trait aggression in comparison to 
subjective „emotional change‟ which may or may not have involved an aggressive 
component. Thus it can be suggested that emotion interpretation deficits may not be 
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present in aggressive individuals specifically, but in those individuals displaying 
antisocial or emotional changes more broadly.  
The identification of various emotional expressions may also be related to the 
issue of task difficulty. That is, selective impairments in recognising certain emotions 
may be due to that fact that some emotional expressions may be more difficult to 
discriminate than others. This may be because some expressions are configurally 
ambiguous, are more complex, or may make specific demands on the perceptual 
system (Adolphs, 2002a). Rapcsak et al. (2000) used a labelling task to investigate the 
issue of task difficulty in a sample of brain-damaged subjects and normal controls. 
The authors reported that recognition of fear was less accurate than recognition of 
other emotions even in normal subjects. This was also demonstrated in the current 
study, with frightened faces being the expression interpreted with least accuracy.  
Happiness could be viewed as a superordinate category and the other basic 
negatively valenced emotions as subordinate categories of the superordinate category 
of unhappy (Adolphs, 2002a). This may help to explain why expressions of happiness 
were interpreted with significantly more accuracy than the relatively negatively 
valenced emotions including sad, aggressive, disgusted, and surprised. In Rapcsak et 
al.‟s (2000) study, they found that the errors typically made by brain-damaged 
subjects were to mistake a negatively valenced emotion for another negatively 
valenced emotion but not for happiness. The errors in interpreting frightened faces 
occurred despite longer reaction times. The results indicate that those faces interpreted 
with most accuracy were also responded to significantly faster. This provides 
additional evidence for the above argument that certain faces of emotional affect are 
interpreted with greater ease. 
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6.7.2  Aggression rating task 
Contrary to the hypothesis, the premeditated-aggressive group rated the 
neutral faces as significantly more aggressive than did the control group. This finding 
is not consistent with previous research demonstrating hostile attributional biases 
among impulsive-aggressive children in their attributions of peer‟s intentions in 
provocation situations (Dodge & Coie, 1987). Thus the misattribution of hostile intent 
in adults appears to be associated with elevated levels of premeditated-aggression 
rather than impulsive-aggression. These interpretations occurred despite variations in 
the duration of stimulus presentation. This suggests that premeditated-aggressive 
individuals have a negative attribution bias that affects their ability to interpret 
ambiguous social situations correctly such that they interpret neutral situations 
negatively. Indeed, the work on hostile attributional bias (Dill, Anderson & Deuser, 
1997; Epps & Kendall, 1995; Hall & Davidson, 1996) indicates that hostile 
individuals do indeed see others as hostile.  
 It is proposed then that the processing mechanism responsible for the display 
of premeditated-aggression may be a hostile attribution bias. In terms of the described 
social information-processing model, it appears that premeditated-aggressive 
individuals have a tendency to utilise self-schemas rather than the presented cues 
provided. As the self-schemas of aggressive individuals may be more hostile than 
those of non-aggressive individuals, a reliance on self-schemas could lead aggressive 
individuals to make errors of presumed hostility (Dodge, Price, Bachorowski & 
Newman, 1990). This is consistent with the results of Dodge and Tomlin (1987) who 
found that a reliance on self-schemas is related to erroneous interpretations of the 
social environment. Similarly, Hall (2006) found a positive correlation between self-
reported aggression and errors in perceiving aggression in others when it did not exist. 
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These findings support the possibility that the way in which social information is 
processed may mediate the expression of aggression.  
 People develop a perceptual set which establishes one‟s expectations and 
guides one‟s interpretation of social stimuli and situations. Thus, on the basis of the 
current findings, it can be argued that premeditated-aggressive individuals are more 
likely to utilise these aggressively-themed self-schemas when interpreting socially 
ambiguous situations. These hypotheses are in line with those of Grafman and 
colleagues who argued that knowledge stored in the prefrontal cortex plays a 
managerial role in the control of behaviour, taking the form of thematic 
understanding, planning, and understanding social rules (Grafman, 1994; Grafman et 
al., 1996). Social schema knowledge is thought to inhibit abnormal behaviour, and in 
this way, it would be expected that lesions to the prefrontal cortex would impair the 
ability to access this knowledge, biasing the regulation of behaviour away from social 
rules, toward environmental responsiveness, making aggressive behaviour more 
likely. Thus, if premeditated-aggressive individuals are perceiving hostility in socially 
ambiguous situations, they are more likely to respond in a similarly aggressive 
manner. This aggressive reaction will not be impulsive, but a planned, instrumental 
act of aggression against another who has been perceived to harm them. 
In contrast to expectations, characteristic impulsivity does not cause 
impulsive-aggressive individuals to make rapid decisions, facilitating the cognitive 
mediation between their self-schemas and their response. Rather, they accurately 
interpreted the information presented to them. This type of bottom-up processing 
involving the integration of relevant environmental cues thus leads to more accurate 
interpretations than will schema-based processing that ignores these cues. Thus, given 
that impulsive-aggressive individuals do not present with the hypothesised social 
 157 
information processing deficit, other factors, such as executive functioning deficits 
must contribute to the expression of impulsive-aggressive. 
 
6.7.3  Personality measures 
 On the impulsivity-venturesomeness subscale of the I7 Impulsivity 
Questionnaire, there was a trend indicating higher scores among the impulsive-
aggressive group in comparison to the control group. The impulsive-aggressive group 
also had significantly higher impulsivity scores than the premeditated-aggressive and 
control groups. This finding is comparable to that found in Study 1 and provides 
further evidence of specific personality pathology among impulsive-aggressive 
individuals. This characteristic impulsivity may cause an inability to inhibit 
aggressive responses in provocative social situations. In contrast, premeditated-
aggressive individuals, without trait impulsivity, can inhibit spontaneous acts of 
aggression, instead planning when and where their aggression would be displayed. 
 On the empathy subscale of the I7 Impulsivity Questionnaire, the 
premeditated-aggressive group had significantly lower scores than the impulsive-
aggressive and control groups. This result, while in contrast to those findings from 
Experiment 1, would be expected given the lack of remorse and subsequent 
justification which characterises their aggressive actions.  This result also provides 
further evidence for the proposed premeditated-aggression-psychopathy relationship 
(e.g., Cornell et al., 1996). Further research delineating this relationship is needed, 
however, given the lack of consistency in the I7 results across the current studies. 
 
6.7.4  The link between emotion recognition and aggression 
Green (1998) stated that behaviour in situations of interpersonal conflict is 
guided by cognitive representations of events. Therefore, the incidence of aggression 
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is to a large extent a function of how social information is processed. Aggressive 
facial expressions are argued to act as social cues to initiate response reversal, causing 
the observer to either suppress the current response or to select an alternative response 
(Blair & Cipolotti, 2000) and in this way, trigger an inhibition of aggressive 
behaviour. However, in this instance, premeditated-aggressive individuals do not use 
this type of reinforcing stimuli to stop an aggressive reaction; rather it may encourage 
an aggressive response due to their past experiences. That is, through a history of 
positive reinforcement from aggressive interactions, premeditated-aggressive 
individuals have learnt that this response can be rewarding. In contrast, in non-
aggressive individuals, schemas activated in the frontal lobes would be used as a 
means to inhibit aggressive responding, as they may have encountered negative 
aggressive reactions with others. 
The experience and expression of emotion are correlated (Rosenberg & 
Ekman, 1994). Thus, production of emotional expressions can lead to changes in 
emotional experience through influencing the feeling and autonomic correlates of the 
emotional states (Levenson et al., 1990). Viewing facial expressions results in 
expressions on one‟s own face that may mimic the expression shown on the other 
individual‟s face (Hess & Blairy, 2001). Viewing the facial expression of another can 
thus lead to changes in one‟s own emotional state which in turn could result in a 
change of feeling (Wild, Erb & Bartels, 2001). Wild et al. argued that this process is 
fast and automatic, and provides a basis for one‟s own reactions. With regard to 
premeditated-aggression, it can therefore be argued that the interpretation of neutral 
expressions as aggressive leads to a consequent aggressive emotion in the individual. 
Rather than reacting impulsively to this stimuli, however, such individuals are able to 
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inhibit this response initially and instead plan and carry out an aggressive response at 
a later time. 
 
6.7.5  Conclusion 
The findings of the current study facilitate the understanding of how emotion 
recognition and hostile attributional biases may contribute to the expression of 
impulsive- and premeditated-aggression. The results suggest a tendency to attribute 
hostile intent in ambiguous social situations, coupled with low level empathy may 
contribute to the expression of premeditated-aggression. While premeditated-
aggressive individuals do not necessarily make incorrect interpretations of various 
facial images of affect, they have a tendency to attribute greater levels of 
aggressiveness to neutral expressions. This suggests that premeditated-aggressive 
individuals may interpret benign social interactions as hostile and consequently 
retaliate in a similarly aggressive manner.  
Given the lack of deficits present in the impulsive-aggressive group, the 
findings suggest distinct cognitive processes between individuals who are 
characteristically impulsive-aggressive and those who are characteristically 
premeditated-aggressive. These findings have important implications for our 
understanding of social information processing in aggressive individuals as it appears 
that premeditated-aggressive individuals demonstrate cognitive biases which are 
distinct from those which characterise impulsive-aggressors.  
These results, while only providing preliminary support for the role of social 
information processing in premeditated-aggression, suggest that the expression of 
premeditated-aggression may be due to deficits at the encoding and interpretation 
stages of social information processing. This deficit results in the generation and 
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enactment of socially unacceptable responses. In order to add further weight to this 
proposed relationship, the subsequent stages of Crick and Dodge‟s (1994) social 
information processing model should be investigated in this population, including the 
goal selection, response generation, and evaluation of the response.  
This finding also has important implications for our understanding of how 
perceptions of and social interactions with others impact upon the demonstration of 
aggressive behaviour. A predisposition towards an aggressive response may occur 
because the person perceives the environmental cues that appear to warrant this type 
of response. Thus, such individuals would benefit from assistance in reassessing and 
modifying what is being perceived and what is reality.  
 This study explored the role of the orbitofrontal cortex in the expression of 
impulsive- and premeditated-aggression through an investigation of emotion 
recognition and attribution of emotion towards neutral faces of emotion. While such 
abilities may contribute to the propensity for premeditated-aggression, the following 
study will attempt to further delineate the role of the orbitofrontal cortex in mediating 
subtypes of aggressive behaviour through an analysis of inhibitory, response reversal, 
and decision-making abilities in this population.  
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Chapter 7 
Study 3: Inhibition, Response Reversal, and Decision-Making 
 
The purpose of this study was to test whether subjects who are impulsive-aggressive 
versus premeditated aggressive differ on measures of inhibition, response reversal and 
decision-making.  
 
7.1  Inhibition 
The notion of impulsiveness is understood as a lack of response inhibition. 
Response inhibition can broadly be defined as the process by which a prepotent, 
routine, or dominant response is deliberately withheld (Hampshire, Chamberlain, 
Monti, Duncan & Owen, 2010). Inhibitory deficits thus involve an inability to 
suppress or withhold a previously rewarding response, and the behaviour appears 
impulsive (Bechara, 2004).  
Inhibition is a critical component of behavioural control insofar as it enables 
us to overcome automatic or routine behaviours (Shallice & Burgess, 1993). So, on 
the one hand impulse control implies the ability to avoid risk and to curb excessive 
desire to seek sensation (Verdejo-Garcia, Lawrence & Clark, 2008), while on the 
other hand, implies cognitive operations that allow individuals to change behaviours 
in a dynamic fashion on the basis of information or feedback derived from monitoring 
ongoing behaviour (Kok, Ridderinkhof & Ullsperger, 2006). This latter capability has 
specifically been referred to as cognitive control. By setting goals, inhibiting habitual 
acts, and monitoring performance, cognitive control allows behavioural flexibility for 
one to function adaptively within changing environments and optimise goal-directed 
actions (Dalley, Cardinal & Robbins, 2004) 
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Inhibitory control is one of the executive control functions that determine how 
mental processes such as encoding, recognition, and retrieval, will work together in 
the performance of a task (Logan & Cowan, 1984). It is required in order to choose, 
construct, execute, and maintain optimal strategies for performing a task, and to 
inhibit strategies that become inappropriate. In addition to changes in the external 
environment, individuals might have to stop their action if they detect an error in their 
own performance. In these circumstances, deficient inhibitory control will lead to a 
greater likelihood that a response will be executed rather than withheld (Szatkowska 
et al., 2007). 
 Impulsive behaviour is mostly viewed as being a function of inhibitory 
control, that is, the ability to suppress undesirable response tendencies (Barkley, 
1999). Whiteside and Lynam (2001) identified four personality facets conceived of as 
pathways to impulsive behaviour: (1) urgency, refers to the tendency to experience 
strong impulses, frequently under conditions of negative affect; (2) lack of 
premeditation, or the tendency to think and reflect on the consequences of an act 
before engaging in that act; (3) lack of perseverance, the ability to remain focused on 
a task that may be boring or difficulty; and (4) sensation seeking which is 
conceptualised as a tendency to enjoy and pursue activities that are exciting and to 
have an openness to try new experiences that may or may not be dangerous. Similarly, 
Barkley (1999) argued that impulsive behaviour in ADHD could be attributed to 
deficient inhibitory control. He distinguished three interrelated processes of 
behavioural inhibition: (1) the ability to withhold a prepotent response, (2) the ability 
to stop an ongoing response, and (3) interference control. Interference control is the 
ability to delay the decision to respond or prevent events and responses from 
interfering with an ongoing activity. 
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The definition of impulsivity thus incorporates a decreased sensitivity to 
negative consequences of behaviour and rapid, unplanned reactions to stimuli before 
complete processing of information. Moeller, Barratt, Dougherty, Schmitz and Swann 
(2001) incorporate these factors in their definition of impulsivity as “a predisposition 
toward rapid, unplanned reactions to internal or external stimuli without regard to the 
negative consequences of these reactions to the impulsive individual or to others” (p. 
1784). The idea that impulsivity involves “rapid unplanned” action suggests that such 
behaviours occur before there is an opportunity to consciously consider the 
consequences of the act. This is distinct from impaired judgement or compulsive 
behaviour in which planning occurs before the behaviour. 
 It is important to draw a distinction between inhibitory control as a cognitive 
construct and impulsiveness as a behavioural construct. Impulsiveness is usually 
studied in terms of a response inhibition, that is, after establishing a habit to respond 
to a stimulus that predicts reward, there is a sudden change in the contingencies of the 
task (Bechara et al., 2000a). Cognitive inhibition, on the other hand, which can be 
seen as related to an inability to delay gratification, is a more complex form of 
disinhibited behaviour. There is a link between the two, but deficits in inhibitory 
control cannot account for all manifestations of impulsiveness. Cognitive 
impulsiveness can be observed in deficits in decision-making (as outlined in more 
detail below) (Barratt, 1994). In this way, it is a failure to delay gratification and 
evaluate the outcome of a planned action. In contrast, motor impulsiveness involves 
making a response before all of the necessary information has been obtained or the 
quick action without thinking (Evenden, 1999). Motor impulsiveness of an affective 
nature thus reflects an inability to inhibit a prepotent response that is affective, i.e., a 
prepotent reward response (Bechara, 2004).  
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7.1.1  Inhibition and the frontal lobes 
Whereas the dorsolateral area appears to be primarily involved in the temporal 
integration of behaviours, such as working memory and planning, the orbital and 
ventromedial regions of the prefrontal cortex have a greater involvement in the 
inhibition of behaviours and control of emotional interferences (Roussy & Toupin, 
2000). In line with this, inhibitory control throughout the lifespan appears to parallel 
the time course of prefrontal cortex maturation and decline (Dempster, 1992), and 
damage to the prefrontal cortex often leads to a behavioural „disinhibition syndrome‟ 
in which normal control over social behaviour is diminished (Fuster, 1996). 
Lesion studies have provided equivocal support for the role of the 
orbitofrontal cortex in cognitive inhibition. Some authors argued that orbitofrontal 
lesions result in a loss of inhibitory control only in affective processing (Bechara, 
2004; Bechara et al., 2000a, 2000b; Dias et al., 1996a) and contrasted this with an 
effect of dorsolateral prefrontal lesions on attentional inhibition and selection. On the 
other hand, orbitofrontal damage frequently results in impulsivity and disinhibition 
(Fuster, 1997), and patients with such damage are described as not being able to 
withhold responding regardless of whether the domain is affective or cognitive 
(Compton, 2003; Elliot, Dolan & Frith, 2000; Moscovitch & Winocur, 2002).  
In support of the above theories, it has recently been proposed that inhibitory 
processes are organised in the prefrontal cortex according to different levels of 
abstraction and that different prefrontal areas may play a crucial role depending on 
whether lower-order or higher-order processes are required (Cools, Clark & Robbins, 
2004; Roberts & Wallis, 2000). According to this view, the orbitofrontal cortex 
contributes to lower-order processes such as the inhibition and selection of specific 
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stimulus information, but not abstract task-rule information, which in turn is 
processed by the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Cools et al., 2004). 
 Using fMRI and EEG, Garavan, Ross, Murphy, Roche and Stein (2002) 
identified two systems involved in inhibition: errors were associated with medial 
activation incorporating the anterior cingulate and pre-supplementary motor area, 
while behavioural alteration subsequent to errors was associated with both the anterior 
cingulate and the left prefrontal cortex. The involvement of these two systems can be 
dissociated based on the relative difficulty of the response inhibition. Specifically, 
when ongoing target response speeds were relatively slow, response inhibition was 
executed by the right prefrontal system. This inhibitory system may instigate a more 
controlled inhibition, perhaps related to the role of the right dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex in selecting the appropriate response over the prepotent response (Rowe, Toni, 
Josephs, Frackowiak & Passingham, 2000). The second inhibitory system, involving 
the anterior cingulate, was activated for inhibitions when ongoing response speeds 
were relatively fast, suggesting that this structure may be especially important in 
urgent inhibitions over faster or more automatic behaviours.  
Berlin, Rolls and Kischka (2004) reported that patients with orbitofrontal 
cortex lesions performed more impulsively as shown by both self-report and 
cognitive/behavioural measures of impulsivity. This impulsiveness was specifically 
related to orbitofrontal damage, in that the non-orbitofrontal patients (who 
predominantly had damage to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) were not impaired on 
either measure. In the behavioural impulsivity task, orbitofrontal patients also made 
significantly faster responses than controls. This suggests that impulsivity may be at 
least partly due to a fast cognitive pace, which may lead to impatience or an inability 
to stop and think without acting. The authors also reported an associated between 
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inappropriate „frontal‟ behaviours and impulsivity in the orbitofrontal patients, 
suggesting that the patients may have been too impatient to wait for appropriate 
feedback and therefore failed to respond appropriately in social situations. 
 In order to account for the social cognition deficits observed in patients with 
frontal lobe dysfunction, Sahakian and colleagues proposed the „inhibition 
hypothesis‟ (Plaisted & Sahakian, 1997; Rahman, Sahakian, Hodges, Rogers & 
Robbins, 1999). The hypothesis proposes that the inability of a patient to suppress the 
response evoked by the stimulus prevents the patient from selecting an appropriate 
action plan. That is, orbitofrontal patients may act without giving themselves enough 
time to think about their behaviours and to modify them accordingly. Thus, the 
behaviour becomes dominated by the immediate emotional impact of the stimulus at 
hand.  
 
7.1.2  Inhibition measures  
Within the psychological literature, several behavioural models of impulsivity 
have been developed on the basis of findings from laboratory tasks used to measure 
impulsivity. These tasks fall into three broad categories: (1) punished and/or 
extinction paradigms, in which impulsivity is defined as the perseverance of a 
response that is punished or unrewarded; (2) reward-choice paradigms, in which 
impulsivity is defined as preference for a small immediate reward over a larger 
delayed reward; and (3) response disinhibition paradigms, in which impulsivity is 
defined either as making responses that are premature or an inability to withhold a 
response (Moeller et al., 2001).  
The Stop Signal and Go/No-Go tasks have been widely used to investigate the 
behavioural and neural processes of response inhibition. For example, Aron et al. 
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(2003) found a high correlation between lesion volume within the right inferior frontal 
gyrus and inhibitory performance (r = .83). Rubia, Smith, Brammer and Taylor 
(2003) supported this result, finding that the right inferior prefrontal cortex was 
correlated with successful inhibition and failed inhibition was associated with 
activation in mesial frontopolar and bilateral inferior parietal cortices. More recently, 
Boehler, Appelbaum, Krebs, Hopf and Woldorff (2010), using conjunction analyses 
on fMRI data of successful and unsuccessful stop-trials, identified the lateral-inferior 
frontal and medial frontal cortical areas and the caudate nucleus. There are important 
differences between these two paradigms however; the most critical being that the 
Go/No-Go task is suited for measuring inhibition of prepotent responses, whereas the 
Stop Signal task measures inhibition of already initiated responses. The Stop Signal 
thus places a higher load on inhibitory control than the Go/No-Go Task (Boeker, 
Buecheler, Schroeter, & Gauggel, 2007). 
Using fMRI, Chevrier, Noseworthy and Schachar (2007) found that there are 
distinct areas of the brain involved with the various aspects of inhibition and 
performance monitoring functions utilised during the Stop Signal Task. Namely, 
during the „Go‟ trials which involve response monitoring, activated right prefrontal 
and midline networks, while during „Stop‟ trials, involving response withdrawal 
activated right inferior frontal gyrus and basal ganglia. Furthermore, error detection 
invoked by failed inhibition activated dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and right middle 
frontal Brodmann‟s area 9.  
Aron, Behrens, Smith, Frank and Poldrack (2007a) provided converging 
evidence for a frontal-subcortical network for response control, demonstrating 
increased activation of right pre-supplementary motor area, inferior frontal cortex, and 
subthalamic nucleus regions. Further support comes from Duann, Ide, Luo and Li 
 168 
(2009) who argued that the inferior frontal cortex and pre-supplementary motor area 
play different roles in stop signal inhibition. Their results indicate that the inferior 
frontal cortex, an integral part of the ventral attention system, mediates attentional 
processing of the stop signal while the pre-supplementary motor area mediates 
response inhibition. The authors suggest that this greater inferior frontal cortex 
activity during stop- compared with go-trials may simply reflect attentional 
processing of the stop signal. Thus, by increasing activity in response to the stop 
signal, the inferior frontal cortex may serve to orient attention and resources to the 
stop process and, as a result, facilitate inhibition.  
 ERP research also relates inhibition to prefrontal activation, linking prefrontal 
activity reported in fMRI studies to the so-called Stop-N2 component in ERP research 
(e.g., Pliszka, Liotti & Woldorff, 2000; van Boxtel, van der Molen, Jennings & 
Brunia, 2001). Notably, this component has been demonstrated to be larger for 
successful compared with unsuccessful stoping (Schmajuk, Liotti, Busse & Woldorff, 
2006).  
 The converging evidence from these various methodologies suggests that 
predominantly three brain areas are crucial for response inhibition in the Stop Signal 
Task: inferior frontal gyrus; medial prefrontal areas including the pre-supplementary 
motor area; and the basal ganglia (see Aron et al., 2007b, Chambers, Garavan & 
Bellgrove, 2009; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008 for reviews). The dominant view argues 
that, in response to a stop-stimulus, a signal from the inferior and/or medial frontal 
cortex is sent to the basal ganglia to cancel the motor program triggered by the go-
stimulus (Aron et al., 2007a; Aron & Poldrack, 2006; Eagle et al., 2008; Ray et al., 
2009). Interactions between the different parts of the basal ganglia and the associated 
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subthalamic nucleus produce a signal that is sent to the motor cortex via the thalamus, 
where the response is ultimately inhibited (Stinear, Coxon & Byblow, 2009). 
 
7.1.3  Inhibition and aggression 
Impulsivity can be divided into two distinct types: functional impulsivity 
refers to a rapid information processing style which leads to a tendency to make quick 
decisions when this strategy is appropriate to the situation; dysfunctional impulsivity 
is related to speedy and non-reflexive decisions, which have a negative consequence 
for the individual (Dickman, 1990). Dysfunctional impulsivity thus appears to be 
related to the inability to inhibit competing responses. 
Although most people engage in impulsive behaviour at some time, high 
degrees of impulsivity have been linked to various forms of psychopathology and 
maladaptive behaviour. Previous research has shown higher levels of impulsivity 
among individuals with CD, personality disorders, and substance-abuse disorders 
(Moeller et al., 2001). Moreover, some authors consider impulsivity as the best 
predictor of adult antisocial and delinquent disorders (von Knorring & Ekselius, 
1998). 
Theorists have posited that impulsivity may be viewed as a personality 
characteristic that predisposes individuals to develop long-term, recidivistic antisocial 
behaviour. For example, Gorenstein and Newman (1980) proposed the existence of an 
underlying disinhibitory personality style that will be expressed as antisocial 
behaviour when it comes into conjunction with particular environmental risk factors. 
Further to this, Barratt (1994) suggested that some people are predisposed to respond 
to certain stimuli or situations with feelings of anger that may lead to an aggressive 
response. If such a predisposition is combined with a high level of impulsivity, then 
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the difficulty of inhibiting responses that is characteristic of impulsive individuals 
involves a lower response control, facilitating aggressive behaviour.  
Impulsivity and low self-control have been shown to be consistent predictors 
of delinquency (Moffitt, Caspi, Harrington & Milne, 2002), and there is a well-
documented relationship between impulsivity and antisocial behaviour among 
incarcerated men (Barratt et al., 1997b; Moeller et al., 2001; Wang & Diamond, 
1999). Along with anger, hostility, and antisocial personality style, impulsivity has 
also been shown to be a strong predictor of institutional aggression, violence, and 
adjustment problems among incarcerated male offenders (Fornells, Capdevila & 
Andres-Pueyo, 2002; Wang & Diamond, 1999). More recently, Komarovskaya, Loper 
and Warren (2007) found that female inmates reported significantly higher 
impulsivity scores on a self-report measure than the normative sample and similar 
scores as psychiatric inpatients from the study of Patton, Stanford and Barratt (1995). 
Pratt and Cullen (2000) argued that the effect size for the relationship between low 
self-control and antisocial behaviour is one of the strongest correlates of criminal 
behaviour. The argument then follows that when anger exceeds inhibition, aggression 
is expressed behaviourally. Individuals with poorer inhibition will therefore express 
aggression more frequently. On the contrary, prefrontal effortful control enables long-
term planning in which present impulses are inhibited in favour of possible long-term 
gains. As a result, people with low self-control have a relatively greater focus on 
immediate rewards compared to long-term consequences of their behaviour 
(MacDonald, 2008).  
Few studies have investigated the aggression-impulsivity relationship directly. 
In one such study, LeMarquand et al. (1998) examined the relationship among 
tryptophan depletion, impulsivity and aggression in a sample of adolescent males 
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selected for an extensive history of aggressive behaviour. Aggressive individuals 
made more Go/No-Go „impulsive‟ errors than did non-aggressive individuals and had 
lower scores on tests of executive function. The authors suggested that impulsivity 
and executive function are correlated and underlie aggressive behaviour.  
Stanford et al.‟s (1997) study of neuropsychological performance and 
impulsive-aggression in college students supports this relationship. Specifically 
researchers noted that errors in processing and control of impulses indicative of 
executive functioning deficits were observed among impulsive-aggressive subjects. 
Hoaken et al. (2003) also attempted to test the relationship between executive 
functioning, aggression, and impulsivity. They found that executive functioning was 
related to both aggression and impulsivity as measured by the Go/No-Go task. 
More recently, Vigil-Colet and Codorniu-Raga (2004) investigated the 
relationship between inhibitory deficits and aggression, and the role that impulsivity 
plays in the relationship. They found that inhibition deficits were specifically related 
to the anger scale of the BPAQ (Buss & Perry, 1992). Further to this, dysfunctional 
impulsivity was correlated with aggression, while functional impulsivity showed no 
significant relationship. Impulsive subjects also showed shorter reaction times and 
took less time to answer the questionnaires suggestive of non-reflexive strategies in 
this population which places more importance on speed than accuracy. 
 
7.2  Response reversal 
Reversal learning, by definition, involves a shift in responding from a stimulus 
that is no longer rewarding, to a previously unrewarded stimulus, while extinction 
refers to the normal reduction in behaviour when rewards are no longer given. An 
essential component of adaptive behaviour is the ability to learn the reward value of 
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stimuli, which can change according to an individual‟s circumstances and state. A 
previously rewarded stimulus may cease to be rewarding or even reverse its value and 
become punishing as a function of external changes in reinforcement contingencies.  
 
7.2.1  Response reversal and the frontal lobes 
There is growing evidence from functional neuroimaging studies, human 
lesion studies, and from neurophysiological and lesion studies in non-human primates 
that the ventral parts of the frontal lobe, which include the orbitofrontal cortex, play a 
crucial role in representing the reward and punishment value of stimuli and in rapidly 
learning or reversing associations between visual stimuli and rewards and 
punishments (Rolls, 1999, 2000, 2002). Following from this, the orbitofrontal cortex 
appears to play a critical role in the way in which this representation guides goal-
directed behaviour (Rolls, 1999).  
These hypotheses, and the role in particular of the orbitofrontal cortex in 
human behaviour, have been investigated in a number of studies in humans with 
damage to the ventral parts of the frontal lobe (the description „ventral‟ is given to 
indicate that there was pathology in the orbitofrontal or related parts of the frontal 
lobe, but not in the dorsolateral parts of it). Rolls and colleagues have studied 
stimulus-reward learning and the ability to reverse and/or extinguish responses that 
have been previously rewarded (Rolls et al., 1994). Control patients with damage 
elsewhere in the frontal lobes or in other regions did not show this deficit. The ventral 
frontal patients also made more errors on a similar extinction task in which the reward 
was no longer given. Interestingly, the patients were often able to verbally report that 
the contingencies had changed, but were unable to alter their behaviour appropriately. 
Fellows and Farrah (2003) supported these findings, demonstrating a selective 
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impairment on reversal learning in subjects with lesions of the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex in comparison to a group with dorsolateral frontal lobe damage and 
normal controls. 
In a more recent study, patients with lesions in different regions of the 
prefrontal cortex were tested on a probabilistic visual discrimination reversal test. On 
this task, it was necessary both to determine which feedback was crucial and to use 
this information appropriately to guide the choice of stimulus to maximise the reward 
obtained (Hornak et al., 2004). Patients with bilateral orbital/medial prefrontal lesions 
demonstrated a severe impairment on the test, whereas even large unilateral lesions, 
which included the orbital/medial region, had no such effect. Similarly, Berlin et al. 
(2004) reported that orbitofrontal patients performed poorer on a stimulus-
reinforcement association reversal task than non-orbitofrontal cortex lesions controls 
and normal control participants.  
Mitchell et al. (2006) reported on patient CL who had acquired psychopathy 
following an orbitofrontal cortex lesion. CL demonstrated intact stimulus-
reinforcement based learning, but impaired reversal learning. In addition to this, CL 
showed severely disturbed social behaviour including high levels of impulsive-
aggression. The authors reported that the patient resembled developmental 
psychopathy in the severity of their antisocial behaviour, violence, unconcern for the 
victims, and lack of insight toward the seriousness of their condition. However, it is 
important to note that such patients differ from individuals with psychopathy in that 
their offenses were impulsive with no history of premeditated-aggression.  
Functional neuroimaging studies also implicate the orbitofrontal cortex in 
learning or reversing associations between visual stimuli and rewards or punishments 
(Cools, Clark, Owen & Robbins, 2002; O‟Doherty et al., 2001). Rolls (2000) 
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demonstrated that there is a major visual input to many neurons in the orbitofrontal 
cortex, and that in many cases, these neurons represent the reinforcement association 
of visual stimuli. In addition to these neurons encoding the reward association of 
visual stimuli, other neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex detect non-reward, for 
example, responding when an expected reward is not obtained with a visual 
discrimination is reversed (for background, see Rolls, 2005). Kringelbach and Rolls 
(2003) used the faces of two different people, and if one face was selected then that 
face smiled, and if the other was selected, the face showed an angry expression. After 
good performance was acquired, there were repeated reversals of the visual 
discrimination task. They found that activation of a lateral part of the orbitofrontal 
cortex in the fMRI study was produced on the errors trials, that is, when the 
participant chose a face, and did not obtain the expected reward. Control tasks showed 
that the response was related to the error, and the mismatch between what was 
expected and what was obtained, in that just showing an angry face expression did not 
selectively activate this part of the lateral orbitofrontal cortex. The study revealed that 
the human orbitofrontal cortex is very sensitive to social feedback when it must be 
used to change behaviour. 
 
7.2.2  Response reversal measures 
Several investigators have developed behavioural paradigms to study the 
neural mechanisms underlying the behaviour of patients with lesions to the prefrontal 
cortex, with much of the work relying on two conceptually related measures: object 
reversal learning and extinction. The ability to update and correct behaviour on the 
basis of changes in emotional significance is critical to successful performance on 
such tasks (Rolls, 1999).  
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The Intra/Extra Dimensional Set Shift task (ID/ED) is used to gauge 
attentional set shifting and response reversal. The task assesses the participant‟s 
ability to maintain attention to different examples within the same dimension (ID 
stages) and then to shift attention to a previously irrelevant dimension (ED stages). 
This task thus assesses two dissociable abilities. Firstly, it assesses the ability to 
perform response reversals; the participant is initially rewarded for his/her behaviour 
then this stimulus is no longer associated with reward. Secondly, it assesses the ability 
of the participant to perform ED shifts; to shift their response set from one stimulus 
property to another, for example, shifting attention from the shape of the stimulus to 
lines (Rogers, Andrews, Grasby, Brooks & Robbins, 2000). Therefore, the acquisition 
of this new visual discrimination must occur in the face of an attentional-set 
established over the course of recent reinforcement history. 
While the WCST is widely used to gauge the ability to shift cognitive set, and 
has been considered a cardinal measure of the function of the prefrontal cortex, the 
ID/ED Task allows the cognitive components of set shifting to be assessed 
independently and their contribution examined as the task increases in complexity 
(Fray et al., 1996). Accumulating evidence indicates that focal damage to the 
prefrontal cortex in both human neurological patients and experimental primates 
impairs ED shift learning (Dias et al., 1996a, 1996b, 1997; Owen et al., 1991, 1993). 
Dias et al. (1996a) reported that lesions of the orbitofrontal cortex produce 
impairments in the reversal learning, but not in the ED shift learning. In contrast, 
damage to the lateral prefrontal cortex in monkeys causes a loss of inhibitory control 
in attentional selection, highlighting the dissociable processes of reversal shift and ED 
shift learning.  
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Later research by the Dias et al. (1997) investigated ID and ED shifts in 
marmosets with lesions in either dorsolateral or orbital (ventromedial) frontal cortex. 
They found selective impairment of ID reversals with orbital lesions, selective 
impairment of ED shifts with dorsolateral lesions, and no significant changes on ID 
shifts with either frontal lesion. The authors interpreted these results as suggesting 
that distinct regions of the prefrontal cortex perform independent but complementary 
cognitive processes of visual stimuli in changing environmental circumstances. That 
is, regions within the orbitofrontal cortex enable the rapid reversal of affective 
associations for specific visual stimuli, whereas the higher order shifting of attention 
between features of the visual stimuli is mediated by regions within the lateral 
prefrontal cortex. 
Rogers et al. (2000), using PET, confirmed the dissociability of the ID/ED 
Task processes. They reported activations in prefrontal regions, including left anterior 
prefrontal cortex and right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in ED learning relative to ID 
shift learning. In contrast, reversal learning, relative to ID shift learning, produced 
activations of the left caudate nucleus with little change in the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex.  
In the specific case of the ID/ED Set Shift Task, it appears that reversal shift 
and ED shift learning are highly dissociable in both experimental primates and human 
subjects. For example, lesions of the orbitofrontal cortex in non-human primates have 
been found to impair reversal learning, but not ED shift learning, with lesions of the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex producing the opposite pattern of deficits (Dias et al., 
1996b; Dias, Robbins & Roberts, 1997). Similarly, depletions of the ascending 
cholinergic projections from the basal forebrain appear to produce highly specific 
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deficits in reversal learning (Roberts, Robbins, Everitt & Muir, 1992), while depletion 
of prefrontal dopamine has its greatest effect on ED shifting (Roberts et al., 1994).  
These results suggest that distinct regions of the prefrontal cortex carry out 
independent but complementary forms of cognitive processing of stimuli in changing 
environmental situations. That is, regions within the orbitofrontal cortex enable the 
rapid reversal of associations for stimuli, whereas the shifting of attention between 
features of visual stimuli, such as the perceptual dimensions, is mediated by regions 
within the lateral prefrontal cortex (Dias et al., 1996a). 
The neurophysiological evidence and the effects of lesions described thus 
suggest that one function mediated by the orbitofrontal cortex is rapid stimulus-
reinforcement association learning and the correction of these associations when 
reinforcement contingencies in the environment change. Findings such as those 
described above have led to suggestions that the orbitofrontal cortex is primarily 
involved in the reappraisal of the affective or motivational significance of stimuli and 
thus plays an important role in emotion-related learning (Rolls, 2004). This 
emphasises the fact that reappraisal is likely to play an important role in social 
contexts, where one is required to adapt to rapidly changing contexts (Happaney et al., 
2004). This failure to correct behaviour in response to environmental demands may 
thus underlie the emotional changes and behavioural problems that can follow 
damage to this region in humans (Rolls et al., 1994). 
 
7.2.3  Response reversal and aggression 
 Single cell recordings and lesions studies have demonstrated that the 
orbitofrontal cortex is the substrate of flexible encoding of stimulus reward value in 
both animals and humans (Rolls, 2000). Parallel to this, damage to the ventral 
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prefrontal cortex has been observed to result in personality changes, impaired impulse 
control, and alterations in emotional and motivational state (Mesulam, 2002). It has 
thus been suggested that some of these changes are related to fundamental alterations 
in flexible stimulus-reward learning. That is, the socially inappropriate behaviour of 
frontally-damaged patients may reflect a basic inability to modify ongoing behaviour 
in response to negative feedback (Rolls et al., 1994). 
Decoding the reinforcement value of stimuli enables one to specify goals for 
action which is vital in motivational and emotional behaviour. With respect to 
emotional behaviour, decoding and rapidly adjusting the reinforcement value of visual 
signals is likely to be crucial, due to the fact that emotions are elicited by rewarding 
and punishing stimuli (Rolls et al., 1994). For example, fear is a state produced by a 
stimulus associated with a punisher such as pain. The ability to perform this learning 
rapidly is important in social situations when reinforcements are constantly being 
exchanged and the reinforcement value of stimuli must continually be updated based 
on the reinforcement received and given. Thus, any failure to alter behaviour when 
the reinforcement value of environmental stimuli change will lead to inappropriate 
emotional and social behaviour.  
 Some of the personality changes that can follow frontal lobe damage may be 
related to a dysfunction in altering behaviour in response to a change in reinforcement 
contingencies (Anderson et al., 1999). Indeed, insofar as the orbitofrontal cortex is 
involved in the disconnection of stimulus-reinforcement associations, and such 
associations are important in learned emotional responses, then it follows that the 
orbitofrontal cortex is involved in emotional responses by correcting stimulus-
reinforcer associations when they become inappropriate (Rolls, 2000).  
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Response reversal deficits may also lead to greater frustration in provocative 
social interactions. Response reversal involves the ability to make a new response to 
gain a reward when the old behaviour that previously gave rise to the reward no 
longer does. In this way, frustration, which is a primary trigger for impulsive-
aggression (Berkowitz, 1993), may result if individuals cannot adjust their behaviour 
and consequently continue to make the old response that no longer results in reward 
(Blair, 2004). 
 Patients with ventral frontal lobe damage displaying emotional and social 
problems have been shown to have deficits on tasks of extinction and reversal of 
visual discriminations. Rolls et al. (1994) examined the behavioural ratings given by 
the carers of patients with ventral frontal lobe damage on the Behaviour 
Questionnaire, including disinhibition or socially inappropriate behaviour, 
misinterpretation of others‟ moods, impulsiveness, unconcern or underestimation of 
the seriousness of their condition, and lack of initiative. Such behavioural changes 
correlated significantly with the stimulus-reinforcer reversal and extinction learning 
impairment. Therefore, the difficulty with such correction of behaviour to 
environmental reinforcers may at least party underlie the behavioural problems of 
such patients.  
Berlin et al. (2004) investigated the relationship between frontal dysfunction, 
impulsive behaviour, and the behavioural, emotional, and personality changes seen in 
patients with orbitofrontal cortex damage. These patients performed more impulsively 
on both self-report and cognitive/behavioural tests of impulsivity, reported more 
inappropriate „frontal‟ behaviours, and performed more poorly on a stimulus-
reinforcement association reversal task, than non-orbitofrontal cortex lesion controls 
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and normal controls. Furthermore, orbitofrontal patients experienced more subjective 
anger than controls.  
The relationship between aggression and response reversal and extinction may 
also be explained in terms of learning theory of premeditated-aggression. That is, 
premeditated-aggressive individuals may fail to reverse socially unacceptable 
responses due to positive reinforcement, for example, social power, prestige, or goal 
attainment. Mitchell et al. (2002) explored performance of adult psychopathic 
individuals and controls on the ID/ED Task. The psychopathic individuals were 
significantly impaired in response reversal on this task. On a similar novel response 
reversal task, Budhani, Richell and Blair (2006) found that adult psychopathic 
individuals presented with impairment on the response reversal component but not on 
the acquisition component of the task. On the basis of this it is proposed that 
premeditated-aggressive individuals are unable to form associations between actions 
and punishment and thus continue to engage in aggressive behaviours to obtain their 
desired goal. 
  
7.3  Decision-making 
Decision-making requires the evaluation of multiple response options, 
followed by the selection of the response which is considered to be optimal. Each 
response option may be characterised by the reward and punishment outcomes with 
which it is associated. Response options may vary in terms of (1) the degree of reward 
and punishment; (2) the probability of receiving reward or punishment; and (3) the 
delay until the reward or punishment is received. This framework provides scope for a 
range of decision-making abnormalities in clinical groups.  
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 Deficits in decision-making may become apparent in conditions of increased 
sensitivity to reward or reduced sensitivity to punishment, or at a more complex level, 
under situations of conflict. For example, a failure to avoid rewards with long-term 
negative consequences, or the preference for a small immediate reward over a larger 
delayed reward. This latter phenomenon represents the relationship between decision-
making and impulsivity in that an operational definition of impulsive behaviour is the 
tendency to choose a small immediate reward over a larger delayed reward. In this 
way, deficits in decision-making may be described as a type of cognitive 
impulsiveness (Evenden, 1999). 
 
7.3.1  Decision-making and the frontal lobes 
Patients with damage involving the orbitofrontal cortex have been reported to 
display severe impairments in real life decision-making, despite remaining 
unimpaired intellectually and on traditional neuropsychological measures (Eslinger & 
Damasio, 1985; Shallice & Burgess, 1991). This syndrome, labelled „acquired 
sociopathy‟, is characterised by repeated engagement in high risk behaviours that are 
rewarding in the short term but have likely negative consequences for the individual. 
The engagement in such behaviours has been proposed to arise from impaired 
decision-making between various response options (Bechara et al., 2000a). 
 
7.3.2  Decision-making measures 
Neuropsychological studies of decision-making in humans have utilised two 
paradigms in behavioural studies: The Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara et al., 1994), 
and the Cambridge Gambling Task (Rogers et al., 1999b). The Iowa Gambling Task 
emphasises the learning of reward and punishment associations in order to guide 
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ongoing decision-making. Healthy subjects performing the task learn to avoid „risky 
card decks‟ that offer high immediate rewards with a concomitant risk of occasional 
very high punishment. They develop a preference instead for „safe card decks‟ where 
the immediate rewards are smaller but there is a low risk of punishment. Patients with 
bilateral damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex do not acquire a preference for 
the safe decks on the Iowa Gambling Task, but instead prefer the risky decks for the 
duration of the task (Bechara et al., 1994, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel & Anderson, 
1998; Bechara et al. 2000b). In a more recent study, Clark, Manes, Antoun, Sahakian 
and Robbins (2003) found that the volume of damage in the medial prefrontal cortex 
and middle and superior frontal gyrus on the right side was significantly correlated 
with gambling performance. On the basis of these findings, the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex has been posited to mediate the learning and retrieval of the affective 
information that guides decision-making (Clark, Cools & Robbins, 2004). In this way, 
ventromedial patients‟ performance on the gambling task is comparable to their real 
life inability to decide advantageously in situations involving a choice between 
immediate versus delayed reward or punishment (Bechara et al., 2000b).  
 The Cambridge Gambling task was developed to quantify decision-making 
outside of a learning context. The information needed to make each decision is 
presented to the subject on each trial, and hence the learning demand across trials is 
minimised. In the Cambridge Gambling Task, both the probabilistic judgement and 
the betting decision involve the adaptation of behaviour, on a trial by trial basis, 
according to changes in emotional significance of the stimuli. A failure to adapt over 
trials may be associated with a reduced ability to moderate the bet according to the 
associated risk (Rogers et al., 1999b).  
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 To date, four studies have examined performance on the Cambridge Gambling 
Task in patients with frontal lobe pathology affecting the ventral prefrontal cortex. 
Increased betting relative to matched controls have been shown in patients with 
subarachnoid haemorrhage of the anterior communicatory artery, the blood vessel that 
supplies the ventral prefrontal cortex (Mavaddat, Kirkpatrick, Rogers, & Sahakian, 
2000), frontal variant fronto-temporal dementia (Rahman et al., 1999), and large 
prefrontal lesions including orbitofrontal cortex, caused by haemorrhage or tumour 
resection (Manes et al., 2002). Whilst probabilistic judgment was at the level of 
healthy controls in these three studies, the latencies to make those judgments were 
increased, possibly reflecting an incipient deficit. Surprisingly, however, patients with 
unilateral lesions restricted to the orbitofrontal cortex performed similarly to controls 
on the task. In a fourth study, patients with prefrontal lesions including the orbital 
region showed poorer probabilistic judgment than brain-damaged controls without 
orbitofrontal damage, and placed lower bets (Rogers et al., 1999a). Probabilistic 
judgment and betting on the task therefore appear to be closely linked, and this 
relationship is consistently disrupted by damage to ventral prefrontal cortex. 
Neuroimaging studies, primarily using PET, have confirmed activation of the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex during the similar Iowa Gambling task performance 
(Bolla et al., 2003; Ernst et al., 2002). Furthermore, two fMRI studies have examined 
blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) activity during the Iowa Gambling task 
(Fukui, Murai, Fukuyama, Hayashi & Hanakawa, 2005; Windmann et al., 2006), with 
both studies confirming a role for the medial frontal gyrus in the task. Neuroimaging 
studies have also implicated the ventral prefrontal involvement in the Cambridge 
Gambling Task (Rogers et al., 1999b; Rubinsztein et al., 2001). Furthermore, Rogers 
et al. found that contrasts of the decision-making condition with a visuo-motor control 
 184 
task revealed significant activations in ventral prefrontal cortex including the 
orbitofrontal gyrus.   
The amygdala is a further structure implicated in decision-making circuitry. 
Iowa Gambling Task deficits are pronounced in patients with amygdala damage, 
although these patients show a dissociable autonomic profile. Whereas control 
subjects performing the Iowa Gambling Task developed an „anticipatory‟ SCR prior 
to selection from the risky decks (Bechara et al., 1996), patients with amygdala 
lesions did not acquire anticipatory SCRs to punishing feedback (Bechara, Damasio, 
Damasio & Lee, 1999). Patients with ventromedial prefrontal lesions also failed to 
acquire anticipatory SCRs to the risky decks, but show comparable SCRs to controls 
in response to punishing feedback (Bechara et al., 1996). This suggests that at a 
cognitive level, ventromedial prefrontal patients experience reward and punishment 
normally, but are unable to use the experiences to guide future behaviour. In 
comparison, decision-making deficits seen in patients with amygdala damage are due 
to blunted emotional responses in the initial processing. 
 
7.3.3  Decision-making and aggression 
The ability to make decisions, particularly when faced with novel and/or 
complex problems, is a fundamental skill for functioning in everyday life. Broomhall 
(2005), in his investigation of neuropsychological deficits in reactive and instrumental 
violent offenders, found that the reactive violent offenders sampled significantly more 
cards from the disadvantageous decks on the Iowa Gambling task compared with 
instrumental violent offenders. The result was taken to indicate reactive violent 
offenders‟ real life impairment in the ability to make advantageous choices, 
particularly in social or personal matters.  
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In such situations, the exact future outcome of a particular course of action is 
not possible to determine and choices must be estimations. This suggests that 
impulsive violent offenders are primarily guided by the immediate prospects and 
generally insensitive to the possible consequences of their actions. Interestingly, the 
instrumental group were significantly impaired on the gambling task compared with 
the normal sample. Broomhall (2005) suggested that the instrumental group may have 
been able to see the future consequences of their actions, however were still enticed 
by the high risk decks into making risky choices. This is analogous to their aggressive 
behaviour in real life situations, in that although there is risk of punishment in acting 
aggressively, the possibility of gain outweighs this risk. 
 The data on psychopaths‟ performance on the gambling task is equivocal 
(Blair, 2002; Mitchell et al., 2002). Schmitt, Brinkley and Newman (1999) and Blair 
and Cipolotti (2000) in a small group sample, found that adult psychopathic 
individuals were comparable to controls in their ability to avoid risky packs. 
However, both of these studies used task instructions that differed from those of 
Bechara et al. (1994). Specifically, there were no instructions informing participants 
that some decks involve more loss than others and that participants could win more 
money overall if they avoided the costly decks. In the only study where such 
instructions have been used, the adult psychopathic individuals were significantly less 
likely than the comparison individuals to avoid the risky packs (Mitchell et al., 2002). 
This finding can be explained through the identified involvement of the amygdala in 
stimulus-reinforcement acquisition (Killcross, Robbins & Everitt, 1997). That is, 
given that amygdala dysfunction is associated with psychopathy (Blair, 2004), it may 
be through this route rather than the orbitofrontal system that psychopaths have 
impairment in instrumental learning.  
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7.3.4  Somatic marker hypothesis 
The decision-making research described above has been guided by the 
„somatic marker hypothesis‟. The central idea of this hypothesis is that decision-
making is a process guided by emotion in that there is a link between the 
abnormalities in emotion of orbitofrontal patients and their impairment in decision-
making in real life (Bechara et al., 2000a). 
This hypothesis proposes that the emotions evoked by the experience of 
reward or punishment signal the potential occurrence of an outcome, so that these 
signals guide the behaviour in a manner that is advantageous to the individual. 
Individuals make judgements not only by assessing the severity of outcomes and their 
probability of occurrence, but also, in terms of their emotional quality. Lesions of the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex interfere with the normal processing of emotional 
signals leading to pathological impairments in everyday decision-making (Bechara et 
al., 2000a).  
 The somatic marker hypothesis and the experimental strategies used to study 
decision-making in neurological patients provide parallels and direct implications for 
understanding the nature of clinical disorders. For example, substance abusers are 
similar to ventromedial patients in that when faced with a choice that brings some 
immediate reward (i.e., taking a drug), at the risk of incurring a loss of job, home, and 
family, they choose the immediate reward and ignore the future consequences. Using 
gambling tasks, studies have indicated that impairment in decision-making may stand 
at the core of the problem of substance abusers (Bechara & Damasio, 2002; Grant, 
Contoreggi & London, 2000). This hypothesis may extend to both impulsive- and 
premeditated-aggressors. That is, such individuals are unable to consider the negative 
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consequences associated with behaving aggressively, instead focusing on the 
immediate reaction to the altercation. 
 
7.4  Impulsivity, response reversal, decision-making, and aggression 
Multiple parallels exist between the effects on reversal learning and decision-
making, which supports the hypothesis that these paradigms measure closely related 
constructs. As outlined above, Rahman et al. (1999) showed that fronto-temporal 
dementia is characterised by increased betting on the Cambridge Gambling Task, and 
impaired reversal on the ID/ED Task, in the presence of intact performance on ED 
shifting and other dorsolateral prefrontal measures. Furthermore, symptomatology in 
fronto-temporal dementia resembles the disinhibition syndrome seen after lesions to 
the orbitofrontal cortex (Gregory & Hodges, 1996).  
 A combined impairment in decision-making and reversal learning was also 
observed in a study on psychopathic individuals, selecting more cards from the risky 
decks on the Iowa Gambling Task, and making more reversal errors on the ID/ED 
Task (Mitchell et al., 2002). Thus, psychopathic individuals did not adjust their 
behaviour to avoid making risky decisions and they did not shift their responding 
when the previously rewarded stimulus was no longer rewarded. A second report in 
boys with psychopathic tendencies identified a further dissociation, with these 
subjects making more risky selections on the Iowa Gambling Task but showing intact 
reversal learning on the ID/ED Task (Blair, Colledge & Mitchell, 2001).  
It is important to note here that the aggression shown by psychopathic 
individuals is predominantly instrumental; it is directed toward a specific goal 
(Cornell et al., 1996). In comparison, patients with orbitofrontal cortex lesions show 
primarily impulsive-aggression (Anderson et al., 1999). Thus, it may be that 
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individuals displaying impulsive- or premeditated-aggression may have dysfunction 
in similar neuro-circuitry mediating response reversal and decision-making abilities. 
 
7.5  Aim and hypotheses 
In summary, lesions of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, including 
orbitofrontal cortex, impair reversal learning, decision-making and inhibition in both 
humans and animals. Functional neuroimaging studies provide convergent evidence, 
demonstrating ventral prefrontal cortex responses during performance of decision-
making and reversal learning in healthy subjects. Disruption in one or all of these 
abilities may produce a profound alteration in day-to-day functioning.  
The aim of this study was to investigate (1) inhibition, as assessed by the Stop 
Signal Task; (2) response reversal, as assessed by the ID/ED Set Shift Task; and (3) 
decision-making, as assessed by the Cambridge Gamble Task, in impulsive- and 
premeditated-aggressive individuals relative to controls. Given the proposed 
correlation between impulsivity, aggression, and executive function deficits, it was 
hypothesised that the impulsive-aggressive group would make more errors and have 
shorter response times on the Stop Signal Task than the premeditated-aggressive and 
control groups.  
Both patients with lesions to the orbitofrontal cortex displaying high levels of 
impulsive-aggression, as well as psychopaths, characterised by high levels of 
premeditated-aggression show impairment on tasks of response reversal. It was thus 
hypothesised that on the ID/ED Task, both the impulsive-aggressive and 
premeditated-aggressive individuals would be impaired in stimulus-reinforcement and 
reversal learning, suggesting that such individuals are unable to modify their 
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behaviour appropriately to changes in reinforcement in a dynamic social environment 
(Blair, 2004). 
Furthermore, it was hypothesised that the impulsive-aggressive group would 
be impaired in decision-making on the Cambridge Gamble Task. This is based on the 
premise that such individuals are impaired in their decision-making capacity which 
result in aggressive responding during social interactions. In contrast, premeditated-
aggressive individuals, given their controlled and purposeful aggressive responding, 
would not be impaired in this ability. 
 
7.6  Method 
7.6.1  Participants 
The participants for Study 3 are the same as those for Study 2. 
 
7.6.2  Materials 
7.6.2.1 Questionnaires 
The BPAQ-SF (Bryant & Smith, 2001) was used for the purpose of selecting 
participants who were characteristically aggressive. The IPAS (Stanford et al., 2003a) 
was employed to characterise the aggressive acts as predominantly impulsive or 
predominantly premeditated in nature. Participants also completed the BPAQ (Buss & 
Perry, 1992) and I7 Impulsivity Questionnaire (Eysenck et al., 1985) upon completion 
of the computer tasks. All questionnaires are outlined in detail in Chapter 5. 
 
7.6.2.2 Inhibition, response reversal, and decision-making tasks  
Three subtests from the Cambridge Neuropsychological Test Automated 
Battery (CANTAB) were chosen as measures of inhibition, response reversal, and 
decision-making: the Stop Signal Task, ID/ED Set Shift Task and Cambridge 
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Gambling Task. The CANTAB neuropsychological battery has been extensively 
validated in brain injury and neuroimaging studies (Fray, Robbins & Sahakian, 1996). 
 Stop Signal Task: The Stop Signal Task is based on the classic stop signal 
response paradigm which measures a participant‟s ability to inhibit a response. Such 
tasks require subjects to perform speeded responses on „Go‟ trials and to inhibit their 
responses on „Stop‟ trials. This paradigm reflects Barkley‟s (1999) process of 
suppressing prepotent responses and stopping ongoing responses. Inhibition, as 
conceptualised in this study, refers to the deliberate, controlled suppression of 
prepotent responses. The Stop Signal Task is used to tap this type of inhibition, in that 
it requires the deliberate stopping of a response that is relatively automatic (Miyake et 
al., 2000). 
 Intra/Extradimensional Set Shift Task: The ID/ED Set Shift Task is a measure 
of rule acquisition and reversal. It features visual discrimination and attentional set 
formation, as well as maintenance, shifting and flexibility of attention. It requires 
participants to learn a series of visual discriminations, using feedback provided by the 
computer, in which one of two stimulus dimensions is relevant and the other is not. 
An ID shift occurs when a participant trained to respond to a particular stimulus 
dimension (e.g., shape) is required to transfer the rule to a new set of examples of the 
same dimension. An ED shift occurs when a participant is required to shift response 
set to an alternative previously irrelevant dimension (Owen et al., 1991). Two 
artificial dimensions are used in this test: colour-filled shapes and white lines. Simple 
stimuli are made up of just one of these dimensions, whereas compound stimuli are 
made up of both, namely white lines overlying colour-filled shapes. 
 Cambridge Gambling Task: The Cambridge Gambling Task assesses decision-
making and risk-taking behaviour outside a learning context. Relevant information is 
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presented to participants and it is not necessary for them to learn or retrieve 
information over consecutive trials. The Cambridge Gambling Task has two modes: 
ascending first and descending first. In the ascending first mode, the value of the 
stakes displayed in the stake box rises in stages 2 and 3, and falls in stages 4 and 5. In 
the descending first mode, the value of the stakes falls in stages 2 and 3 and rises in 
stages 4 and 5.  
The CANTAB tasks were presented on a Paceblade Slimbook P110 touch-
screen computer, with a 12 inch monitor. For the Stop Signal Task, participants used a 
press pad. 
 
7.6.2.3 Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Third Edition (Wechsler, 1997) 
As outlined in Chapter 5, the Vocabulary and Digit Span subtests from the 
WAIS-III were selected as control measures.  
 
7.6.3  Procedure 
The tasks for Study 3 were completed at the same time as those for Study 2. 
As outlined in Chapter 6, participants were recruited from undergraduate psychology 
classes at the University of Tasmania using the BPAQ-SF. Following the screening 
process, select participants who qualified as aggressive or control participants were 
invited to participate in computer tasks for Study 2 and Study 3. All participants 
received course credit for their participation. Informed written consent was obtained 
from all individuals prior to participation (see Appendix F and G for participant 
information sheets and consent forms). Participants were tested individually in a quiet 
room in the School of Psychology at the University of Tasmania. Presentation of the 
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tasks for Study 2 and Study 3 were counterbalanced as well as the presentation of the 
tasks within Study 3.  
Participants were seated in front of a computer monitor, approximately 60cm 
from the screen. Each task was explained and comprehension ensured before 
beginning.  
Stop Signal Task: The task screen for the Stop Signal Task began with a white 
ring presented on a black background, displayed to focus the attention of the 
participant. After a 500ms delay, a visual stimulus was displayed, consisting of a 
white arrow pointing to the left or to the right. The test consisted of two parts. In the 
first part, the participant was introduced to the press pad, and told to press the left 
hand button when they saw a left-pointing arrow and the right hand button when they 
saw a right-pointing arrow. Participants were instructed to use their index fingers to 
press the key pad. The participant completed one block of 16 trials to practice this. 
For the second part, the participants were told to continue pressing the buttons on the 
press pad when they saw the arrows as before, however if they heard an auditory 
signal (a beep), they should withhold their response and not press the button. There 
were five assessed blocks, each of 64 trials. Each block was divided into four sub-
blocks of 16 trials for analysis purposes only (not evident to the participant). Every 
sub-block contained twelve „go‟ trials, with no auditory stop signal, and four „stop‟ 
trials, with an auditory tone played following the „stop signal delay‟ (SSD) period, 
which is measured from the onset of the arrow stimulus. The twelve „go‟ trials and 
four „stop‟ trials were given in a random order within each sub-block, but all trials 
from one sub-block took place before the next sub-block began.  
The timing of the auditory stop signal changed throughout the test, depending 
on the participant‟s performance, so that stopping occurred approximately 50% of the 
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time for each participant. The shorter the SSD, the more likely it was that the 
participant would be able to hold off responding to the arrow. Note, for some 
participants, the SSD may have become negative, that is, the auditory signal occurred 
before the onset of the arrow stimulus. At the end of every assessed block, a feedback 
screen was displayed, displaying a graphical representation of the participant‟s 
performance, which the examiner explained to the participant, as well as encouraging 
them to respond faster. The participant was also shown if their speed of response was 
improving or not.  
 Intra/Extradimensional Set Shift task: The ID/ED Task consisted of nine 
blocks. Block 1 began with the presentation of two simple, colour-filled shapes. The 
participant had to learn which of the stimuli was correct by touching it, and continue 
until the criterion was reached. In Block 2, the contingencies were reversed, so that 
now the previously incorrect stimulus was correct. In Block 3, a second dimension 
was introduced, initially lying adjacent to, and then, for Block 4, overlapping, the first 
dimension. The contingencies did not change, remaining the same as at the end of the 
simple discrimination. The contingencies were reversed for Block 5, within the 
original dimension. New compound stimuli were introduced in Block 6, still varying 
along the same two dimensions (of shape and of line). Participants were required to 
attend to the previously relevant dimension of shape and learn which of the two new 
exemplars was correct (the „ID shift‟). Once the participant successfully completed 
the ID shift, followed by a reversal (Block 7), the compound stimuli were again 
changed. For Block 8, participants were required to shift attention to the previously 
irrelevant dimension and learn which of the two exemplars in this new dimension was 
now correct (the „ED shift‟). In Block 9, the contingencies were again reversed. 
Participants indicated their responses by touching the identified pattern on the screen. 
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For each of the nine stages, participants proceeded onto the next stage when a 
criterion of six consecutive correct responses had been attained. If this criterion was 
not reached after 50 trials, the computer automatically terminated the test. 
Performance was examined by the mean number of stages completed and the number 
of errors made at each stage.   
 Cambridge Gambling Task: On each trial of the Cambridge Gambling Task, 
participants were presented with a row of ten boxes across the top of the screen, some 
of which were red and some of which were blue. At the bottom of the screen were two 
rectangles, containing the words „Red‟ and „Blue‟. The participant was instructed to 
guess whether a yellow token was hidden under a red box or a blue box. In the 
gambling stages, participants started with a number of points which was displayed on 
the screen. They were to select a proportion of these points (5%, 25%, 50%, 75% or 
95%), displayed in either rising or falling order, to gamble on their confidence in the 
location of the yellow token. A stake box on the screen displayed the current amount 
of the bet. The task was made up of five stages, with instructions provided at the start 
of each stage. The first stage was a decision stage only, in which the participant chose 
whether a token was hidden under a red box or a blue box by touching the appropriate 
box at the bottom of the screen. The second stage was a training stage for gambling, 
with either ascending or descending stakes (depending on the test mode), in which the 
participant first chose whether the token was hidden under a red box or a blue box by 
touching the appropriate box at the bottom of the screen, and then selecting the 
amount they wished to bet by touching the stake box on the screen at the appropriate 
time as the bets were displayed in either ascending or descending order. If the screen 
was not touched to choose a stake, the final value displayed in the stake box was used. 
The third stage was the test stage for gambling, in which the participant‟s 
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performance was assessed. The fourth stage was a further training stage for gambling, 
however in this stage, the stakes were offered in the reversed order to the second and 
third stages (i.e. either ascending or descending). The final stage was the final 
gambling stage with the stakes offered in the same direction as the fourth stage. The 
participant‟s performance was assessed. The order of the ascending and descending 
presentations was counterbalanced. 
 
7.7  Results 
7.7.1  Stop Signal Task 
 The Stop Signal Task has five outcome measures: (1) Direction Errors 
measures each trial in which the participant pressed the wrong button (the left button 
when the right arrow was shown on the screen, or vice versa); (2) Proportion of 
Successful Stops measures the number of times the participant stopped successfully, 
divided by the total number of stop signals; (3) Reaction Time on „Go‟ Trials; (4) 
SSD refers to the delay at which the participant was able to stop 50% of the time. It is 
calculated as the arithmetic mean of the measured SSD, or failed-stop reaction time if 
applicable, from completed assessment stop trials; (5) Stop Signal Reaction Time 
(SSRT) is an estimate of the length of time between the go stimulus and the stop 
stimulus at which the participant is able to successfully inhibit their response on 50% 
of the trials. This measure is calculated from two other SST measures – the reaction 
time on „Go‟ trials and the SSD (50%) measure.  
Mean scores were analysed using separate one-way ANOVAs. The results of 
the analysis yielded no significant differences between the three participant groups for 
direction errors, F(2, 86) = 0.278, MSE = 20.62, p = .758, 2 = .007, proportion of 
successful stops, F(2, 86) = 0.831, MSE = .007, p = .439, 2 = .019, mean correct 
reaction time, F(2, 86) = 0.394, MSE = 2367.03, p = .676, 2 = .009, SSD, F(2, 86) = 
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1.48, MSE = 25010.07, p = .233, 2 = .034, or SSRT, F(2, 86) = 1.78, MSE = 
13331.41, p = .758, 2 = .041. See Table 7.1 for means and standard deviations. 
 
Table 7.1 
Means (and standard deviations) for the Stop Signal Task for the three participant 
groups 
  
Impulsive-
Aggressive 
Premeditated-
Aggressive 
Control Total 
     
Direction Errors 6.86 (8.54) 8.27 (11.19) 5.27 (6.19) 6.16 (8.53) 
Proportion of 
Successful Stops 
0.44 (0.11) 0.47 (0.07) 0.47 (0.08) 0.46 (0.09) 
Mean Correct 
RT 
387.52 
(66.71) 
399.36 
(75.43) 
404.11 
(89.92) 
396.24 
(77.01) 
SSD 
140.66 
(136.62) 
188.14 
(122.05) 
190.55 
(127.38) 
169.87 
(130.65) 
SSRT 
222.49 
(96.66) 
191.59 
(81.03) 
184.10 
(77.77) 
201.44 
(87.45) 
          
 
 
7.7.2  Intra/Extra Dimensional Set Shift task 
 The nine outcome measures for the ID/ED are divided into two groups; errors 
and numbers of trials and stages completed.  
 Errors: (1) Pre-ED Errors are the number of errors made prior to the extra-
dimensional shift of the task. Errors are defined as instances when the participant fails 
to select the stimulus that is compatible with the current rule; (2) ED Shift Errors are 
those errors made in the ED stage of the task as they have been committed at the stage 
where the participant is required to make an ED shift. Errors committed at the reversal 
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stage following the ED shift stage are not included; (3) Total Errors is a measure of 
the participant‟s efficiency in attempting the test. Thus, whilst a participant may pass 
all nine stages, a substantial number of errors may be made while doing to. It is 
important to note that participants failing at any stage of the test have had less 
opportunity to make errors. The Total Errors (adjusted) measure attempts to 
compensate for this: (4) Total Errors (adjusted) is a measure of the participant‟s 
efficiency in attempting the test. The adjusted score is calculated by adding 25 for 
each stage not attempted due to failure. This value of 25 is used since most 
participants must complete 50 trials to fail a stage and half of these could be correct 
by chance alone; (5) Completed Stage Errors is the number of errors made on stages 
successfully completed.  
Number of Trials and Stages Completed: (1) Stages Completed is the total 
number of stages the participant completed successfully; (2) Total Trials is the 
number of trials completed on all attempted stages. Subjects failing at any stage of the 
task have had less opportunity to complete trials – the Total Trials (adjusted) measure 
attempts to compensate for this; (3) Total Trials (adjusted) is the number of trials 
completed on all attempted stages with an adjustment for any stages not reached. The 
adjustment adds 50 for each stage no attempted due to failure at an earlier stage; (4) 
Completed Stage Trials is the number of trials undertaken on all successfully 
completed stages. 
Mean scores for the nine outcome measures were analysed with separate 
univariate ANOVAs (see Table 7.2 for means and standard deviations). The results of 
the analysis yielded non-significant differences between the three participant groups 
on all outcome measures (p>.05). See Table 7.3 for results of ANOVA.  
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Table 7.2 
Means (and standard deviations) on the Intra-Extra Dimensional Set Shift Task for 
the three participant groups 
  
Impulsive-
Aggressive 
Premeditated-
Aggressive 
Control Total 
     
Completed 
Stage Errors 
11.57 (7.28) 9.59 (3.26) 10.93 (5.50) 10.85 (5.86) 
Completed 
Stage Trials 
70.51 (16.09) 67.55 (8.06) 69.73 (14.73) 69.49 (13.88) 
ED Shift 
Errors 
6.66 (8.43) 6.50 (8.33) 4.30 (5.65) 5.81 (7.55) 
Pre-ED Errors 6.14 (2.02) 6.14 (2.38) 6.70 (4.19) 6.33 (2.99) 
Stages 
Completed 
8.71 (0.67) 8.64 (0.79) 8.70 (1.32) 8.69 (0.96) 
Total Errors 17.89 (13.99) 13.81 (8.42) 12.57 (7.30) 15.02 (1089) 
Total Errors 
(adjusted) 
19.03 (16.34) 18.36 (17.95) 18.40 (31.24) 18.64 (22.66) 
Total Trials 79.09 (18.57) 76.64 (15.78) 73.07 (13.02) 76.39 (16.16) 
Total Trials 
(adjusted) 
84.80 (28.92) 85.73 (34.82) 84.73 (56.20) 85.01 (41.13) 
          
 
 
7.7.3  Cambridge Gambling Task 
The Cambridge Gambling Task has six outcome measures: (1) Quality of 
Decision-Making is the proportion of trials on which the participant chose to gamble 
on the more likely outcome; (2) Deliberation Time is measured from the presentation 
of the coloured boxes to the participant‟s choice of colour; (3) Risk Taking reports the 
mean proportion of the current points total that the participant chose to risk on gamble 
test trials for which they had chosen the more likely outcome (i.e., trials on which  
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Table 7.3 
Results of univariate ANOVAs for the Intra/Extra Dimensional Set Shift task  
Variable df F MSE p 2 
      
Errors      
     Pre-ED Errors 2, 86 0.34 3.08 .714 .008 
     EDS Errors 2, 86 0.91 52.00 .406 .021 
     Total Errors 2, 86 2.17 249.89 .121 .049 
     Total Errors (adjusted) 2, 86 0.01 4.35 .992 .000 
     Completed Stage Errors 2, 86 0.77 26.65 .465 .018 
Number of Trials and 
Stages Completed 
     
     Stages Completed 2, 86 .05 0.04 .955 .001 
     Total Trials 2, 86 1.13 293.51 .329 .026 
     Total Trials (adjusted) 2, 86 0.004 7.58 .996 .000 
     Completed Stage Trials 2, 86 .31 60.84 .734 .007 
          
 
 
they had more chance of winning than losing); (4) Risk Adjustment reflects the 
tendency of participants to bet a higher proportion of their points on trials when the 
large majority of boxes are the colour chosen than when a smaller majority of the 
boxes are of the colour chosen; (5) Delay Aversion measures the tendency for 
participants who are unable or unwilling to wait to bet larger amounts when the 
possible bet amounts are presented in descending order than they do when the 
amounts are presented in ascending order. It is calculated by subtracting the Risk 
Taking measure, calculated for ascending gamble trials, from the Risk Taking 
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measure, calculated for descending trials; (6) Overall Proportion Bet reports the 
average proportion of the current points total that the participant chose to risk on each 
gamble test trial, including trials on which they bet on the less likely outcome, and 
trials on which both outcomes were equally likely.  
Mean scores for each of the six outcome measures were analysed using 
separate univariate ANOVAs (see Table 7.4 for means and standard deviations). The 
results of the analyses yielded a non-significant effect of group for all outcome 
measures (ps.>.05) with the exception of Risk Adjustment (descending order). Post 
hoc Tukey‟s indicated that in comparison to the premeditated-aggressive group, the 
control group bet a higher proportion of their points on trials when the large majority 
of boxes were the colour chosen, than when a smaller majority of the boxes were the 
colour chosen (ps.<.05). See Table 7.5 for ANOVA results.  
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Table 7.4 
Means (and standard deviations) on the Cambridge Gambling Task for the three 
participant groups 
  
Impulsive-
Aggressive 
Premeditated-
Aggressive 
Control Total 
     
Quality of 
Decision Making  
    
Total 0.96 (0.08) 0.94 (0.10) 0.97 (0.07) 0.96 (0.08) 
Ascending 0.96 (0.08) 0.94 (0.12) 0.96 (0.08) 0.95 (0.09) 
Descending 0.96 (0.10) 0.95 (0.11) 0.98 (0.07) 0.96 (0.09) 
Deliberation Time      
Total 
1441.29 
(328.86) 
1453.49 
(490.81) 
1648.02 
(451.77) 
1515.66 
(423.97) 
Ascending 
1458.21 
(452.52) 
1468.93 
(610.95) 
1701.89 
(494.93) 
1544.95 
(517.53) 
Descending 
1421.43 
(408.74) 
1454.14 
(476.30) 
1559.97 
(618.33) 
1477.47 
(504.15) 
Risk Taking      
Total 0.57 (0.14) 0.53 (0.16) 0.56 (0.11) 0.56 (0.14) 
Ascending 0.42 (0.19) 0.41 (0.16) 0.43 (0.13) 0.42 (0.16) 
Descending 0.73 (0.15) 0.71 (0.20) 0.70 (0.14) 0.71 (0.16) 
Risk Adjustment      
Total 1.14 (0.79) 1.48 (0.94) 1.65 (1.02) 1.40 (0.93) 
Ascending 1.89 (0.83) 2.25 (1.12) 1.98 (1.12) 2.01 (1.01) 
Descending 0.85 (0.89) 1.18 (0.92) 1.49 (1.06) 1.15 (0.99) 
Delay Aversion 0.31 (0.22) 0.31 (0.22) 0.27 (0.15) 0.30 (0.20) 
Overall 
Proportion Bet  
    
Total 0.54 (0.12) 0.51 (0.14) 0.52 (0.11) 0.53 (0.12) 
Ascending 0.38 (0.17) 0.36 (0.15) 0.39 (0.12) 0.38 (0.15) 
Descending 0.70 (0.16) 0.67 (0.20) 0.66 (0.15) 0.68 (0.16) 
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Table 7.5 
Results of univariate ANOVAs for the Cambridge Gambling Task  
Variable df F MSE p 2 
      
Quality of Decision 
Making 
     
Total 2, 86 0.63 0.005 0.534 .015 
Ascending 2, 86 0.69 0.006 0.503 .016 
Descending 2, 86 0.61 0.005 0.545 .014 
Deliberation Time       
Total 2, 86 2.31 402109.86 0.106 .052 
Ascending 2, 86 2.17 564685.48 0.121 .049 
Descending 2, 86 0.64 163026.79 0.532 .015 
Risk Taking       
Total 2, 86 0.64 0.012 0.53 .015 
Ascending 2, 86 0.11 0.003 0.894 .003 
Descending 2, 86 .042 0.013 0.626 .011 
Risk Adjustment       
Total 2, 86 2.59 2.15 0.081 .058 
Ascending 2, 86 0.87 0.89 0.422 .020 
Descending 2, 86 3.60 3.32 0.032* .079 
Delay Aversion 2, 86 0.45 0.02 0.642 .010 
Overall Proportion Bet       
Total 2, 86 0.31 0.004 0.737 .007 
Ascending 2, 86 0.30 0.007 0.739 .007 
Descending 2, 86 0.74 0.02 0.482 .017 
          
 
 
7.8  Discussion 
 In this study, subtests from the CANTAB neuropsychological battery were 
used to investigate possible inhibition, response reversal and decision-making 
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dysfunction in impulsive- and premeditated-aggressive individuals. Although this is 
the first report on the use of this battery with an aggressive sample, the findings can 
be compared with a number of other studies using CANTAB to assess 
neuropsychological function in a variety of disorders including APD (Dolan & Park, 
2002), brain injury (Owen et al., 1991; 1993), schizophrenia (Elliott, McKenna, 
Robbins & Sahakian, 1995; Pantelis et al., 1997), depression (Elliott et al., 1996; 
Sweeney, Kmiec & Kupfer, 2000) and ADHD (Kempton et al., 1999). Contrary to 
prediction, there were no significant differences in performance between the 
impulsive-aggressive, premeditated-aggressive or controls on tests of inhibition, 
response reversal, or decision-making, all of which to a greater or lesser extent 
depend on the functional integrity of the orbitofrontal cortex. 
 
7.8.1  Stop Signal Task 
On the Stop Signal Task, it was anticipated that impulsive-aggressive 
individuals would exhibit performance deficits (e.g., shorter response times and 
higher number of errors) than the premeditated-aggressive and control groups. This 
hypothesis was based on previous findings suggesting a relationship between the 
propensity for impulsive-aggression and executive and inhibition deficits. The results 
from the Stop Signal Task do not support this hypothesis, finding no differences 
between the three participant groups on this measure.  
Several studies have demonstrated that performance deficits on the Stop 
Signal Task are associated with medial and inferior frontal lobe functioning (see Aron 
et al., 2007b; Chambers et al., 2009; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008 for reviews). This 
suggests that the inhibitory deficits mediated by such regions of the prefrontal cortex 
are not responsible for the display of impulsive-aggression in a subclinical population. 
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In contrast however, Dolan and Park (2002) found that APD subjects had significantly 
greater difficulty in inhibiting a prepotent response than controls on the similar 
Go/No-Go task. Such discrepant findings suggest distinct neural mechanisms 
underlying specifically characteristic aggression in comparison to antisocial behaviour 
more broadly. 
 The lack of significant group differences on this measure may be relative to 
the fact that aggression contains a social component and the Stop Signal Task does 
not. There is evidence to suggest that prefrontal cortex is involved in the processing of 
both motivational and emotional stimuli and moreover that prefrontal lesions may 
lead to disruptions in social behaviour (Anderson et al., 1999; Damasio, 1995). Such 
disruption may occur, however, only in situations of heightened arousal such as 
hostile social interactions. In this way, the increased levels of frustration and anger 
impede on adequate social-information processing leading to a retaliatory response. 
This is in stark contrast to the environment in which the Stop Signal Task was 
performed when participants were not experiencing anger and could successfully 
attend to the task at hand. 
 Thus, although this study found no evidence of an inhibitory deficit in the 
impulsive-aggressive group, this result may be specific to non-social situations. 
Aggression is a primal social response option for social situations. This may become 
the chosen reaction in an interpersonal interaction when the individual is faced with 
complex contextual cues. As Robbins (1998) described, executive function involves 
the ability to formulate new plans of action, to select appropriate responses, and to 
monitor behaviour with respect to one‟s emotional state. It may then be that 
impulsive-aggressive individuals, who have executive functioning deficits, 
demonstrate poor social information processing skills and are unable to cope with 
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overwhelming response options. As a consequence, they fail to access more socially 
appropriate response options and make default aggressive responses in provocative 
situations despite experiencing regret for reacting in this manner. 
The use of ERPs can help to elucidate the relationship between underlying the 
impulsivity personality trait and inhibition. Comparable to the present study, Dimoska 
and Johnstone (2007) found non-significant group differences on the Stop Signal Task 
in non-clinical adults who scored in the top and bottom 15% on the I7 Impulsivity 
Questionnaire (Eysenck et al., 1985). Interestingly, however, the results revealed that 
lateralised readiness potential amplitude on „Stop‟ trials was larger in the High 
impulsivity than Low impulsivity group, indicating greater response side-specific 
motor preparation in the primary motor cortex. An N1/P3 complex was also evoked 
on successful „Stop‟ trials and was enhanced in the High group in comparison to the 
Low group. The successful-stop P3 has previously been implicated as an index of 
inhibition in the primary motor cortex, suggesting enhanced inhibitory processing in 
the High group. These findings indicate that the High impulsivity group was able to 
counteract an impulsive response style on stop-signal trials with enhanced inhibitory 
activation, resulting in comparable overt performance to the Low impulsivity group. 
 In the Stop Signal Task, the P3 has been linked to the response inhibition 
process (Kok, Ramautar, de Ruiter, Band & Ridderinkhof, 2004), with a larger 
successful-stop P3 component in fast compared to slow responders suggesting that the 
component may reflect inhibition activated when an urgent inhibitory responses is 
required (Dimoska, Johnstone & Barry, 2006). A reduced or delayed P3 on inhibition 
trials, indicating an impaired response inhibition process, has been reported in a 
number of clinical populations characterised by impulsivity including children 
(Overtoom et al., 2002) and adults with ADHD (Bekker et al., 2005). As outlined 
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above, however, Dimoska & Johnstone (2007) found that in non-clinical subjects who 
reported high degrees of impulsiveness showed enhanced response inhibition as 
evidenced by a larger N1/P3 complex. These results suggest that non-clinical 
impulsive individuals are able to compensate an impulsive response style on stop-
signal trials with enhanced inhibitory activation, resulting in comparable overt 
performance to those reporting low impulsiveness. The authors argued that such 
findings indicate that a high degree of trait impulsivity in non-clinical adults is not 
due to a deficiency in the response inhibition process.  
 The personality trait impulsivity is typically measured using self-report 
measures. In the laboratory, however, impulsivity has been operationalised as an 
inability to inhibit a behavioural or cognitive response, and is measured through tasks 
such as the Stop Signal Task. To date, however, it remains unclear whether a deficient 
response inhibition mechanism may underlie the personality trait impulsivity in non-
clinical populations. Correlational studies in non-clinical populations have reported 
that higher scores on impulsiveness questionnaires correspond with longer stop signal 
reaction times (Gorlyn, Keilp, Tryon & Mann, 2005), reduced inhibition rates (Keilp, 
Sackeim & Mann, 2005), or general stopping problems (Vigil-Colet & Codorniu-
Raga, 2004). However, a number of studies, including the present investigation, have 
failed to find a reliable relationship between impulsiveness and stop signal reaction 
times. When examining extreme high and low non-clinical impulsivity groups, several 
studies reported no differences between groups (Dimoska & Johnstone, 2007; Lijffijt 
et al., 2004; Rodriguez-Fornells, Lorenzo-Seva & Andres-Pueyo, 2002). Furthermore, 
factor analyses suggest self-report measures of the impulsiveness trait and laboratory 
measures of response inhibition and impulsivity may reflect distinct constructs (Dolan 
& Fullam, 2004; Reynolds, de Wit & Richards, 2002). Thus, although self-reporting 
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high levels of impulsivity, behavioural measures of this trait do not indicate inhibitory 
deficits in the response inhibition process.  
 Inhibition is important in the development of emotional self-regulation, that is, 
those who have deficiencies in inhibition should demonstrate greater emotional 
reactivity to emotionally charged events as well as less capacity to regulate emotional 
states in the action of goal-directed behaviour (Barkley, 1997). Disorders of emotion 
are common in individuals with injury sustained to the prefrontal cortex, which 
suggests that this region is critical not only for inhibition but also for the self-control 
of emotion (Davidson et al., 2000b). Given the findings of the current study, it may be 
suggested that performance on the Stop Signal Task does not reflect inhibitory 
dysfunction present in impulsive-aggressive individuals. While the Stop Signal Task 
is a valid measure of inhibition, it may be the combination of heightened arousal, 
anger, and information processing deficits coupled with an impulsive personality that 
give rise to the display of impulsive-aggression. Inhibitory deficits in isolation, 
however, will not cause impulsive-aggression.  
 
7.8.2  Intra/Extradimensional Set Shift task 
On the ID/ED Set Shift task, there was no significant difference between the 
groups on any of the measures, including the number of trials until the first reversal, 
and the number of trials completed to acquire a positive stimulus. Further, the 
acquisition task was completed successfully by all participants. This indicates that all 
participants understood the task demands, could follow task instructions, and learn 
appropriate stimulus-reinforcement associations. Therefore, in contrast with 
expectations, impulsive-aggressive and premeditated-aggressive individuals do not 
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present with reversal impairments, that is, a failure to change behaviours in response 
to changed reinforcers. 
Patients with lesions to the orbitofrontal cortex have been shown to be 
impaired in forming new stimulus-reward associations when reinforcement 
contingencies are reversed (Berlin et al., 2004). Furthermore, difficulties adapting 
behaviour to changes in reinforcement (i.e., response reversal) have been linked with 
aberrant social behaviour (Rolls, 2004). Blair (2004) argued that the increased rates of 
impulsive-aggression seen in psychopaths may be due to heightened levels of 
frustration resulting from a failure to modify their behaviour appropriately to changes 
in reinforcement in dynamic social environments. Following from this, it was 
proposed that subclinical aggression, either impulsive or premeditated in nature, 
would similarly result from such frustration in interpersonal situations when 
individuals are unable to adjust behaviours. However, the current findings do not 
indicate such impairment in the present population.  
 The lack of significant group differences on ED shifts are in contrast to the 
findings by Dolan and Park (2002) in their sample of APD individuals and Owen et 
al. (1990, 1991) in patients with frontal lobe damage and with neuro-degenerative 
disorders involving frontal circuitry. With regard to Dolan and Park, they found that 
their sample were impaired on the ED shift stage, but not at the ID shift stage of the 
ID/ED Task, taking the result to implicate the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in APD 
through its role in set-shifting ability. In contrast, deficits were not seen on either the 
ID or ED shift stages of the task in both impulsive- and premeditated-aggressive 
individuals in the current study, indicating non-impaired functionality of these 
abilities in this sample. These findings again indicate distinct neuropsychological 
deficits associated with specifically impulsive- and premeditated-aggression and those 
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associated with the broader diagnosis of APD. The increased severity of behaviours 
demonstrated by APD individuals could thus be a result of the further impairment in 
response reversal.  
 In line with this argument, Mitchell et al. (2002) found that psychopathic 
individuals showed a selective response reversal deficit, and similarly, Lapierre et al. 
(1995) suggested impaired response reversal performance in psychopathic adults. 
Indeed, psychopaths present with marked psychopathology, including aggressive 
narcissism and a socially deviant lifestyle (Hare, 1991). In contrast, the present 
sample, while reporting heightened levels of trait aggression, continue to function 
adaptively within the community. 
It can then be suggested that the degree of dysfunction in the orbitofrontal 
circuit will determine the degree of response reversal impairment on tasks such as the 
ID/ED. That is, the impairment evident in the current experimental groups may be 
less that that in clinical populations used in previous studies (e.g., Mitchell et al., 
2002). This difference in the degree of orbitofrontal impairment between these 
samples could significantly impact upon the severity of the aggressive behaviour 
displayed.  
With regard to premeditated-aggression, those presenting with high levels of 
premeditated-aggression may not be impaired in reversing responses in negative 
social interactions as they do not deem aggressive exchanges as a form of punishment. 
Instead, aggression is viewed as a viable way to attain their desired goal, and in this 
way, is viewed as a reward for the current behaviour. In line with this, Mitchell et al. 
(2002) reported that the psychopathic individuals performed similar to comparison 
individuals on the learning component of the ID/ED Task.  
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7.8.3  Cambridge Gambling Task 
The performance of the impulsive- and premeditated-aggressive groups on the 
Cambridge Gambling Task did not differ significantly from that of controls. 
Specifically, all participant groups were able to make appropriate choices related to 
the uncertain outcomes involved in the decision-making task. 
Performance deficits on the gambling task are associated with ventromedial 
dysfunction in humans (Rogers et al., 1999b; Rubinsztein et al., 2001). Following 
prior work in the neuropsychiatric literature, it is assumed that the orbitofrontal cortex 
mediates sensitivity to changing reinforcement contingencies, and thus may be 
particularly important for modulating individuals‟ response in social situations. 
Impaired performance on the Gambling Task may reflect an inability to effectively 
process feedback information regarding reward and punishment, and thus employ 
such cues to guide behaviour. 
This non-impaired performance of the impulsive-aggressive group on the 
Gambling Task finding is in contrast to that of Broomhall (2005) in his investigation 
of neuropsychological deficits in reactive and instrumental violent offenders as well 
as Mitchell et al. (2002) in psychopathic individuals. These samples were less likely 
to avoid making risky selections over the course of the gambling task relative to 
comparison participants. Similarly, Best et al. (2002) reported the performance of 
psychiatric patients with Intermittent Explosive Disorder. They found that such 
individuals continued to pick cards from the disadvantageous decks whereas the 
control subjects learnt to avoid such decks, instead choosing from the advantageous 
decks. However, while their performance was impaired compared to controls, it was 
not as impaired as that of neurological patients in previous studies (Bechara, Damasio, 
Tranel & Damasio, 1997; Bechara et al., 1998; Bechara et al., 1999), indicating that 
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the impairment associated with Intermittent Explosive Disorder may be milder than 
after orbital/medial damage.  
In everyday life, individuals with Intermittent Explosive Disorder continually 
use problem-solving strategies that involve aggression, despite it being socially 
inappropriate and frequently leading to punishment in the form of injury or 
incarceration. In this way, such individuals show an inability to learn from social cues 
provided in the environment. Thus, it may be that the impulsive-aggressive 
individuals in the present study do not have dysfunction within this region of the 
prefrontal cortex, while those presenting with more severe impulsive-aggression do 
have such deficits. This is in conjunction with the orbitofrontal circuit hypothesis 
outlined above. That is, the degree of dysfunction in this cortical circuit determines 
the degree of severity of aggressive behaviours.  
The finding that impulsive-aggressive individuals did not place earlier bets in 
either the ascending or descending conditions of the task compared with controls 
suggests that such individuals are able to withhold impulsive responding. This is in 
contrast to the presumed impairment in withholding responses in order to gain larger 
immediate rewards which characterises impulsive-aggressive responding. Berlin et al. 
(2004) suggested that part of the reason orbitofrontal patients are impulsive may be 
related to a tendency to respond rapidly to rewards and punishers without sufficiently 
assessing the consequences. That is, orbitofrontal patients may act without giving 
themselves enough time to think about their behaviours and to modify them 
accordingly. In contrast, the performance of the impulsive-aggressive individuals on 
the Cambridge Gambling Task does not suggest impulsive responding in experimental 
conditions. Such controlled action however may become impaired when combined 
with heightened levels of anger present in hostile interactions. 
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With regard to premeditated-aggression, while they are able to make decisions 
adequately based on information provided to them in social interactions, they may not 
have experienced punishment following a display of aggression and therefore do not 
perceive the need to modify their behaviour. Evidence from social interaction theory 
(Tedeschi & Felson, 1994) suggests that premeditated-aggression may involve 
decisions on how to achieve goals by making explicit cost-benefit analyses that take 
into account the probabilities of various outcomes. Premeditated-aggressive 
individuals often have explicit beliefs that aggression will be a successful means of 
attaining a particular outcome (Huesmann & Guerra, 1997), or they are inhibited from 
aggression because of explicit representations of the possible costs (Buss, 2005). 
Premeditated-aggression is thus facilitated by explicit attitudes on the appropriateness 
of aggression in certain situations.  
 This suggestion fits with models emphasising the importance of explicit 
processing in aggression. An internal state of anger is produced via an aversive 
experience that results in an automatic appraisal. According to Anderson and 
Bushman (2002), whether these internal states results in aggression is determined, in 
the absence of impulsivity, by the outcome of conscious appraisal and decision 
processes enabled by an effortful control system. 
 
7.8.4  Limitations and directions for future research 
 The CANTAB neuropsychological battery has been extensively validated in 
brain injury and neuroimaging studies (Fray et al., 1997). However, to date, relatively 
little research has been conducted utilising this battery in subclinical populations, and 
more specifically aggressive populations. One study conducted by Robbins et al. 
(1998) investigating executive functioning in normal volunteers found that on the 
ID/ED Set Shift Task, participants under the age of 55 made significantly fewer errors 
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than the older age groups. Given that the mean errors rate on the more difficult 
extradimensional shift reversal stage was approximately two in the younger age 
group, a possible ceiling effect in younger adults on this task may be suggested. 
Further research is thus required to determine its sensitivity in this population before 
more definite theories can be postulated regarding the relationship between 
subclinical aggression and performance on measures of orbitofrontal functioning as 
purported to be measured by the tasks used in the current study.  
To more finely assess the extent to which aggression is related to difficulties 
inhibiting such responses, adaptation of currently existing cognitive measures of 
inhibition and impulsivity such as those utilised in the current study should be adapted 
to use socially relevant stimuli such as facial expressions of affect. Furthermore, 
neuroimaging techniques such as fMRI and ERPs could be used with subclinical 
aggressive individuals to assess abnormal activation in regions of the prefrontal 
cortex, abnormalities which may not be detected in neuropsychological tests. 
 
7.8.5  Conclusion 
These data indicate that both impulsive- and premeditated-aggressive 
individuals do not exhibit impairments on tests of inhibition, response reversal, or 
decision-making, shown to be mediated by orbitofrontal/ventromedial regions of the 
prefrontal cortex. While APD individuals and psychopaths have been shown to have 
deficits on such measures, the lack of significant findings in this study suggests 
distinct neural mechanisms underlying aggression specifically and antisocial 
behaviour more broadly. Indeed, psychopathological disorders such as APD and 
psychopathy may or may not involve an aggressive component. It may thus be 
suggested that the additional ventromedial deficits in inhibition, response reversal, 
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and decision-making may contribute to the display of more severe antisocial 
behaviours as those seen in APD and psychopathy. 
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Chapter 8 
General Discussion 
 
The central aim of the present thesis was to clarify the role of the prefrontal cortex in 
impulsive- and premeditated-aggression. More specifically, it sought to investigate 
the separable roles of the dorsolateral and orbitofrontal regions of the prefrontal 
cortex and how they may mediate the expression of these subtypes of aggressive 
behaviour.  
 The first study explored possible executive functioning impairment, pertaining 
to dorsolateral prefrontal function, in this population. Study 2 examined emotion 
recognition and the attribution of aggression in emotional face expressions, abilities of 
which are attributed to orbitofrontal functioning. Lastly, an investigation into 
additional orbitofrontal functions was conducted; namely inhibition, response reversal 
and decision-making capacities. 
 
8.1  Overview of findings 
8.1.1  Executive functioning 
The first study assessed performance of impulsive-aggressive, premeditated-
aggressive and control participants on a range of executive functioning tasks, 
including measures of cognitive flexibility, planning, problem-solving, verbal fluency, 
and inhibition. All measures were purported measures of dorsolateral prefrontal 
functioning. In line with hypotheses, the impulsive-aggressive individuals 
demonstrated impairment on all aforementioned measures. 
The results from Study 1 were congruent with and built on past research 
demonstrating a link between executive deficits and the propensity for a reactive, 
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impulsive subtype of aggressive responding (e.g., Stanford et al., 1997). However, 
while previous research on impulsive-aggression has reported prefrontal deficits more 
broadly, these findings implicate the dorsolateral region more specifically in 
mediating this aggressive subtype. In contrast, no impairment was found in the 
premeditated-aggressive group. This finding was expected given the controlled and 
purposeful action which characterises such individuals‟ aggressive display. Taken 
together, these results suggest distinct roles of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in the 
expression of impulsive- and premeditated-aggression.  
 Executive dysfunction, through impairment in the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex, may contribute to a propensity for impulsive-aggression in a number of ways. 
Aggression is a primal social response option and provides a response option in social 
environments in which individuals are faced with multiple complex cues. As Hoaken 
et al. (2003) suggested, it may be that individuals with poor executive functioning 
who social information processing deficits are unable to cope with competing 
response options in interpersonal interactions. In this way, they fail to access more 
socially appropriate responses and consequently react aggressively in provocative 
situations.  
 Fuster (1997) proposed that the prefrontal cortex is essential in tasks that 
require the temporal integration of information. If an individual is overwhelmed by 
information in the social environment, such processes may not work adequately. This 
can subsequently lead to behaviour which is not appropriate for the situation. Thus, 
prefrontal function may lead to impaired regulation of social behaviour through an 
interruption in the synthesis of external and internal cues underlying the regulation of 
complex social behaviour. Behaviour consequently becomes governed more by 
impulsivity, the current focus of attention, or salient social cues, rather than by social 
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rules or plans. In this way, aggression would be more likely to be the response in 
those situations where the salient cues are provocation or hostility in others (Lau et 
al., 1995).  
 This suggestion is in parallel to Kane and Engle‟s (2002) position on executive 
functioning. They propose that a primary function of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
is to maintain representations in memory when faced with interference. Such 
representations may reflect the individual‟s plans, goals, or task-relevant stimuli in the 
environment. According to Kane and Engle, failures to maintain such goal states 
result in incorrect information and response tendencies being retrieved. In the case of 
aggressive responding, impulsive-aggressive individual‟s executive deficit may cause 
an inability to follow preconceived plans and goals, resulting in a tendency to rely on 
reflexive aggressive responding. The probability of such interference occurring 
increases significantly in social interactions in which there are multiple stimuli 
requiring response coupled with heightened anger and frustration. 
 Antisocial traits as outcome behaviours can be arrived at by a variety of 
pathways. Morgan and Lilienfeld (2000) suggest that some aetiologies of antisocial 
behaviour are related to impaired executive functioning, while APD is not. However, 
their finding that executive skill deficits are associated with such heterogeneous 
classifications as „criminality‟ or „delinquency‟ does not explain which aetiologies of 
antisocial behaviour are linked with these cognitive deficits. The current study 
attempted to clarify this matter. The finding of significant differences between 
impulsive- and premeditated-aggressive individuals supports the idea that executive 
dysfunction is differentially present in antisocial individuals depending on the 
aetiology of those antisocial traits and behaviours. Further research with other 
narrowly defined antisocial groups is needed to more fully map these differences. 
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8.1.2  Emotion recognition and aggression attribution 
Study 2 explored the interpretation of emotional facial expressions and 
possible hostile attributional biases in impulsive- and premeditated-aggressive 
individuals. Contrary to hypotheses, while the impulsive-aggressive group were not 
impaired on either measure, the premeditated-aggressive group attributed greater 
levels of aggression to neutral expressions, suggesting a tendency to a hostile 
attribution bias within this population.  
Of interest is the relationship between the ability to accurately interpret facial 
expressions and success on measures of executive function. There is evidence, 
especially within the schizophrenia research literature, to suggest that executive 
cognitive capacities and emotional processing may be related (e.g., Kee, Kern & 
Green, 1998; Kohler, Bilker, Hagendoorn, Gur & Gur, 2000). Whether these 
associations between emotion recognition and executive functioning are an exclusive 
hallmark of schizophrenia is unclear, however it is possible that these deficiencies 
exist in others, and may play a role in other types of poorly regulated behaviour. 
Hoaken et al. (2007) tested this hypothesis, finding that violent offenders performed 
significantly poorer on measures of executive function and facial affect recognition 
than non-violent offenders and controls. This relationship was not found in the current 
study, finding distinct cognitive processes between individuals who are 
characteristically impulsive-aggressive and those who are characteristically 
premeditated-aggressive. Thus, while the present sample display dysregulated 
behaviour, a combination of executive and emotion recognition deficits do not 
contribute to the presentation of these behaviours. Rather, such cognitive processes 
represent individual and separate deficits in mediating the propensity for aggressive 
behaviour in the identified aggressive population. 
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8.1.3  Inhibition, response reversal, and decision-making 
Study 3 investigated whether impulsive- or premeditated-aggressive 
individuals present with inhibition, response reversal, and/or decision-making 
dysfunction. The hypotheses that the impulsive-aggressive group would demonstrate 
deficits on measures of inhibition and decision-making were not supported. Similarly, 
contrary to hypotheses, neither impulsive-aggressive nor premeditated-aggressive 
groups were impaired on a measure of response reversal.  
Previous research has demonstrated inhibition, response reversal, and 
decision-making deficits in individuals with APD (e.g., Dinn & Harris, 2000). Such 
impairments have also been found in individuals with lesions to the orbitofrontal 
cortex who present with disinhibition, impulsivity, irritability, and antisocial 
behaviour (Cummings, 1995). Similarly, psychopaths, who present with marked 
premeditated aggression, have been found to have response reversal deficits 
pertaining to the orbitofrontal cortex (Mitchell et al., 2002).  
Dinn and Harris (2000) suggested that such impairment may reflect an 
inability to effectively process feedback information regarding reward and 
punishment (i.e., the inability to successfully employ punishment cues to guide 
behaviour), an ability mediated by the orbitofrontal cortex (Rolls, 2002). It may then 
be that individuals who do not meet the criteria for APD (e.g., subclinical 
populations) do not have impairment in this ability and thus do not engage in such 
criminal behaviour. Such individuals are able to effectively process feedback 
information regarding reward and punishment and thus employ such cues to guide 
behaviour. In this way, while they have some similar characteristics, aggressive 
individuals such as those identified in the current study do not engage in behaviour as 
severe as to meet criteria for APD.  
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Thus, although the findings outlined above have been taken to suggest a 
relationship between orbitofrontal impairment and aggressive behaviour, the analysis 
of a more explicitly defined aggressive population does not support this relationship. 
These results suggest that it may be the cumulative impact of impairment in both the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and orbitofrontal cortex which modulates the expression 
of clinically significant antisocial behaviour. In contrast, individuals who present with 
subclinical levels of aggression have impairment solely in the dorsolateral region of 
the prefrontal cortex. 
 
8.2  Theoretical implications 
 The results suggest that differences in prefrontal functioning between 
impulsive- and premeditated-aggressive individuals might contribute to the variability 
in aggressive responding between the groups. Evidence from animal and human 
studies suggests that multiple brain systems exert control over aggressive behaviour, 
and the type of aggression that occurs may depend on the brain system that is 
damaged (Weiger & Bear, 1988). The current research provides further evidence for 
this hypothesis. 
Impulsive-aggressive individuals and patients with orbitofrontal lesions appear 
to share similar locus of neuroanatomical disruption, but the extent and nature of the 
pathology is presumably quite different. While it was hypothesised that impulsive-
aggressive individuals would present with impairment on measures of orbitofrontal 
functioning, this was not found. Rather, impulsive-aggressive individuals showed 
deficits on several putative dorsolateral prefrontal cortex markers, compared with 
premeditated-aggressive individuals and controls. It thus appears that impulsive-
aggression as identified in the present study is mediated by different regions in 
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comparison to clinically significant levels of aggression. Thus, one possible 
explanation for the differences is that impulsive-aggressive individuals have a milder 
form of brain dysfunction.  
These results, in concert, allow for some tentative theorising on the cognitive 
and social-perceptual concomitants of impulsive- and premeditated-aggression. It may 
be that impulsive-aggressive individuals, through executive function impairments, 
lack the cognitive flexibility to alter their behaviour and the ability to access and 
utilise more adaptive response options. In contrast, those individuals characterised by 
high levels of premeditated-aggression are more likely to inaccurately interpret subtle 
social cues. That is, in ambiguous social interactions, premeditated-aggressive 
individuals are more likely to attribute greater levels of hostility in others. This way of 
interpreting social cues may increase hostility and negative arousal, which may result 
in a heightened aggressive response towards a situation that was initially non-
threatening. By engaging in an aggressive response, the premeditated-aggressive 
individual could create a potentially aggressive interaction. In line with social learning 
theories, if such aggressive responding leads to goal attainment, such individuals learn 
that aggressive responding is a viable means of achieving one‟s objective. 
The neuropsychological evidence provided by the present study, in the context 
of previous findings, provides strong support for the functional specialisation of the 
prefrontal cortex. Indeed, it suggests specialisation of the prefrontal cortex for 
separable systems of social cognition. One system, mediated by the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex, allows the successful execution of executive functions. The second 
system, incorporating the orbitofrontal cortex, responds to facial expressions of 
emotion and the expectation of others‟ anger. While such hypotheses are tentative, it 
does call for further research to investigate the complex relationships between 
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executive functioning, arousal, and social perception and the propensity for aggressive 
behaviour. 
 
8.2.1  Inhibition 
The two measures of inhibition, the Stroop and Stop Signal tasks seem to draw 
into question the predominant disinhibition explanation of the executive functioning-
aggression relationship. On the Stroop task, it was expected that the impulsive-
aggressive group would make more errors on the interference condition, indicating an 
inability to inhibit responding. This hypothesis was partially supported, with the 
impulsive-aggressive group making more errors than the control group, but not 
differing significantly from the premeditated-aggressive group. On the second 
measure of inhibition, the Stop Signal Task, impulsive-aggressive individuals were 
expected to make more errors and have shorter response times than premeditated-
aggressive individuals and controls. However, no significant group differences were 
found. Furthermore, while participants in the impulsive-aggressive group failed to 
inhibit responses on the Stroop task, the reaction-time data for these participants are 
contrary to the expectancy that rapid action, and an absence of adequate forethought, 
characterises impulsive-aggression. These two putative measures of impulsivity thus 
seem to lend contradictory support for the inhibition hypothesis.  
Given the lack of definitional agreement in the clinical literature regarding 
impulsivity, investigating the link between aggression and impulsivity is complex 
(Parker, Bagby & Webster, 1993). There exist numerous self-report measures of 
impulsivity, all of which conceptualise impulsivity slightly differently (see Parker & 
Bagby, 1997 for review). Furthermore, correlational research has identified 
inconsistent relationships between them (Luengo, Carrillo-de-la-Pena & Otero, 1991). 
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There are also several behavioural measures of impulsivity which do not correlate 
(Gorlyn et al., 2005). These behavioural measures are based on the theories that 
impulsive individuals have a tendency to make quick decisions and act without 
thinking, and that they tend to overestimate the amount of time that has passed. Of 
importance to the current study is that correlational studies have found no relationship 
between self-report and behavioural measures of impulsivity (Dolan & Fullam, 2004; 
Helmers, Young & Pihl, 1995; Malle & Neubauer, 1991). In this way, the findings in 
the present study may simply represent a definitional discrepancy in the impulsivity 
construct. That is, although demonstrating impulsive-aggressive behaviour, this 
inhibition deficit may be context-specific. That is, in situations of heightened arousal 
and complex social stimuli, impulsive-aggressive individuals are unable to inhibit 
such responding. In contrast, in experimental situations in which the individual is not 
experiencing anger they are able to inhibit responding. 
 The research question then becomes whether cognitive dysfunction becomes 
prominent in the presence of heightened emotion, at least in subjects with high levels 
of impulsive-aggression. It is known that stress (e.g., emotional distress) correlates 
with lower performance in cognitive tasks (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Yee & Vaughan, 
1996). Thus, it may be that in states of high emotional reactivity, limited mental 
resources might trigger cognitive impairment. Therefore, future studies should not 
examine cognitive processes as if they were independent of emotional states.  
In line with this theory, evidence suggests that the relation between difficulties 
with frontal lobe functioning and aggressive behaviour may be contingent on the 
presence of inhibition cues (Giancola, 2000). As Lau et al. (1995) proposed, 
difficulties on measures of executive functioning should not necessarily contribute to 
increased levels of aggression unless individuals are in situations in which “the salient 
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cue is provocation and where peripheral or less contingent cues that inhibit aggression 
are lessened” (p. 150). As suggested above, this argument implies that the effect of 
executive functioning difficulties on aggression is context dependent. In such contexts 
there must be cues that generally inhibit aggression which are ignored by impulsive-
aggressive individuals. In contrast, those who do not have executive deficits are able 
to process social cues adequately and thus respond in a more socially appropriate 
manner. 
 
8.2.2  Premeditated-aggression 
 The premeditated-aggressive individuals did not demonstrate impairment on 
measures of dorsolateral functioning compared to controls. This is consistent with the 
view that such individuals have relatively intact ability to plan and regulate their 
aggressive behaviour in order to achieve desired goals. Premeditated-aggressive 
individuals did however attribute greater levels of hostility to neutral faces of emotion 
than did the impulsive-aggressive and control groups. This would lead to a greater 
experience of negative affect from others and may contribute to the greater incidence 
of aggressive responding toward others. 
However, while a hostile attribution bias may contribute to the likelihood of 
premeditated-aggression, it is unlikely that this represents the only cognitive mediator 
in increasing the susceptibility to display such aggressive behaviour. Premeditated-
aggression can be considered as instrumental, and a form of controlled behaviour. 
Goal directed behaviours are performed in expectation of receiving the desired reward 
and if they are not punished. Moral socialisation enables an individual to learn that 
aggressive behaviour is not the ethical manner in which to obtain his/her desired goal. 
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In this way, it may be presumed that socialisation has not been achieved in those 
displaying high levels of premeditated-aggression (Blair, 2007). 
 As Blair (2007) outlined, there are two capacities necessary for successful 
socialisation. Firstly, the individual must find the distress of others aversive. Such 
distress may be manifested in expressions of fear and sadness which serve as social 
reinforcers (Blair, 2003b). Secondly, the individual must be capable of performing 
stimulus-reinforcement learning. Psychopaths show impairment in both of these 
capacities (Blair, 2003a; Budhani et al., 2006), and it is thus proposed that 
psychopaths do not learn to avoid using aggression to achieve their goals. This is due 
to a relative lack of concern to the victim‟s distress (i.e., punishment) and impairment 
in learning the association between this punishment and the representation of the 
action that caused the distress.  
 The ability to respond to distress cues and to achieve stimulus-reinforcement 
learning are both related to the functioning of the amygdala. Neuroimaging research 
demonstrates that while the amygdala may respond to expressions generally, it is most 
responsive to fearful expressions (Adolphs, 2002b). Similarly, neuroimaging research 
has also implicated the amygdala in stimulus-reinforcement learning in both aversive 
conditioning and passive avoidance learning (Kosson et al., 2006; LaBar, Gatenby, 
Gore, LeDoux & Phelps, 1998). These data have prompted the suggestion that 
psychopathy relates to dysfunction in the amydala‟s role in expression processing and 
stimulus-reinforcement learning (Blair, 2003a; Blair, Peschardt, Budhani, Mitchell & 
Pine, 2006) 
While psychopaths show impairment in both of these capacities, the 
premeditated-aggressive individuals in the current study have not. The level of 
premeditated-aggression identified in the present study thus appears to be the result of 
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behavioural choices; the individual had other behaviours available to meet his or her 
goals or could have chosen different goals. It is suggested that premeditated-
aggressive individuals choose these behaviours not because of deficient decision-
making; but because the behaviour is believed to meet their identified goal.  
 
8.3  Clinical Implications 
Given the putative underlying mechanisms of impulsive- and premeditated-
aggression, there are some potential implications for intervention. Clients with 
aggressive traits often have significant and chronic problems with poor anger control, 
lack of empathy and/or remorse, irresponsibility, and impulsivity, all of which can 
impede successful treatment. The current findings indicate that individuals whose 
aggressive behaviour is predominantly premeditated in nature do not have difficulties 
with executive behaviours that require planning, problem-solving, purposeful action, 
and abstract reasoning in comparison to those whose aggressive behaviour is 
impulsive in nature. Thus, it would seem more valid for clinicians to conceptualise the 
client‟s behaviour as either predominantly impulsive or predominantly premeditated 
in nature in order to determine the appropriate treatment program. In turn, this may 
help clinicians channel their therapeutic efforts to these potentially more malleable 
domains in order to effect behavioural change.  
The current results suggest an association between executive dysfunction and 
impulsive-aggression. Programs that would be most effective with such a population 
should thus aim to improve or restore cognitive ability. Such programs should 
encompass cognitive training in executive functions such as problem-solving, 
planning, selective attention, abstract reasoning, judgement, inhibition, learning from 
 227 
experience and cognitive self-monitoring of behaviour during goal-directed activities 
(Paschall & Fishbein, 2002). 
Deficits in cognitive flexibility could contribute to the expression of 
impulsive-aggression through an inability to effectively find an alternative solution to 
a confrontational situation. If cognitive flexibility is correlated with poor problem-
solving and deficiencies in generating alternative non-aggressive responses, 
enhancing the ability to think flexibly should lead to a decrease in aggressive 
responses. For example, Ross, Fabiano and Ewles (1988) found that engaging 
offenders in alternative ways of thinking about problems or to improve their creativity 
in problem-solving was the most useful in rehabilitation. Further to this, Slaby and 
Guerra (1990) also found that by encouraging the discovery of alternative responses, 
aggressive responses could be reduced. 
Techniques for inhibiting inappropriate behaviours could utilise associations 
between cues and consequences, which serve to slow down or stop the behaviour. The 
emphasis should be on drawing the individual‟s attention to the behaviour and to its 
consequences, and in this way the individual becomes aware of their behaviour at 
specific points in time and can make the identified adjustments. Such adjustments can 
then be either rewarded or punished in order to highlight the consequences of the 
behaviour (Paschall & Fishbein, 2002). 
Research has demonstrated that it also possible to employ the same tools used 
to assess executive cognitive skills (i.e., neuropsychological tests) to strengthen such 
these abilities (see Giancola, 2000 for review). Repeat performances of these 
instruments appear to improve executive abilities by teaching techniques to delay 
gratification, inhibit prepotent responses, shift strategies to produce more 
advantageous consequences, and reinforce mood regulation and behavioural controls. 
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Computerised versions of these assessment instruments are also able to be 
programmed with a hierarchy of different levels so that as executive cognitive 
capacity increases, the individual could attempt more demanding versions. One 
particular example of the success of cognitive rehabilitation techniques come from 
New South Wales where individuals with aggressive, disinhibited, and socially 
inappropriate behaviours were treated. Using tokens to reward self-regulated 
behaviours and withholding the tokens at scheduled times when behaviours were 
inappropriate resulted in a substantial reduction of violent episodes (Manchester, 
Hodgkinson & Casey, 1997). 
 
8.4  Limitations 
There are several limitations to the current research. The use of university 
students as a sample, while providing some evidence of prefrontal dysfunction within 
a subclinical population, restricts external validity. Similar research using a wider 
range of participants from the general community is needed to overcome this issue.  
This study used traditional neuropsychological tests which are believed, based 
on lesion and neuroimaging studies, to reflect brain dysfunction in specific areas. 
However, it is acknowledged that such measures cannot be attributed specifically to 
one region. Rather, the successful completion of such tasks depends on a wide range 
of brain regions which are intrinsically associated with each other. Further research 
using new functional and structural neuroimaging techniques will contribute to a 
greater understanding of the neural underpinnings of cognitive abilities and 
consequently to the knowledge of brain-behaviour relationships. Furthermore, while 
this research has investigated cognitive abilities thought to be associated with aspects 
of the prefrontal cortex, it is difficult to make causal commentaries about cognition 
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and structure in the absence of specific neuroimaging data. In the absence of these 
data, future studies would be strengthened by the assessment of specifically 
aggressive individuals using neuroimaging techniques. 
 
8.5  Conclusion 
In conclusion, this study provides some preliminary evidence for separable 
roles of regions of the prefrontal cortex in impulsive- and premeditated-aggression. 
The results suggest that impulsive-aggressive individuals demonstrate impairment 
across a wide range of executive domains, including verbal fluency, cognitive 
flexibility, planning, problem-solving and inhibition suggesting potential dorsolateral 
prefrontal dysfunction in impulsive-aggressive individuals. This is consistent with 
data demonstrating significant correlations between neuropsychological measures of 
frontal lobe function and impulsive-aggression in incarcerated samples and head-
injured samples. In contrast, premeditated-aggressive individuals, while not 
presenting with executive impairment, attribute greater levels of hostility to neutral 
faces of emotion, abilities of which are predominantly mediated by the orbitofrontal 
region of the prefrontal cortex.  
 These findings suggest distinct cognitive processes between impulsive-
aggressive individuals and those whose aggressive behaviour is premeditated in 
nature. Furthermore, the results have helped to delineate the hypothesised relationship 
between prefrontal functioning and antisocial behaviour. While previous research has 
suggested a relationship between orbitofrontal dysfunction and impulsive antisocial 
behaviour, the current results indicate that such relationship does not pertain to 
aggressive behaviour more specifically. Rather, impulsive-aggression in a subclinical 
population appears to be mediated by primarily the dorsolateral region of the 
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prefrontal cortex, while premeditated-aggression may be related to dysfunction in the 
orbitofrontal cortex through its involvement in emotion recognition.  
While such theories are preliminary, it is hoped that knowledge gained from 
this study will encourage further research into the cognitive processes of aggressive 
individuals in a non-clinical population. Further investigations will enhance the 
understanding of the cognitive and social-perceptual underpinnings of aggression and 
may be used to better inform contemporary intervention strategies for aggressive 
behaviour. 
In light of these findings, it is important to note that such conclusions 
regarding the role of the prefrontal cortex in aggression are simplistic. Such results do 
not suggest that the dorsolateral and orbitofrontal cortex areas are the only cortical 
areas involved in the propensity for impulsive- and premeditated-aggression. These 
specific brain regions are richly connected with other neural regions, cortical and 
subcortical. Thus it may be the modulation between these identified brain regions that 
increases the susceptibility to aggressive responding. 
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Appendix B: Information Sheet for Study 1 
 
Research Project on Personality Differences  
Information Sheet for Participants 
 
This research is about personality and behaviour and will investigate the ways in which 
people with difference personality styles differ and how these differences impact on 
information processing. The research is being conducted by Sarah Haberle, a PhD student, 
under the supervision of Dr Frances Martin and Dr Clive Skilbeck. This research is primarily 
interested in group data. Individual results will not be identifiable at any stage of the data 
analysis and reporting.  
 
Based on your responses to a questionnaire completed in your first year psychology prac 
class, you have been invited to take part in further stages of this research project.  
Participation in this project will involve some very simple procedures.  If you have any 
questions about the nature of the study, please feel free to ask at any stage.  Participation is 
completely voluntary, and you may withdraw at any time without penalty. It is up to you 
whether or not you wish to take part. If you choose to participate, there are several activities 
that you will be asked to complete.  These are detailed below. 
 
Firstly, you will be asked to complete a pattern recognition task, which consists of viewing a 
series of cards with a particular pattern printed on them. You are required to guess the pattern 
presented on the following card. Accuracy will be recorded on this task. 
 
Secondly you will be asked to complete a simple verbal task which requires you to generate 
as many words as possible in one minute beginning with a specific letter. There will be three 
trials in this task and your performance will be indexed by the number of words produced. 
 
The third task comprises of five separate conditions which involves joining a sequence of 
numbers and/or digits in a specific order as quickly as possible. 
 
The fourth task is a computerised game which requires you to move five rings which differ in 
circumference from one rod to another rod according to certain rules. Performance is indexed 
by the number of moves taken to produce the stacking configuration. 
 
The fifth task is also computerised and involves watching for and responding to certain 
colours and words. This is a very simple task and you should be able to complete it even if 
you do not have any previous experience with computers or video games. Reaction time and 
accuracy will be recorded on this task. 
 
The sixth task requires you to provide oral definitions for words which the experimenter 
states. 
 
Finally, the seventh task is composed of two conditions. On both subtests, the experimenter 
will read aloud a series of numbers. For the first condition, you are required to repeat the 
number sequence in the same order as presented. For the second condition, you are required to 
repeat the number sequence in the reverse order. 
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Following the completion of these tasks, you will be asked to complete two questionnaires 
relating to different aspects of personality and behaviour. 
 
Completion of these tasks and questionnaires will take approximately one hour. You will 
receive one hour course credit upon the completion of all tasks and questionnaires. 
 
Your personal data which was obtained from the screening questionnaire will be kept in a 
coded form and the information linking these codes to individuals will be securely stored in a 
locked filing cabinet. Personal contact information will be destroyed after the completion of 
data collection. The information obtained from testing will be stored in a locked filing cabinet 
for a minimum of five years, accessible only by the investigators identified below. Results 
will be presented and publicised, however no results will involve identification of individual 
participants in any way, as this research is purely interested in group data. Please note that 
subsequent to the project you will be given a full debriefing on the project. 
 
Your participation in this project is entirely voluntary, and evidenced by signing a consent 
form. You can, in any case, withdraw from the project at any time during your participation. 
 
This research project has the approval of the Human Research Ethics Committee (Tas) 
Network and the School of Psychology.  If you have any concerns of an ethical nature or 
complaints about the manner in which the project is conducted, please contact the Executive 
Officer of the Network, Ms Nadia Mahjouri (6226 7479). Alternatively, you may prefer to 
discuss any concerns confidentially with a University Student Counsellor, who are located on 
the top floor of the TUU building and can be contacted on 62 262697.   
 
This project will be conducted by Sarah Haberle as a component of her PhD in Clinical 
Psychology, and is to be supervised by Dr Frances Martin and Dr Clive Skilbeck who lecture 
within the School of Psychology.  Please keep this information sheet, and if you have further 
queries please call Sarah Haberle (62262260). A summary of the results of the project will be 
available on the School of Psychology website at year end. 
 
Thank you. 
 
Sarah Haberle (PhD student) 
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Appendix C: Consent form for Study 1 
 
Research Project on Personality Differences 
 
Statement of Informed Consent 
 
 
Participants:  Please read, sign and date this form. 
 
I have read and understood the information sheet for this research.  The nature and 
possible effects of the research, and the activities that I will be involved in have 
been explained to me.  I understand that my participation in this project will involve 
completing a series of different tasks, involving computer tasks, verbal tasks, and 
pattern recognition tasks.  I understand that these tasks should not be distressing in 
any way, that the tasks will be explained in a way that I can understand, and that 
anonymity will be assured at all times.  Any questions that I have asked have been 
answered to my satisfaction, and I am aware that I may contact the researchers if I 
have further queries or concerns.  I also understand that I can withdraw from the 
research at any time without prejudice, and that I will have access to a copy of the 
research report on its completion if I so wish.   
 
I, ………………………………………………..(your name), hereby consent to 
take part in this research and agree that data gathered for the research may be 
published, provided that my identity is not revealed. 
 
 
....................................................................................................... 
 
(Signature of Participant) 
 
Date  __/__/20 
 
 
To be filled in by researcher at time of assessment: 
 
I have explained this research to ..............................................……….. 
(participant‟s name).  I believe the consent is informed and that he/she understands 
the implications of participation and that he/she may withdraw at any time without 
prejudice. 
 
 
................................................................................................... 
 
(Researcher‟s Signature) 
 
Date  __/__/20 
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Appendix D: Facial stimuli from Ekman and Friesen’s (1976) collection used for 
the emotion recognition task 
 
Aggressive Faces 
EM5-14; JJ3-12; MF2-7; MO2-11; NR2-7; PE2-21; SW4-9; WF3-1 
 
Disgusted Face 
EM4-17‟ JJ3-20; MF2-13; MO2-18; NR3-29; PE4-5; SW1-30; WF3-11 
 
Frightened Faces 
EM5-21; JJ5-13; MF1-26; MO1-21; NR1-19; PE3-21; SW2-30; WF3-16 
 
Happy Faces 
EM4-7; JJ4-7; MF1-6; MO1-4; NR1-6; PE2-12; SW3-9; WF2-12 
 
Surprised Faces 
EM2-11; JJ4-13; MF1-9; MO1-14; NR1-14; PE6-2; SW1-16; WF2-16 
 
Sad Faces 
EM4-24; JJ5-5; MF1-30; MO1-30; NR2-15; PE2-31; SW2-16; WF3-28 
 
Neutral Faces 
EM2-4; JJ3-4; MF1-2; MO1-5; NR1-3; PE2-4; SW3-3; WF2-5 
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Appendix E: Facial stimuli from Ekman and Friesen’s (1976) collection used for 
the aggression rating task 
 
Aggressive Faces 
EM5-14; C2-12; CS2-8; JJ3-12; MF2-7; MO2-11; NR2-7; PE2-21; SW4-9; WF3-1 
 
Disgusted Face 
EM4-17; C1-4; CS2-25; JJ3-20; MF2-13; MO2-18; NR3-29; PE4-5; SW1-30; WF3-
11 
 
Frightened Faces 
EM5-21; C1-23; GS1-25; JJ5-13; MF1-26; MO1-21; NR1-19; PE3-21; SW2-30; 
WF3-16 
 
Happy Faces 
EM4-7; C2-18; GS1-8; JJ4-7; MF1-6; MO1-4; NR1-6; PE2-12; SW3-9; WF2-12 
 
Neutral Faces 
EM2-4; C2-3; GS1-4; JJ3-4; MF1-2; MO1-5; NR1-3; PE2-4; SW3-3; WF2-5 
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Appendix F: Information sheet for Study 2 and Study 3 
 
Research Project on Personality Differences  
 
Information Sheet for Participants 
 
 
This research is about personality and behaviour and will investigate the ways in which 
people with difference personality styles differ and how these differences impact on 
processing of social information. The research is being conducted by Sarah Haberle, a PhD 
student, under the supervision of Dr Frances Martin and Dr Raimondo Bruno. This research is 
primarily interested in group data. Individual results will not be identifiable at any stage of the 
data analysis and reporting.  
 
Based on your responses to a questionnaire completed in your first year psychology prac 
class, you have been invited to take part in further stages of this research project.  
Participation in this project will involve some very simple procedures.  If you have any 
questions about the nature of the study, please feel free to ask at any stage.  Participation is 
completely voluntary, and you may withdraw at any time without penalty. It is up to you 
whether or not you wish to take part.  
 
If you choose to participate, there are several activities that you will be asked to complete.  
These are detailed below. 
 
You will be asked to sit in front of a computer screen and complete a simple computerised 
game involving watching for and responding to target items on the screen.  This is a very 
simple task and you should be able to complete it even if you do not have any previous 
experience with computers or video games. Reaction time and accuracy will be recorded on 
this task. 
 
Next, you will be asked to complete a mock gambling task. This task involves selecting cards 
off one of four decks which may yield either a high or low reward or high or low punishment. 
The measure for this task is the amount of money you have at the end of the task. 
 
The third task requires you to discriminate and respond differently to a series of letters and 
numbers shown on the screen using various keys on the keyboard. Reaction time and accuracy 
will be recorded on this task. 
 
The fourth task requires you to view a series of faces displayed on the screen. After viewing 
each face, you will be asked to rate each face with respect to provided adjectives.  
 
For the final task you will be asked to view a series of emotional faces and state which 
emotion the face is displaying. 
 
Following the completion of these tasks, you will be asked to complete three questionnaires 
relating to different aspects of personality and behaviour. 
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Completion of these tasks and questionnaires will take approximately two hours. You will 
receive two hours course credit upon the completion of all tasks and questionnaires. 
 
Your personal data which was obtained from the screening questionnaire will be kept in a 
coded form and the information linking these codes to individuals will be securely stored in a 
locked filing cabinet. Personal contact information will be destroyed after the completion of 
data collection. The information obtained from testing will be stored in a locked filing cabinet 
for a minimum of five years, accessible only by the investigators identified below. Results 
will be presented and publicised, however no results will involve identification of individual 
participants in any way, as this research is purely interested in group data. Please note that 
subsequent to the project you will be given a full debriefing on the project. 
 
Your participation in this project is entirely voluntary, and evidenced by signing a consent 
form. You can, in any case, withdraw from the project at any time during your participation. 
 
This research project has the approval of the Human Research Ethics Committee (Tas) 
Network and the School of Psychology. Should you have any concerns, questions or 
complaints with regard to the ethical conduct of this research, please contact the Executive 
Officer of the Human Research Ethics (Tasmania) Network, on 6226 7479 or 
human.ethics@utas.edu.au. Alternatively, you may prefer to discuss any concerns 
confidentially with a University Student Counsellor, who are located on the top floor of the 
TUU building and can be contacted on 62 262697.   
 
This project will be conducted by Sarah Haberle as a component of her PhD in Clinical 
Psychology, and is to be supervised by Dr Frances Martin and Dr Raimondo Bruno who 
lecture within the School of Psychology.  Please keep this information sheet, and if you have 
further queries please call Sarah Haberle (skh@utas.edu.au, 6226 2260), Dr Frances Martin 
(F.Martin@utas.edu.au, 6226 2262) or Dr Raimondo Bruno (Raimondo.Bruno@utas.edu.au, 
6226 2240). A summary of the results of the project will be available on the School of 
Psychology website at year end. 
 
Thank you. 
 
Frances Martin (Chief Investigator)    Sarah Haberle (PhD Student) 
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Appendix G: Consent form for Study 2 and Study 3 
 
Research Project on Personality Differences 
Statement of Informed Consent 
 
Participants:  Please read, sign and date this form. 
 
I have read and understood the information sheet for this research.  The nature and 
possible effects of the research, and the activities that I will be involved in have 
been explained to me.  I understand that my participation in this project will involve 
completing a series of different tasks, involving computer tasks, face rating tasks 
and questionnaires.  I understand that these tasks should not be distressing in any 
way, that the tasks will be explained in a way that I can understand, and that 
anonymity will be assured at all times.  Any questions that I have asked have been 
answered to my satisfaction, and I am aware that I may contact the researchers if I 
have further queries or concerns.  I also understand that I can withdraw from the 
research at any time without prejudice, and that I will have access to a copy of the 
research report on its completion if I so wish.   
 
I, ………………………………………………..(your name), hereby consent to 
take part in this research and agree that data gathered for the research may be 
published, provided that my identity is not revealed. 
 
 
....................................................................................................... 
 
(Signature of Participant) 
 
Date  __/__/2009 
 
 
To be filled in by researcher at time of assessment: 
 
I have explained this research to ..............................................……….. 
(participant‟s name).  I believe the consent is informed and that he/she understands 
the implications of participation and that he/she may withdraw at any time without 
prejudice. 
 
 
................................................................................................... 
 
(Researcher‟s Signature) 
 
Date  __/__/2009 
 
